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General principles of EU law have been used by the Court of Justice of the European 
Union since its inception. They have been attributed several functions, and their 
application reaches across all fields of EU law. Much has been written about individual 
principles, but the analysis of their application in combination with other legal sources 
has been neglected.  
This thesis aims at presenting a framework to study the relationships of different norms 
in the EU, having general principles as a reference norm. It is an enquiry on how certain 
general principles are applied in combination with provisions in Treaties, regulations 
and directives. The Court has, in great part, been responsible for the construction of 
these interactions; and the modes of operation used show another facet of a peculiar 
legal system. Many times studied from the perspective of a rigid hierarchical legal 
system, EU law is indeed much more complex, with its different sources assuming 
different possible combinations, which lead to different results.  
By deconstructing the existing pre-conceptions with regard to the categories and 
functions attributed to general principles of EU law, this thesis aims at showing that a 
broader theory relating to the interaction of these and other legal sources, and the impact 
and effects achieved therewith, is missing. As such, a new taxonomy, based on the 
modes of operation deployed in the use of these tools, is here proposed, in an attempt to 



















'An army of principles will penetrate where an army of soldiers cannot' 























maxima perfectio suae imperfectionis cognitio 
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A. Overview of the Topic 
General principles of European Union law have been eulogized and demonized in equal 
proportion due to their polemic use in the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the 
European Union (hereafter ‘CJEU’ or ‘the Court’). The European adjudicatory system 
presents, much like every other aspect in EU law, the peculiarities of a wholly new legal 
system, when compared to both the international and national planes. This new legal 
order, created by the union of countries with different legal traditions, required a strong 
interpreter, a discoverer, to build upon the wills manifested upon the creation of new 
rules. Such is the Court. Established in 1952, the ‘guardian of the Treaties’ seats in 
Luxembourg, and is composed of the Court of Justice, the General Court and the Civil 
Service Tribunal. As the main judicial body of the European Union, it is responsible for 
ensuring the uniformity in the interpretation and application of EU law throughout the 
Union. With that aim, it ‘reviews the legality of the acts of the institutions of the 
European Union, ensures that the Member States comply with obligations under the 
Treaties, and interprets European Union law at the request of the national courts and 
tribunals.’
1
 It thus assumes an extremely important role in the construction, maintenance 
and development of the legal system. However, with great power comes great 
responsibility
2
 - as well as, necessarily, heavy criticism.  
On the balancing of freedom and constraints on its adjudicatory role, general principles 
have many times tipped the scale of the Court towards what was labelled as unbridled 
expansionist aims
3
. Over the years, the Court pronounced estranged and greatly debated 
                                                 
1
 As stated in the Curia website: http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/jcms/Jo2_6999/  
2
 To cite Voltaire's commandement: 'un grand pouvoir impose une lourde responsabilité'. 
3
 See amongst others, Keeleng, D., ‘In Praise of Judicial Activism, but What Does It Mean? And Has the 
European Court of Justice ever Practiced It?’, in Scritti in Onore di G.F.Mancini (Curti Gialdino ed., 
Milano 1998); Mancini, G. F., ‘Attivismo e Autocontollo nella Giurisprudenza della Corte di Giustizia’, 
RDE 229 (1990); Cappelletti, M., ‘Is the European Court of Justice Running Wild?’, 12 EUR.L.REV. 3 
(1987); Editorial Comments, 'The Court of Justice in the limelight - again', CMLRev 45, 2008, 1571-
1579; Editorial Comments 'The scope of application of the general principles of Union law: an ever 
expanding Union?, CMLRev 47, 2010, 1589-1596; De Mol, M., 'The novel approach of the CJEU on the 
horizontal direct effect of the EU principle of non-discrimination: (unbridled) expansionism of EU law?', 




rulings, decisions which shaped the Union to its current state. In some of those rulings, 
it recurred to general principles. Borrowed from international instruments, national legal 
constitutions and traditions, or extracted from Treaty aims and objectives, they appear 
as an unavoidable feature of the development of European Union law, their use dating 
back to the very foundations of the latter. 
What can explain the Court's proclivity to use them? It should be noted that, from the 
outset, the Court was called upon to define the boundaries of the European 
Communities. The system was undeniably born with economic aims: the creation of an 
internal market, where the fundamental freedoms protected the individual as a factor of 
production and whose objective was close economic cooperation. The Court itself was 
designed to be the keeper of this order, not as a constitutional or supreme court of any 
kind. It was the system created by the Council of Europe the one designed to guarantee 
further protection, in the human rights field
4
. The development of the Communities and 
the movement of people, however, soon brought about further concerns, and the 
reaffirmation of the system implied the recognition of founding bases: primacy of EC 
law over Member States' law, and direct effect of the former, in certain situations, on 
the latter’s sphere. The strength of these claims necessarily implied that the system 
should give answers which extended to problems in areas other than the strictly 
economic, so as to avoid undermining by part of national laws and judiciary. Accepting 
the contrary would result in a complete failure of the system. 
The lack of protection of fundamental rights of the individual, that same individual who 
is exercising the economic freedoms and consolidating the internal market, soon 
became, however, a pressing matter, triggered especially by the intervention of the 
German and Italian Constitutional Courts
5
. While it is perhaps excessive to recall all the 
                                                 
4
 With the creation of the European Court of Human Rights, in 1959, as rightful guardian of the European 
Convention on Human Rights (Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms) 
5
 See the decision of the Bundesverfassungsgericht of the 18.10.1967, and the Frontini sentence from the 
Italian Constitutional Court, 27.12.1973. These were followed, respectively, by Solange (1974) and 
Granital (1984). On the matter, see De Witte, B., 'Community law and national constitutional values', in 
Legal Issues of European integration, 1, 1991, p.10/11: 'fundamental rights have been the primary focus 
of the 'rebellion' of the German and Italian constitutional courts against the Court of Justice in the 1970's. 
They were not prepared to accept the absolute supremacy of community law, as required by the Court of 
Justice, if that implied the sacrifice of fundamental rights' guarantees provided by their national 





facts, the idea is that it seems clear that the only possible response on the Court's part 
would have to be the one given: the EC system would necessarily encompass the 
protection of fundamental rights. General principles were, undoubtedly, the available 
legal sources to fill in this 'gap'. As such, since they form 'an integral part of the general 
principles of law, the observance of which it ensures'
6
, fundamental rights were 
protected. The rulings enacted in the line of Nold, Stauder, Internationale 
Handelsgeselschaft and Hauer are the precursors of this technique, the reliance on 
general principles of law, which would end up being perfected by the Court, and 
expanded to other areas
7
.  
It is easy to understand why the Court would have to state a fundamental rights vocation 
for EU law. Without it, it would never be capable to enforce the primacy it had 
pronounced as one of the main features of the system, or it would run the risk of 
countervailing. The choice of general principles as the tools to undergo this 'expansion' 
comes across as a product of the background in which it was set. Indeed, albeit the 
Court was a totally new institution, the judges composing it had deeply enshrined 
educational roots in the national legal systems they derived from. The continental civil 
law tradition was hence present, based on the premise that the system is to be regarded 
as complete, and that gaps are to be filled within the system, since the role of the judge 
is not to create law, but to interpret it
8
. The judges of the Court had to 'find' the general 
principles inherent to the system so as to complete it. This arguably happened by 
recourse to the values fostered and protected as general principles in the national 
constitutional laws and traditions of the Member States, together with inspiration taken 
from international instruments, such as the European Convention on Human Rights
9
.  
                                                                                                                                               
fundamental rights are part of the unwritten general principles of law which the Community institutions 
have to respect in their activities'. 
6
 Judgment in Nold v High Authority, 18/57, EU:C:1959:6 
7
 Ibid., and cases Stauder, 29/69, EU:C:1969:57, Internationale Handelsgesellschaft, 11/70, 
EU:C:1970:114 and Hauer, 44/79, EU:C:1979:290. 
8
 Article 5 of the Code Napoléon states: 'Il est défendu aux juges de prononcer par voie de disposition 
générale et réglementaire sur les causes qui leur sont soumises.' 
9
 This process of integration has frequently been equated with a constitutionalisation of the European 
Union legal order. See Andriantsimbazovina, J., 'Unité ou dualité du système de protection des droits 
fondamentaux de l'Union européenne depuis du Traité de Lisbonne?', in Mélanges en l'honneur du 





Nonetheless, the intricate patchwork of rules created needed connecting factors and the 
surpassing of difficulties and gaps. As such, beyond the acknowledgement of 
fundamental rights as general principles, other areas are equally important, with 
highlight to the area of administrative law. The Court has, in fact, expressly recognized 
a certain number of general principles of EU law: Rideau refers to the examples of good 
faith
10
, observance of the rights of defense
11
 and legal certainty
12 , 13
; Tridimas 
individualizes further the principles of proportionality
14
















, prohibition of unjust 
enrichment
22
 and, arguably, the precautionary principle
23
, ne bis in idem
24
 and 





Their use in the area of fundamental rights, however, due to its visibility (and the initial 
reluctance of the Court to tackle them) was particularly criticized, with blooming 
accusations of judicial activism, 'competence-creep' and attribution of horizontal direct 
                                                                                                                                               
constitutionalisation [de l'Union européenne] se traduit notamment par l'intégration progressive dans l'UE 
des valeurs véhiculées par la protection des droits de l'homme'. 
10
 See, namely, judgment in SNUPAT v High Authority, 32/58 and 33/58, EU:C:1959:18 
11
 See, namely, judgment in Compagnie belge d'assurances générales sur la vie and contre les accidents, 
27/69, EU:C:1969:56 
12
 See, namely, judgment in Neumann, 17/67, EU:C:1967:56 
13
 Rideau, J., Droit Institutionnel de l’Union européenne, 6
ème
 ed., LGDJ Eds., 2010, at p.248 
14
 See judgment in Vodafone and Others, C‑58/08, EU:C:2010:321, and Fédesa and Others, C‑331/88, 
EU:C:1990:391 
15
 See, amongst others, judgment in Sofrimport v Commission, C‑152/88, EU:C:1990:259, and judgment 
in Mavridis v Parliament, 289/81, EU:C:1983:142 
16
 See, amongst others, judgment in Brasserie du pêcheur and Factortame, C‑46/93 and C‑48/93, 
EU:C:1996:79 and, more recently, judgment in Köbler, C‑224/01, EU:C:2003:513 
17
 Tridimas, T., The General principles of EU law, 2nd edition, Oxford University Press, 2006 
18
 Judgment in Abad-Villanueva and Others v Commission, F‑23/06, EU:F:2011:149 
19
 Judgment in Klöckner-Werke AG v Commission, C-303/81, EU:C:1983:129 
20
 Judgment in Ferriera Valsabbia and Others v Commission, 154/78, 205/78, 206/78, 226/78 to 228/78, 
263/78, 264/78, 31/79, 39/79, 83/79 and 85/79, EU:C:1980:81 
21
 Judgment in IFG v Commission, 68/77, EU:C:1978:23 
22
 Judgment in Maxwell v Commission, F‑55/09, EU:F:2010:44 
23
Judgment in Alpharma v Council, T ‑ 70/99, EU:T:2002:210, and judgment in Agrarproduktion 
Staebelow, C‑504/04, EU:C:2006:30 
24
 Judgment in Limburgse Vinyl Maatschappij and Others v Commission, C‑238/99 P, C‑244/99 P, C‑
245/99 P, C‑247/99 P, C‑250/99 P to C‑252/99 P and C‑254/99 P, EU:C:2002:582 
25
 Judgment in Berlusconi and Others, C‑387/02, C‑391/02 and C‑403/02, EU:C:2005:270; judgment in 
Jager, C‑420/06, EU:C:2008:152 (especially at paragraphs 59 and 60) 
26
 As provided under the title ‘Principes Généraux du droit’ in the Digest of the CJEU’s jurisprudence, 





effect to directives, amongst others: the CJEU would be running wild
27
. Nowadays, 
there is arguably little space for such intervention. The system has become more mature 
and comprehensive, and European legislation has evolved to exhaustive levels, with 
regulatory instruments being enacted in almost all areas subject to the application of EU 
law. Nonetheless, general principles are still being used by the Court – and perhaps in a 
more creative way. It is precisely perhaps the increase in the number of legislative 
instruments, with detailed frameworks, the one dictating that the use of general 
principles has been unfolded in several different modes of operation. The ‘creative’ 
activity of the Court has guaranteed that general principles have still, notwithstanding 
the existence of other instruments, a role to play in the consolidation of the EU legal 
system. 
 Without any doubt, they are established and recognized as sources of European Union 
law. ‘Discovered’ by the Court, derived from the ‘national constitutional laws and 
traditions’, as well as international instruments, general principles of EU law are yet to 
reunite a real consensus as regards their true universal character and the way they are 
extracted from these sources. Albeit it seems clear that the Court should not have to 
                                                 
27
 See Conway, G., The limits of legal reasoning and the European Court of Justice, Cambridge/New 
York, Cambridge University Press (2012), at p.4: ‘The ECJ is widely noted for the creative nature of its 
teleological interpretation, and although the Court has often been strongly defended in the literature, its 
central role in developing the norms of EU law in a way that goes beyond just applying existing norms is 
hard to deny’; Herdegen, M., ‘General Principles of EU Law – the Methodological Challenge’, in Bernitz, 
U., Nergelius, J. And Cardner, C. (eds), General Principles of EC Law in a Process of Development, 
Kluwer Law International, Great Britain 2008, at p.344: ‘While hence being an indispensable instrument 
for establishing and maintaining the rule of law within the European Union (...) general principles of law 
may inadvertedly turn the ‘rule of law’ into a ‘rule of judges’, a gouvernement des juges’; Rasmussen, H., 
'Between Self Restraint and activism: a judicial policy for the European Court', ELRev, vol.13(1), 1988, 
28-38, at p. 77: 'the European Court went too far, too often. In defiance of much European tradition, the 
European court engaged in a teleological, pro-community crusade, the banner of which featured a deep 
involvement which led it to give primacy to pro-integrationist public policies over competing ones that 
were often (...) considered as meriting some protection'. On the 'defending' side, see Tridimas, T., ‘The 
European Court of Justice and Judicial Activism’, 21 EUR.L.REV. 199 (1996), at p. 209/210: 'The 
founding Treaties are moulded by teleology and the idea of incremental integration is expressly provided 
for in the EC Treaty. (...) The language of the Treaty is often unhelpful; teleological interpretation is 
particularly suited to the interpretation of the Treaties; and the Court exercises the functions of a 
constitutional court.' (...) One may venture to suggest that, in some cases, the reasoning of the Court is 
less than compelling. (...) But it is not correct to say that, by having regard to the objectives of the Treaty 
which seeks to further integration, the Court oversteps its power as a judicial body.'; and Arnull, A., 
'Judicial Activism And The Court Of Justice: How Should Academics Respond?', Maastricht Working 
Papers - Faculty of Law 2012-3, at p.25: 'Many of the decisions often criticised as activist were not 
reached contra legem, that is to say, by disregarding the express terms of the Treaties. What the Court 




resort to a ‘lowest common denominator’ technique, the fact is that the origin and 
legitimacy of certain proclaimed principles is questioned still
28
.  
At this point, it should come as no surprise that the topic of general principles of EU 
law has been academically dissected. These sources have been analyzed in relation to 
their nature and origin, their functions and categories, their importance in the 
fundamental rights field, their intrusive capacity as tools for judicial activism, amongst 
others. In the latest years, in view of the growing body of written rules, the literature has 
been particularly fierce in criticizing the ‘principle-based’ or 'principled' reasoning of 
the Court, questioning the legitimacy of a gap-filling which seems to go beyond the 
arguably existent lacunae
29
. Bearing this in mind, it is hard to see how any analysis 
could present novelties in the field. 
Even so, this work proposes a look at the thematic of general principles from perhaps a 
slightly different point of view, where a different taxonomy comes into play. Indeed, the 
chosen approach departs from the usual pre-conceptions used in the treatment of general 
principles; however, rather than focusing on particular general principles, it shifts the 
spotlight to the modus operandi, that is, when and where general principles are used in 
the reasoning of the Court, combined with other norms, and which are the effects 
achieved therewith. This thesis thus aims at creating a framework to study the 
interaction of legal instruments and the dynamics created therein, in view of providing a 
different look into the theory of legal sources of the EU. The norms of reference to 
assess the relationships between them are hence here general principles of EU law, and 
the interactions analyzed encompass those with Treaty provisions, as well as secondary 
EU law and national laws. 
                                                 
28
 Reuter points, making reference to the Algera case (judgment in Algera and Others v Assemblée 
commune, 7/56 and 3/57 to 7/57, EU:C:1957:7), that the Court reads such principles by analyzing rather 
'l'esprit des droits nationaux, leur oriéntation et leur évolution'. Reuter, P., 'Le Recours de la Cour de 
Justice des Communautés européennes à des principes généraux', in Mélanges offerts à Henri Rolin, 
Éditions A. Pedone, Paris, 1964, p.262-283, at p.273. 
29
 Amongst others, see Herzog, R. and Gerken, L., ‘Stop the European Court of Justice’, published on 
September 10, 2008 at 10:07 CET and available at http://euobserver.com/?aid=26714; Pollicino, O., 
‘Legal Reasoning of the Court of Justice in the Context of the Principle of Equality Between Judicial 




B. Project Relevance and Focus of the Research 
This thesis is not about general principles 'in general'. It is about the combination of 
these and other legal sources, in an attempt to expound an EU theory of legal sources. It 
started as a deep interest in the effect of general principles of EU law as created, or 
discovered, by the Court of Justice of the European Union in the area of fundamental 
rights protection and enhancement of European Union citizenship. It drifted into 
administrative law and employment law issues, having finally settled for a focal lens 
over certain phenomena related to the use of such tools in combination with other 
sources of EU law.  
Most of other works focusing on general principles of EU law have opted by presenting 





, start by presenting opening chapters on the origins, functions and categories 
of general principles, to then turn to more specific analysis of particular general 
principles of EU law, tracing the way their development took place in the case-law of 
the ECJ. The focal point of these analyses is on particular general principles of EU law, 
deemed especially important due to their expression in the case law of the Court and/or 
effects. By presenting the different cases and the way such principles have been shaped 
throughout the time, and in response to different situations, both authors have 
contributed for a thorough overview of the position general principles of EU law have 
occupied in the evolution of the legal system. 
While accepting the extreme importance of such approach and the deep contribution it 
has brought to the understanding of general principles as legal sources and crucial tools 
for the development of EU law, it is perhaps, at this point, worth adopting a slightly 
different perspective, in order to amplify the understanding of certain phenomena in EU 
law. My work hence tries to shift the focus of the analyses: rather than trying to isolate 
each general principle and the way it was developed, it deals with the different ways in 
which the Court has deployed general principles, with which objective it has done so, 
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and which are the effects achieved as a result. In view of the difficulties stemming from 
the terminology chosen by both the Court and the legislature, my aim was to find other 
ways to perceive these legal sources. This analysis brings dynamic elements of source 
combination, showing the proclivity general principles have to be used not only in a 
static top-down relationship, but in different combinations. Hence, the division I will 
use throughout this thesis takes into account the modes of operation adopted by the 
Court in the use of general principles. By taking each source on their own, I explore the 
complex combinations made thereof, reversing the traditional hierarchy considerations 
and exploring the complexity of the norms which lend themselves to an entwined 
application. 
Nevertheless, this does not mean that no part will be devoted to the basic concepts 
essential to understanding the matter. On the contrary, I believe it is essential to address 
the functions usually attributed to general principles, in order to contrast and align them 
with the modes of operation which will be presented. It will equally look at the 
categories in which traditionally general principles of EU law are divided. With regard 
to the latter, a caveat exists: this work does not adhere to any of the presented 
categories, nor does it purport to present a new, all encompassing, categorization. This 
can be explained by different reasons. In the first place, I believe that all the categories 
presented fail to consider certain aspects, which, as will be explored further, results in 
one principle belonging to more than one category at the same time. Secondly, I firmly 
believe that it is impossible to encompass general principles of EU law in closed 
categories, without considering the inter-changeability of roles, the evolution achieved 
through the case-law and the malleability these tools present as legal sources. These and 
other arguments will be explored in detail in Chapter I. 
What is the added value of this approach? This thesis is about the combination of legal 
sources in European Union law, with general principles serving as an epicentre for the 
analysis. As such, the focus lies on the different methods the Court uses in deploying 
general principles, or, if we prefer to call it so, the different ways general principles of 
EU law operate, instead of in particular general principles and their expression in the 
case-law. By exploring the interactions construed by the Court, I tried to depart from the 




Indeed, the EU legal system is composed of a myriad of sources, whose study has 
neglected to take into account much more than hierarchical relationships. The norms are 
presented in a rigid hierarchical set; the focus is on the application of EU law in a top-
down movement, even though the concept of hierarchy is blatantly omitted in the 
Treaties
32
. It is undeniable that hierarchy represents an extremely important feature in 
the system of the EU polity: EU law is generally seen as a hierarchical structure, albeit a 
sui generis one. With the basic premises for its operation being primacy and direct 
effect, EU law is read from the perspective of a structured polity, walking towards the 
creation of a federal system.  
Having been qualified as primary law
33
, general principles of European Union law have 
the capacity to trump inferior norms. This facet has been extensively analyzed in the 
doctrine, usually, and understandably, from the point of view of their primary law rank. 
Qualified as 'constitutional' principles
34
, they fulfilled a function inherent to the 
establishment of a hierarchy of norms in EU law. This hierarchical view reflects the 
traditional approach: general principles are seen as legal sources in their own right, as 
primary law. Albeit hierarchical relations can explain the affirmation of the system as a 
whole, it should be noted that the novelties brought about by the case-law have been, 
many times, connected to a different application of legal sources, whose combination 
results in different effects, effects which would not be achieved had each sort been 
applied individually. 
What this analysis strives to add to the theory of EU legal sources is thus something 
slightly different. While accepting the traditional approach, I believe that it is important 
to look at these legal sources (and others, surely) beyond their application in isolation. 
My suggestion is to take a different perspective which focuses on the combination of 
legal sources, rather than on each source by itself. To be more precise: general 
principles have been used in multiple ways, trumping secondary law, and imposing a 
primary law value interpretation. They have been used as seminal tools for judicial 
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review of national legislation, arguably their first and foremost primary function, and as 
hermeneutical tools to fill the 'gaps' of a system whose birth departed from both national 
and international law canons
35
. The theory of legal sources in EU law I purport to 
present goes beyond this: it looks at the functions that general principles perform, not 
only in their hierarchical prevalence, as primary law, but especially focusing on which 
other results can stem from their combination with written sources, and how this 
impacts on the development of EU law. As such, the aim is not to give an exhaustive 
account of all the possible general principles used in the reasoning of the Court, but 
merely on specific ways in some general principles operate in interaction with legal 
sources of different kinds, that is, how their individual application to a case is in fact 
different, and leads to different results, depending on which other element or norm they 
are connected to. The goal is to understand the combinations, and how the Court refers 
to certain principles to achieve a result that neither the principle nor the instrument at 
stake could achieve on their own.  
This choice was made, as mentioned, due to the difficulties lying on the definition of 
what can be considered or not to be a general principle, especially in light of the 
unwritten/written character of such legal sources, and the confusing terminology 
stemming from case-law and primary and secondary sources. On the other hand, in face 
of the impossibility of making one particular general principle correspond to a specific 
mode of operation, since, depending on the situation, underlying considerations and 
other legal sources at stake, the types of interaction vary greatly, this work does not 
achieve a mathematical formula which is all encompassing and will always point to the 
right result. 
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This analysis entails a brief look at the nature, terminology and functions of general 
principles of EU law, as developed both by the Court and academic scholarship. The 
following chapters will nonetheless follow a line of argument which is based on a 
methodological or operative aspect rather than an ontological one. Indeed, much has 
been said about the nature and sources of general principles, and their qualification is 
still heavily debated nowadays; nonetheless, it seems that what has been lacking in the 
approach taken in these analyses is a closer look at the mechanisms used by the Court 
so as to make general principles applicable, instead of the general principle per se. 
With this frame of reference, it will be shown that the traditional definition, categories 
and functions usually attributed to general principles of EU law are less than 
elucidating. The same goes for the terminology used, blurred in the case-law, legislative 
instruments and Charter of Fundamental Rights. Depending on the policy area 
concerned and the written instrument that supports its application, the same principle 
will be seen to achieve different results, and perform different operations. Particularly 
important is the recognition of fundamental rights as general principles, as stated by Art. 
6.3 TEU. The Charter, furthering the terminology difficulties in light of the codification 
of 'rights' and 'principles' will also be analyzed. It will moreover be defended that a 
special niche for the development of different modes of operation of general principles 
as fundamental rights seems to be that of employment and labour law; the reasons for 
this will be discussed further. 
The combination of legal sources assumes a peculiar role in the structure of EU law, 
especially as designed by the case law of the Court. Indeed, whilst hierarchy is an 
important factor in the establishment and development of EU law, other forms of 
combination of written and unwritten norms have equally allowed for a deepening of 
the EU legal system as a whole. The part played by general principles in these dynamics 
has a particular importance, since the modes of operation in which the Court has 
deployed them, in interaction with written provisions, have deeply fostered EU's 
integration, in light of a telos the Court itself has 'discovered' for EU law. In fact, as will 




interchangeable, with one becoming the other, and vice-versa, depending on the 
situation. The first have provided the latter with an 'operative' facet, allowing the pursuit 
of the aims of the Union.  
At this point, one should perhaps recall what this work is not about. This research is not 
about finding distributive justice, nor does it provide a normative approach to the 
Court's case law, aiming at proposing any type of solutions. It is not about fundamental 
rights, or European citizenship. It is especially not about judicial activism of the 
European Court of Justice. Having said so, this thesis might, and will certainly, touch 
upon some or all of those, since it endeavours at delivering a comprehensive approach 
to certain phenomena present in the rulings of the Court. In as much the ultimate aim of 
this thesis is to present a study of the ways in which general principles are used as tools 
by the ECJ, when combined with other (written) sources, and to propose a new 
taxonomy for such analysis. 
As regards the principles studied here, some caveats are in order. In the first place, 
albeit starting with the concept of the general principle and its categories and functions 
in EU law, as is explained throughout, focus is rather pointed at specific modes of 
operation. This means that this work does not follow a structure developed around 
particular principles - and that indeed there will be no extensive treatment of certain 
very important general principles of EU law, such as proportionality, subsidiarity, rights 
of defense, State liability, etc. Moreover, areas identified as core areas for the 
development of general principles, such as the common agricultural policy and 
competition law, are not extensively studied as such
36
. The lack of individualization of 
general principles will, however, be replaced by an individualization of the specific 
types of interaction found to exist between general principles and written legal sources. 
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D. The Contribution of General Principles to the Development 
of EU law 
The role of the Court of Justice is a factor which necessarily has to be considered in this 
work, as it has been a crucial actor in the integration of the European Union and its 
conception as a fully-fledged new legal system. Its legitimacy in this development, and 
the singular characteristics of its judicial adjudication, which are displayed namely in 
the use of general principles, prompts an inquiry to the very origins of the institution, so 
as to understand the way its own authority was established, and how it has changed and 
been consolidated in the more recent years. 
Indeed, when the Court was created in the cradle of the European Communities, the 
inspiration for the interpretation of the new emerging legal system was necessarily a 
product of the national formation of judges'. There was a need to build a certain body of 
legal tradition, which was necessarily inspired by the available national legal contexts. 
Moreover, it should be noted that, at the inception, the common law system was absent 
as a direct inspiration source, with influences being in particular provided for by the 
French and German legal systems
37
. This context explains equally the recourse to 
general principles as tools for legal reasoning. General principles were envisaged within 
the national legal systems as a way to guarantee that judicial adjudication was 
sufficiently grounded in the existing rules
38
. Indeed, the references found in the Code 
Napoléon show a clear intention of keeping general principles as mere gap-fillers, being 
that the gaps encountered in the provisions would have to be filled with recourse to the 
rules existing in the system and not 'invented' by the judges
39
. 
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The characteristics of the Communities, however, soon prompted the need for a deeper 
teleological approach to interpretation of the (then incipient) body of rules
40
. The Court 
has recurred to the objectives established by the founding Treaties so as to create a 
fully-fledged legal system, to which the Member States transferred part of their 
sovereignty
41
. In the attempt to concretize the new system as a complete one, the Court 
imbued it with constitutional character and established its own authority as the supreme 
court of the Union
42
. The evolution of the system shows deference on the part of the 
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European legislator, who integrated the changes sought by the jurisprudence in the new 
written rules, stemming from the Treaty revisions and new secondary legislation
43
. 
The consolidation of the doctrines was in part successful due to the strong attitude of the 
Court regarding its own authority and powers. This authority was developed much in 
line with that of a supreme court, which necessarily begs the comparison between the 
jurisprudential doctrine in the EU in a parallel way to that of a federal system, namely 
that of the United States. In fact, many of the developments the Court imprinted in the 
process of maturing EU law to have been inspired by pre-existing doctrines, and those 
connected to the operation of a federal system
44
. 
In the first place, the methods of interpretation employed ranged from literal to 
purposive interpretation, along with a clear integrative aim
45
. The expansive readings 
were often grounded on the need to guarantee the effectiveness and the unity of EU 
law
46
. On the other hand, in spite of not openly incorporating in its self-governing rules 
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a principle of stare decisis, it is quite clear that the Court established its authority 
solidly, in a self-justificatory movement. The Court used its own jurisprudential 




A doctrine of precedent? 
Some authors have interpreted this movement as the establishment of a precedent in the 
reasoning of the European Court of Justice. This is especially accurate if one is to 
understand precedent in a broad sense, namely as 'a prior judicial decision which has 
normative implications beyond the context of the particular case in which it was 
delivered', in the words of Komarék
48
. Jacob furthermore notes that this practice has 
been essential in shaping the EU's legal landscape; however, adding to the lack of 




What is apparent from the case-law is the Court's tendency to refer to its own rulings so 
as to solidify the proposed legal solutions, resting the legitimacy to tackle certain issues 
in the fact that they were previously addressed, even if in an incipient way, by previous 
rulings
50
. These broad references that the Court engages into have necessarily earned it 
fierce criticism, and necessarily brought accusations of judicial activism. 
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Notwithstanding, the Court has established its own role in consolidating the European 
legal order, along with strengthening its own position as interpreter, as provided for by 
the Treaty, a process which has been qualified as a 'self-sustaining' one
51
. 
The need for this sort of approach in EU law can easily be justified by the fact that the 
system was formulated as an incomplete, evolving one, with the early Treaties 
establishing but the bases of a new, fast-growing polity
52
. These conjectures are relevant 
for the topic at hand due to the deep entrenchment of these realizations with the use of 
general principles of EU law. Indeed, the latter acted as aggregating tools for the 
system, creating a bridge with national laws and international instruments, contributing 
to the enactment and consolidation of the doctrines spelled out by the Court
53
. 
On the other hand, the pluralism of values represented and the vague concepts these 
tools represent justify all the more the need for a type of precedent. The Court has long 
supported its use of general principles on the need to respect the rule of law; it is this 
same rule which requires consistent application of the decisions enacted by the judiciary 
to situations presenting unequivocal similarities
54
. General principles have played a 
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determinant role in this type of self-reference, guaranteeing the affirmation of the Court 
as the ultimate interpreter of European law, not only in what concerns the development 
of the legal system but also, and especially, in establishing this relationship vis-à-vis the 
national courts (ensuring the latter act equally as European courts)
55
. 
While it is well known that the EU was not built envisaging a federal structure, the 
developments explored above are inevitably connected with the perception of the Court 
of Justice as the closest form to a supreme court in what comes to the Union's legal 
order
56
. This is not clear from the outset, with the Court being seen as a ‘mix between 
an administrative Court focused on the control of the legality of the decisions and 
actions of the High Authority, and a classic international Court of Arbitration between 
the member states and the Community’
57
. However, soon these features gave place to 
the creation of a true supranational organ, aimed at developing the Treaties according to 
a true, common European law
58
. The Treaties provided the written constitution, 
completed by general principles which infuse it with meaning and fill in the lacunae 
which were not foreseen. 
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A constitutional court can base its expansive intervention on the need to apply and 
interpret the written Constitution
59
. This is exactly the vest the ECJ seems to have taken 
as its own
60
. Moreover, it has equally been defended that the preliminary ruling 




It is, in this aspect, hard not to draw a parallel with what can be observed in the United 
States legal system. Albeit that we are addressing very different structures - the USA 
being marked by its stable character and the EU as a still evolving polity, and 
configuring a form of international organization, unlike the first, amongst many other 
differences
62
 -, comparisons are inevitable, and the judiciary is not an exception. To 
take but two references, Riggs v Palmer, from the New York Court of Appeals, and 
McCulloch v Maryland, from the United States Supreme Court, provide examples 
which find very close expression in rulings of the European Court of Justice. This does 
not come as a surprise, since the founding fathers necessarily looked at the other side of 
the ocean for inspiration. In 1957, discussing this topic with Michel Gaudet, Swatland 
affirmed that the position of the Court had to be carefully considered, due to the absence 
of ‘any established code or system of jurisprudence for its law’
63
; Gaudet replied that 
the ‘various possible interpretations of the Treaty’ would have to be guided by the spirit 
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and aims thereof, so that the decisions of the Court could ‘make sense for the 
Community both in the present and in the long run’
64
. 
The lawsuit in Riggs v Palmer concerned the attempt, by the daughters of Mr. F. 
Palmer, to invalidate his will. Leaving them small legacies, this document established 
that the majority of Mr. Palmer's estate was to be inherited by his grandson, Mr. E. 
Palmer. Knowing this fact, and afraid that Mr. F. Palmer could change the will, the said 
grandson had murdered him. As such, in spite of being subject to criminal punishment, 
Mr. E. Palmer was not, by law, prevented from claiming the estate. The plaintiffs 
argued that allowing for the will to be executed as prescribed would result in Mr. E. 
Palmer being able to profit from a crime he committed. The Court responded 
affirmatively to the claim, using the values underlying the legislation as a tool to extend 
its scope, in a move they qualified as 'rational interpretation'. Indeed, in the words of the 
Court, 'it is a familiar canon of construction that a thing which is within the intention of 
the makers of a statute is as much within the statute as if it were within the letter; and a 
thing which is within the letter of the statute is not within the statute, unless it be within 
the intention of the makers. The writers of laws do not always express their intention 
perfectly, but either exceed it or fall short of it, so that judges are to collect it from 
probable or rational conjectures only, and this is called rational interpretation'
65
. 
This is a typical form of teleological or purposive interpretation, if read in comparison 
with the ones undertaken by the European Court of Justice. However, the NY Court of 
Appeals did go further, referring to the 'general, fundamental maxims of common law'. 
This can easily be equated with many of the cases which will be analyzed throughout 
this work, where a general principle underlying written provisions provided for an 
extensive reading, so as to guarantee the conformity of the law with the spirit envisaged 
by the Treaty makers. The 'gap' is filled with reference to a principle, understood as a 
value or objective to be protected under the system. 
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McCulloch v Maryland, on the other hand, provides a parallel to the implied powers 
doctrine, as developed by the European Court of Justice. Indeed, in this case the US 
Supreme Court was faced with a debate on the existence of the power, for the US 
government, to create a national bank. The Supreme Court decided this case by 
establishing that certain powers existent in the Constitution should be accompanied by 
powers of execution, or else the fulfillment of the aims pursued would be hindered
66
. It 
is easy to see a resemblance in this approach with the one undertaken in the implied 
powers case law
67
. Furthermore, the words of chief justice Marshall are quite marking 
as regards the nature of the mission of the Supreme Court: 'we must never forget, that it 
is a constitution we are expounding'
68
; the same can definitely be said about the work of 
the Court of Justice and its approach to the interpretation of the Treaties. Indeed, the 
Court did qualify them as the 'constitutional charter' of the Communities
69
. 
This type of expansive ruling, with a consolidating aim, is moreover visible in landmark 
decisions as Les Verts and Chernobyl, where the Court established core principles in 
what comes to institutional relations within the Union system
70
. As Komarék puts it, 
this type of interpretation is justified with the need to adapt the existing law so as to 
comply with the development of the society - this type of evolution hence seems to find 
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a particularly fertile ground in the development of the Communities, and then Union, as 
a substantive body of law and as a self-standing polity
71
. 
This is essentially proof that progressive changes undergone in the EC/EU are a natural 
evolution of a legal system. In fact, the reference cases presented from the United States 
are from the 19th century, which shows that the innovative aspects of the EC/EU are so 
due to its peculiar configuration, but that the decisions of the Court have been inspired 
in well-established polities. This points equally at the affirmation of the European Court 
of Justice as quasi federal constitutional court, whose jurisdiction impacts on areas such 
as division of competences, but equally on matters relating to private law affairs, as will 
be explored throughout this work
72
. This process of uniformisation of the interpretation 
of law, with inspiration being sought from different sources, has been essential for the 
unification and integration of the European legal order: 'like Augustine, the ECJ may 
rely upon consensus among the different versions to uncover outliers that probably have 
simply gotten the point wrong, or it may attempt to find various threads running through 
the different versions which, taken together, suggest an underlying purpose behind the 
legislation'
73
. This underlying purpose, which the open texture of general principles 
assists in developing, has thus provided the Court with the power to create, develop and 
consolidate the EU as a legal system. 
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Cuyvers has argued that indeed there seems to be an approximation of systems, one 
which would render the EU closer to the form of a 'modified confederacy'
74
. The use of 
general principles appears here as a relevant tool for the convergence of systems, since 
they endow the Court with the flexibility to address numerous issues with a 
constitutional framework. Indeed these tools foster the interaction of legal sources at the 
various levels of EU law, favouring the interpenetration of primary and secondary law, 
as well as inserting considerations deeply connected to the national legal systems of 
Member States, binding the system altogether. This thesis hence purports to provide an 
overview of the systemic way in which general principles of EU law operate. 
E. Approach and Methodology 
With regard to the first, this analysis focuses on the case-law of the European Court of 
Justice, along with some cases of the General Court. It will essentially look at the mode 
of operation of general principles in rulings when combined with directives, regulations 
and, sometimes, with Treaty provisions. The aim is to keep the analysis grounded on a 
very analytical approach to the text used in the rulings, as well as the interpretation 
provided to the written instruments which come into play in combination with general 
principles.  
In terms of methodological concerns, further explanation is due. As was said above, 
there are several issues concerning the use of general principles, what implies enormous 
difficulty in tackling them separately. Moreover, since the analysis is based on case-law, 
choices had to be made in relation to the sample cases - and choosing such a sample is 
made especially difficult due to the lack of coherent terminology in both written 
instruments and rulings of the Court. This dictated that the analysis could not be based 
on the choice of a particular general principle of EU law, nor in the use of certain words 
or expressions by the Court. 
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The cases were rather chosen in function of the mode of operation in question: by 
isolating different combinations of general principles with written instruments and their 
effects, throughout different areas and situations under EU law. The results produced 
and the reasoning behind them are thus the focus; consequently, and although from the 
text it will result that there is a special emphasis on the general principle of equality and 
non-discrimination, due to the multitude of its particular expressions, several general 
principles will be analyzed, without a particular order of precedence that not that 
imposed by the interaction at stake. 
The approach will focus with particular acuity on issues of terminology, logical 
sequences in reasoning and the connexion discovered, or created, between general 
principles and written legal sources. The delimitation of the concept of general principle 
and the consideration of the ways in which the Court has used such tools would not be 
complete without a legal theory approach. I will thus recur to the basic definitions of 
principle and rule, together with their scope of application, and question whether the 
presented traditional theories fit the peculiar way in which these concepts have been 
developed in EU law. Here, I must, however, introduce again a caveat: while I 
recognize the value of such theories and their necessity in conceptualizing the dynamics 
present in any legal system, I feel their applicability in a system such as the EU legal 
system can present limitations which would not arise if the context was that of a 
national legal system, or the traditional international relations plane. This is particularly 
blatant when one attempts to transpose the 'balancing' exercise inherent to the use of 
'principles' or 'standards', as opposed to rules, to the reasoning of the Court of Justice. 
Indeed, mathematical forms seem to fall short of explaining the phenomena observed, 
especially when general principles are deployed. The complexity and primary law value 
of the latter, considered together with the specificities their application entails, dictates 
that the principled reasoning of the Court cannot entirely follow the traditional legal 
theory approach to this distinction. 
Moreover, it should be noted that there will be principles, and case-law developments, 
which will stray also from the types of interaction individualized throughout this work. 
This is especially so due to the inconsistencies in the terminology used, along with the 




the Court's rulings are a process in constant evolution, as is the integration of the 
European Union. That implies that this work cannot provide a final word on the topic, 
since new cases will surely be added to the presented modes of operation, or even 
demand the 'creation' of new ones. 
F. Structure and Outline 
This thesis will be structured around six main chapters. The first one will look at the 
concept of general principle in EU law. With the topic of this thesis being developed 
around this concept, it seems necessary and essential to attempt a delimitation of what 
can be considered a true general principle of EU law. The definition will hence take into 
account the case-law and academic literature, equally presenting the categories in which 
such tools are usually compartmented, as well as the functions they are to perform in the 
EU adjudicatory system. These do not seem conclusive, however, which is the reason 
why chapter two will focus on issues of terminology. This, as will be seen, represents 
one of the major difficulties tied with this research, since very different tools have been 
labelled, in the rulings and in legislation, as general principles, whilst not all of them 
present the characteristics the very Court claims as essential. The second chapter will 
hence analyze different layers of general principles in EU law, considering whether they 
may correspond to distinct functions and hierarchical levels.  
The differences found in this chapter will point at the impossibility to rely in either the 
categorizations proposed in the first chapter or the expressions used. As such, chapter 
three will be devoted to the pivotal role that general principles have had in the 
development and consolidation of the different dynamics at play in EU law, through the 
case-law of the Court of Justice. After having broken the concept of general principle of 
EU law into its possible meanings, the idea shaping this chapter is to deepen the 
understanding of the correlation of general principles and other essential features in the 
development of EU law. Legal theory concepts will be borrowed as a departing point in 
the case law analysis, so as to show that general principles of EU law seem to have a 
very specific configuration within the system, especially in the way they are deployed 




principles are used, and hence the analysis of the combination of norms patent in the 
interpretation of the legal system. 
This chapter will thus serve as an opening for the subsequent ones, which will isolate, 
after the general considerations above, cases of specific application of general principles 
in interaction with other sources. The classification and separation proposed do not 
intend to put forward a closed system of sealed categories; rather contrarily, they 
purport to organize the taxonomy present in EU law at the moment, in order to surpass 
the difficulties brought about by terminological uncertainty. As a consequence, it should 
be stated from the outset that the intention of this work is not to fit all general principles 
of EU law in the three categories proposed: while it does make sense to analyze them 
with those categories as a departing point, there are principles whose use does not fit in. 
As such, the taxonomy presented should be considered flexible and open, admitting 
exceptions, as this work also tries to show from the outset. The typologies of interaction 
will hence be analyzed in the following three chapters of this thesis.  
Chapter four will lay down the type of interaction which would fit more commonly with 
the so-called traditional view of general principles of EU law. It will explore general 
principles of EU law as tools for interpretation, exercising the functions both doctrine 
and jurisprudence have recognized them to be endowed with. The analysis therein 
enshrined focuses on how the interaction of general principles of EU law and written 
instruments operates in a way which affects the scope of application of EU law with 
regards to the area or subject matter covered.  
Moving to the second mode of operation identified, chapter five will look at the same 
phenomenon, but with the impact being achieved on the relationships covered. This will 
represent the more controversial use and what many have labelled as the core, 
competence-creep, function of general principles in the case law of the Court of Justice. 
The matter raises, as a side issue, the possibility for horizontal direct effect of directives. 
As such, the Chapter shall start by giving a brief account of the possible effects of these 




Chapter six will focus on yet a different mode of operation. Here, the case law analyzed 
underlines the peculiar relationship achieved with national legislation, when general 
principles are applied in combination with EU secondary law, so as to structure the 
interaction with national rules/national authorities. This type of interaction will be 
analyzed mainly in two different areas. The first one will tackle the area of general 
principles of private law, with a particular focus on consumer protection and contracts. 
There is a special 'twist' in this area, since the reference to concepts extracted directly 
from national legal instruments imprints national law concepts more directly in the 
reasoning. 
Other area of particular interest for this mode of operation, and this interaction between 
European Union law and national law via secondary legislation, is that of criminal law. 
The Treaty of Lisbon has considerably extended the competences of the EU in these 
matters; however, as will be shown, the Court's case-law already took into consideration 
basic principles of individual protection, using them to restrict the reading of 
instruments of secondary law. Also in this area, consideration will be given to the nature 
of the general principles in question, and in which instruments the Court has anchored 







CHAPTER I: WHAT IS A GENERAL PRINCIPLE OF EU LAW? 
Foreword 
The aim of this chapter is to explore the concept of general principle of European Union 
law as it has been understood and used in the EU, especially by the European Court of 
Justice. A very common expression in case-law and textbooks, there is, however, little 
consensus on the exact contours of this legal figure, whose relevance is undeniable in 
the construction of the EU legal system.  
This chapter will start by looking into the definition of the general principle of EU law, 
its nature and features. Then, it will proceed to present the categories in which general 
principles of EU law are usually divided, by both the doctrine and judiciary, as 
encompassing the different types of elements to be considered within the format of 
these tools and, finally, the functions they serve and the rank they are attributed in the 
hierarchy of legal sources. It will then shift to a critical view of the existing problems 
through the structure outlined above. Indeed, before turning to issues related to the 
terminology used in case law, legislation and academic analyses, this work will consider 
whether the definitions provided indeed portray what general principles of EU law are. 
In addition, the categories in which these tools are usually divided will be challenged in 
light of their nature. 
A look into the functions and rank of general principles will equally point at the 
necessity to analyze the subject in a different way. This chapter, together with chapter 
II, purports to present the traditional approach to general principles and, while 
acknowledging its strengths, they will show the shortcomings and criticisms that can be 
pointed out, which this work intends to overcome by shifting the angle of the analysis. 
Notwithstanding this attempt, this analysis does not provide for exhaustive 'solutions' to 
the definition and categorization of general principles. It will rather aim at looking at the 
ways in which these tools are deployed, in an attempt to make sense of the results 
achieved by each mode of operation utilized by the Court in its principled reasoning. 




not fall within the categories presented. This hypothesis will be analyzed further in 
chapter II. 
1.1 The traditional definition of General Principles 
To understand the role of principles as interpretative norms and their concrete mode of 
operation in the rulings of the CJEU, one is compelled to start from the very basics and 
ask a seemingly simple question: what is a general principle of law? Such a concept, 
with its varied categories, functions and volatile character, is in fact difficult to grasp in 
its full meaning. 
In the Eur-Lex website, general principles are presented as part of the 'unwritten sources 
of European law having judicial origin', which are 'used by the Court of Justice as rules 
of law in cases where the primary and/or secondary legislation do not settle the issue'. It 
is furthermore noted that fundamental rights are recognized by the Court as general 
principles and 'are gradually becoming elements of primary legislation'
75
. The first 
elements of this definition are hence that these instruments are 'unwritten' and 'sources 
of EU law'; it then proceeds to explore the role principles play in the system. It is quite 
tempting (and it is often the approach followed
76
) to define general principles with 
reference to the functions they fulfill, equating their importance namely with that of 
their gap-filling aptitude. Nonetheless, I will try to separate both and highlight the 
characteristics of these norms and the categories in which they are divided, before 
entering the realm of their functions.  
Basedow addresses general principles of EU law departing from their unwritten 
character, stating that they are 'rules' which are not contained either in the Treaty or 
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secondary legislation of the EU
77
. De Witte equally qualifies them as 'unwritten' 
norms
78
. While accepting that the lack of positivation of general principles might have 
been a distinctive factor in the annals of EC law, the fact is that, nowadays, references 
in writing to these tools have been largely multiplied. In spite of the scarce Treaty 
references, stating that general principles are unwritten appears to be a legal fiction: 
most of them have been expressly referred to in the case-law of the Court, in addition to 
the several mentions contained in secondary legislation. This cannot, thus, be presented 
as a decisive characteristic for the definition of general principles of EU law.  
Morvan defends that 'principles come from scattered texts or upper-values pre-existing 
in a positive law, of which they extract and write the reasoning, the ratio legis'
79
. In the 
international plane, general principles are expressly recognized as legal sources of law, 
according to article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice
80
. This seems 
like a more feasible departure point for the analysis of general principles of EU law: 
their origin and status as legal source. 
In the European context, they have served to transport the fundamental values of the 
legal systems adhering to the Union from the national level to this supranational, quasi-
federalist, form of legal system. Usually conceived as general and vague propositions, 
they are imbued of the firmest beliefs underlying the legal systems, hence providing the 
(new) legal system formed with the Treaty of Rome with the legitimacy and acceptance 
it needed. Indeed, their roots being anchored in both the legal systems of the Member 
States, and widely recognized as international law tools, it is not surprising that also the 
European Court of Justice has adopted their use from the beginning. More surprising is 
perhaps the little mention these tools deserve in the Treaties. In fact, in spite of 
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recognizing the 'values' of EU law and objectives it purports to achieve
81
, the references 
to general principles as sources of law are scarce. Express references can be found only 
in article 6.3 TEU, on fundamental rights protected as general principles of EU law, and 
article 340 TFEU, on non-contractual liability of the EU. Both these provisions indicate 
an anchoring of these principles in the national constitutional laws and traditions of 
Member States, as well as international instruments to which the EU is part.  
They are, however, 'exotic beings'
82
 in EU law, assuming a particular configuration, 
intrinsically connected to the sui generis character of the legal order they intend to 
shape. In fact, they are both different from international law principles as they derive 
from national law principles. Here lies one of the many peculiarities of EC/EU law: 
general principles which, albeit inspired by other sources, became original to its 
configuration, due to the formulation used by the Court. They have contributed to the 
creation of a teleological basis for the legal system, one which, in light of the case-law, 
progressively became independent from the existing structures belonging to the 
Member States. General principles seem to have imbued the system with fundamental 
grounding 'pillars' which stemmed from other instruments and legal orders; however, 
these 'Trojan horses'
83
 have served not only as a vehicle for other legal sources to make 
their way into the system, but also became an important legal source of their own, 
putting the emphasis on values other than those to be protected by the internal common 
market throughout the years. 
In conclusion, general principles of EU law are sources of law specific to the Union/EC 
system, which, in written or unwritten form, have been, due to their fundamental value 
and proneness to create commonalities, a strong vehicle for European integration.  
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1.2 Categories of General Principles of EU law: four, three, two...? 
As was referred above, the two references of general principles in the Treaty are 
contained in article 6 TEU, with respect to fundamental rights protected as general 
principles of EU law; and in article 340 TFEU, with regard to general principles 
common to the laws of the Member States in the establishment of non-contractual 
liability of the Union. These two areas are not, however, the only sectors of EU law 
where the Court of Justice has developed its general principles doctrine
84
. Under its 
sovereign competence to ensure 'the law is observed', the Court has used these tools in 
several areas of EU law, affirming their primary law value in the rulings and hence 
legitimizing the development of EU law achieved with it
85
.  
This wide-spread use justifies the many categorizations proposed by the doctrine. 
Simon divides general principles of EU law in four core categories: ontological (those 
constituting the nucleus of the sui generis EU legal system), axiological (underlying 
values of the Union), sectorial (circumscribed to certain areas of EU law) and 
instrumental (those guiding judicial reasoning)
86
. This classification appears to be too 
divisive, failing to grasp the flexibility inherent to general principles. Would using it 
mean that characterizing principles such as direct effect and primacy as 'ontological' 
would lead to excluding them as configuring 'axiological' and 'instrumental'? Such an 
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assumption would deprive principles from their eclectic character. Logically, this same 
objection applies to other principles. 
Another four-folded categorization is that proposed by Wiesbrock, who divides general 
principles into 'general principles of administrative and legislative legality', 'general 
principles based on the fundamental freedoms of the internal market', political rights of 
EU citizens and fundamental rights
87
. Albeit fairly different from the previous four 
categories presented, this too seems considerably divisive: although indeed general 
principles are often connected to fundamental freedoms, for instance, it is hard to see 
why the political rights of the European citizens would not be enshrined in the 
fundamental rights category. The first category, on the other hand, would fall flat from 
providing a comprehensive and encompassing approach to the general principles 
'developed' by the Court. 
Waelbroeck and Schermers, instead use three different categories which would embody 
all general principles. The first is of 'compelling' general principles, those stemming 
from natural law; the second, 'regulatory', those common to the laws of the Member 
States; finally, there would be 'indigenous' general principles, corresponding to the ones 
developed by Community law
88
. This categorization is very similar to the one proposed 
by Jean Boulouis
89
. Again, however, such classification seems to become too narrow to 
encompass the peculiarities of general principles. The 'regulatory' principles, for 
example, as developed by the jurisprudence of the Court, have the proclivity to become 
indigenous. Moreover, how can one define them as not compelling, as opposed to the 
first ones? 
Flaesch-Mougin synthesizes the categories of general principles of EU law in a different 
way. She refers to 'founding' principles, which would contain the principles connected 
to the functioning of the institutions. On the other hand, there would be 'sectorial' 
principles, 'open' principles and principles emanating from Member States. She adds to 
                                                 
87
 Wiesbrock, A., ‘Legal Migration to the European Union’ (cit. supra), at p.170 
88
 Schermers, H., and Waelbroeck, D., Judicial Protection in the European Communities, Europa Instituut 
University of Leiden, Kluwer Law, Netherlands, 1992, at p.27/28 
89
 Boulouis, J., Droit Institutionnel de L’Union Européenne, Domat Droit Public, Montchrestien, Paris, 




these different strands those principles which stem from the Court’s case-law
90
. It is 
nonetheless questionable that principles stemming from the Court’s case-law cannot 
equally be sectorial, open... or even borrowed from Member States’ laws and traditions, 
as the justification for general principles of EU law usually goes. Furthermore, take 
those principles which regulate the functioning of the institutions which are naturally 
sectorial, since they do not extend to the whole field of application of EU law. Their 
foundations, however, are many times rooted in the rulings of the Court, for which they 
would pertain to the last category as well. 
Tridimas suggests that the proposed classifications 'raise more questions than they 
answer', their limited value being attached to the 'relative character' of general 
principles. He then proposes a dual categorization: ‘principles which derive from the 
rule of law' and 'systemic principles which underlie the constitutional structure of the 
Community and define the Community legal edifice'. Advocate General Trstenjak, on 
the other hand, claims ‘a distinction can be drawn between general principles of 
Community law in the narrow sense, namely those which are developed exclusively 
from the spirit and system of the EC Treaty and relate to specific points of Community 
law, and those general principles which are common to the legal and constitutional 
orders of the Member States'
 91
. 
The latter two proposals are similar to those advanced by Pescatore, in the early 80's
92
; 
in a way, together with the unwritten or written character of such rules, this dual 
categorization allows for a clear line of analysis, while encapsulating the differences 
found between principles which are original to the 'new legal order' and those which are 
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adopted, and adapted, to fit it. However, it is clear from the list presented above that 
there is no real consensus on this matter. In my view, the division between principles 
native to EC/EU law and principles imported from Member States fails a priori. While 
the first are said to be fruit of its development and affirmation as an entity, it is 
undeniable that many of them are the result from adaptation of national legal principles 
to the specific characteristics of the EU legal system. Even today, the flux continues 
between the national concepts and European ones, with influences being noted both 
ways. These categories seem hence to be movable - which was especially visible in the 
primordial state of the European Communities, when the biggest source of inspiration to 
fill in lacunae were necessarily the legal systems of the Member States in face of the 
inexistent developed corpus of rules.  
On the other hand, if one were to take the difference which so often seems fundamental 
between written and unwritten principles to make this division, the obstacles are the 
same. Naturally unwritten principles lend themselves more easily to the general 
principle configuration due to the vague contours and configuration, left almost 
exclusively for the Court to inflate. However, this appears to be a mere legal 
construction, when looked at through the lens of development of the EU legal system. 
Many of the unwritten principles have progressively become codified, first by being 
qualified as such in the rulings of the Court, and then making their way into the Treaties 
and secondary legislation, having been 'adopted' in that form by the European legislator. 
Trying to maintain the qualification as a general principle of EU law attached to the 
written or unwritten character of the principles seems thus too feeble as a criterion, in 
light of the present stage of evolution of EU law. 
Whichever categories one decides to adopt, it remains indisputable that no such division 
can be deemed hermetic and all encompassing. This is one of the reasons this work does 
not profess to any of the suggested categorizations, supported by the belief that the 
characteristics that may define the inclusion of a general principle in one or the other are 
mutable, and hence not defining
93
. It is clear that the Court has developed principles as 
                                                 
93
 Indeed, any attempt of containing the diversity of general principles and their characteristics in 
hermetic ranks would result in voiding them of the flexibility essential to the role they play in the 





structural to the EU legal system, and, in conjunction with those which clearly stem 
from the Member States and are presented as such, such norms were progressively 
developed into the acquis communautaire, with the boundaries becoming blurred 
throughout the integration process. 
It should be noted, furthermore, that this jurisprudential intervention, legitimized under 
article 19 TEU and its guarantee of the rule of law, does not seem to entail the 
derivation of a lowest common denominator amongst the national systems, but rather a 
harmonization process
94
. In fact, the general principles of EU law ‘discovered’ by the 
Court, derived from the ‘national constitutional laws and traditions’, as well as 
international instruments, are yet to reunite a real consensus as regards their true 
universal character and the way they are extracted from such laws and traditions
95
. 
                                                                                                                                               
Communautaire’, (cit.supra), at p.290: 'si l'on veut cerner le sens et la portée des principes en droit 
communautaire et s'essayer à une reconstruction, il est impossible méthodologiquement de tenter de 
plaquer une homogénéité artificielle sur cette diversité essentielle. Tout essai de réduction à l'unité est 
voué à l'échec, à moins que l'on accepte de restreindre la portée des principes à une notion vaporeuse qui 
les viderait de toute signification opératoire.' 
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Albeit it seems clear that the Court should not have to resort to a ‘lowest common 
denominator’ technique, the fact is that the origin and legitimacy of certain proclaimed 
principles is questioned still. This can also explain that the inspiration may be derived 
from a mixture of concepts and values of different legal systems, which are then 
transformed into ‘topoi or interpretative criteria’, in a demonstration of a communitarian 
approach, which intends to be flexible and progressive
96
.  
1.3 Functions and Rank of General Principles of EU law  
General principles have been recognized in international law and throughout national 
legal systems as a generally accepted gap-filling tool. This is what could be called their 
'first' function, their aptitude to serve as tools for a process of judicial review of 
conformity of national laws or secondary law with primary EU law.  
Historically, it should be recalled that the use of general principles for this purpose 
meant that they were tools made available within the legal systems: inherent to the legal 
acquis and searching for system completing, they helped the judiciary look into 
solutions within the system. This was the aim they were endowed with in the early Code 
Napoléon
97
. It should, however, be noted that they were therein seen as a way to 
reinforce the all-encompassing character of the law and the impossibility, for judges, to 
go any further than the solutions proposed by the system itself. The filling of gaps was 
to be made in harmony with the system as a whole, not to go beyond it. This is the 
context to which the judges of the European Court of Justice belonged. General 
principles seem to serve as a tool for both consolidation and control, allowing the 
judiciary to integrate the legal system on the basis of the spirit of the system itself. 
                                                                                                                                               
method: do EU courts merely discover or ‘acknowledge’ principles that were so far unknown, or do they 
create new ones?’. 
96
 Beck, G., 'The Legal Reasoning’ (cit. supra), at p.196. See also Mayer, F., 'Constitutional 
comparativism in action. The example of general principles of EU law and how they are made—a 
German perspective', I•CON 11 (2013), 1003–1020, at p.1006: The formula “draws inspiration” used by 
the Court—the wording of article 6 TEU does not include that part of the CJEU’s concept—indicates that 
the CJEU does not engage in any kind of mathematical-empirical task.' and p.1008: 'What also appears to 
be obvious is that the CJEU cannot simply engage in a copy–paste effort. Typically, the CJEU will not try 
to transplant the member states’ doctrinal concepts of a given fundamental right'. 
97




Although their position in the hierarchy of sources of EU law is, in the view of some 
authors, still open to debate
98
, general principles of EU law are usually consensually 
attributed a tripartite set of functions
99
. Besides the already mentioned role as ground 
for judicial review, they are said to work as interpretation tools and as standards for 
EU/State liability
100
. This stems from the doctrinal analysis of the case-law of the Court 
and from the rulings themselves, along with the Opinions enacted by Advocates 
General. The recognition of their role in the review of validity of other measures and 
conformity of national legislation is, in fact, what could be labelled the 'historical' 
function of general principles or, if one prefers, the most recurrent 'mode of operation' 
in which these rules are triggered. Rideau states that principles form an integral part of 
the legality parameters to which the European Union judge refers in order to examine 




The interpretative function of general principles has, on the other hand, developed in 
line with the progressive European integration. It grew to encompass what would not 
traditionally be labelled as a ‘gap’, extrapolating those which would be considered the 
typical fields of application of EU law. Gap-filling is used whenever courts struggle to 
surpass lacunae in written law
102
. In such a case, both national courts and the 
International Court of Justice recognize these mechanisms as a legitimate way to find 
solutions which are not directly and expressly written. The legal system in question is to 
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be taken as a whole and the ‘gap’ is filled by recurring to its underlying aims and 
objectives, preventing courts from non liquet. 
Since European Union law is a product of a combination of Member States’ law and 
international law, it should come as no surprise that general principles appear equally as 
a source of international law. As academia notes, however, general principles do not 
materialize very often in the rulings of international courts, which seem to be reluctant 
to apply this source of law in detriment of the written rules
103
. It is hence argued that, 
whilst at international level general principles might have a more muted character and 
be applicable merely as a subsidiary source, that is not the case in what comes to 
European Union law.  
At EU level, general principles have their primary law status stemming from the Treaty 
provisions, and the interpretation made by the Court of Justice of national constitutional 
laws and traditions, as well as international instruments of which the Union is part
104
. 
Tridimas notes that, ‘in Community law their function goes further. They are (…) an 
integral part of the judicial methodology.’
 105
 It should be noted that a strong 
hierarchical component is present at EU level. General principles of EU law are 
certainly to be recognized as superior to secondary law. Their relationship with other 
primary law, however, is rather difficult to define. Many have argued that general 
principles have, undoubtedly, primary law rank. Nonetheless, in certain instances it has 
been observed that, when interacting with primary law, their position is not as clear cut. 
My claim is that it is so due to a failure to look at these tools in a dynamic way, rather 
than in a rigid interplay. These tools lend themselves to several modes of operation.  
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It has been argued that the need for gap-filling in the interpretation of the European 
legal system has progressively decreased from the moment of the foundation of the 
European Communities
106
. In their early birth, the Treaties were incipient and could not 
encompass the constant challenges created with the progressive opening of frontiers and 
movement of capital, services and people. The Court hence performed its integrator task 
and used general principles as interpretative tools in several fields
107
. It started by 
affirming the primacy and direct effect of EU law and went on to develop 
administrative law
108
 and create a catalogue for fundamental rights’ protection
109
, 
amongst others. This case-law illustrates precisely the claim that general principles were 
used, at least to some extent, to allow European law to be applied outside the fields of 
legislative competence
110
. On the other hand, some of the Court’s decisions have 
equally influenced the subsequent Treaty revisions in a decisive way
111
. And it is 
precisely the profusion of legislative texts nowadays – from the Treaties to the Charter 
of Fundamental Rights, encompassing also regulations, directives and other instruments 
– which dictates that the role of general principles, as understood traditionally, would 
tend to be exhausted, or at least extremely reduced. The modern tendency to written 
formalization of rules would necessarily reflect a decrease in the importance of these 
instruments, were they a mere gap-filling tool, taken in its literal sense. 
Nonetheless, the importance of general principles in the contemporary jurisprudence of 
the CJEU seems not to have been exhausted with the crystallization of rules. Indeed, 
general principles have often provided the anchor for the CJEU to base its rulings, 
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defying a literal wording of the Treaties: not as gap-filling instruments, but rather as an 
interpretative method used to go beyond the text in question. It is thus perhaps the 
amount of written instruments available nowadays which can explain the need to look at 
the way general principles operate in a different way, recognizing their role has shifted 
in accompanying the evolution of EU law. 
This work aims precisely at making sense of the taxonomies presented, as well as 
providing some alternative views on the way general principles are deployed in the 
case-law of the Court. However, there are limitations. Indeed, there seem to be certain 
principles which, even if characterized as such, and so called, do not seem to follow any 
of the modes of operation individualized in this work. Whichever the categorization 
followed, there seem to exist general principles of EU law which will have a standing of 
their own, with their particular configuration being developed within certain areas, in 
order to respond to the challenges raised therein. This is the notably the case of the 
precautionary principle, which, although characterized, in certain occasions, as a 
general principle of EU law, seems to have a distinct configuration – and, equally, mode 
of operating. 
1.4 The precautionary principle 
The precautionary principle has some particularities which give it an interesting position 
within the system. Effusively used by the Court in the areas of environmental law and 
healthcare, this principle seems to assume a different role from that of the principles 
analyzed in the section above. Nonetheless, it does not seem to qualify either as a 
general principle of EU law, albeit that has been the wording used by the General 
Court
112
. Looking at the case law might provide a better understanding of its 
characteristics and consequent rank
113
. The aim of this section is precisely to show that, 
even though the intention in this work is to be as inclusive as possible in the treatment 
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of general principles, there are certain figures which abide by different rules. The 
inclusion in this chapter was chosen precisely because the wording points at potentially 
the same instrument - but a look at the specificities in the case-law demonstrates we are 
in face of something else.  
1.4.1 The cases 
The Artegodan case, on medicinal products for human use, provides a particularly 
enlightening succession of arguments which relate to the features and scope of this 
principle
114
. The General Court started by stating that such a principle is binding. It 
further noted that, despite the fact that its mention in the Treaty is connected to the 
environmental policy, the principle is much broader in scope, extending to ‘all the 
Community’s spheres of activity’
115
. This explains its extension to the field of human 
health. The precautionary principle is then boldly characterized as a general principle of 
Community law, to be ‘regarded as an autonomous principle stemming from the Treaty 
provisions’ and, as such, requiring the competent authorities to act accordingly
116
. This 
case was later appealed – but the CJEU did not pronounce itself on the qualification of 
the principle. 
Merely by reading the above, the classification seems striking: it is qualified as 
‘autonomous’ and as a general principle of EU (Community) law. However, the 
principle is expressly referred to in the Treaty (more precisely in article 191.2 TFEU): it 
'stems' from the written primary norms, rather than behaving as a constitutional 
substratum; that is, this particular principle does not seem to be an underlying value, but 
to be more meshed with the Treaty provisions. This type of anchorage of the principle is 
visible in the Waddenvereniging and Vogelsbeschermingvereniging case
117
, where the 
Court states that the provision of secondary law 'integrates’ the principle. The case 
concerned the assessment of the implications of mechanical cockle fishing in a 
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protected site under the Habitats directive
118
. The analysis of ‘significant effects’ 
according to article 6.3 of the directive led the Court to raise the use of the 
precautionary principle, ‘one of the foundations of the high level of protection pursued 
by Community policy on the environment (…) and by reference to which the Habitats 
directive must be interpreted’
119
. In reading that provision, the Court acknowledged that 
‘the authorisation criterion laid down in the second sentence of Article 6(3) of the 
Habitats directive integrates the precautionary principle’, further remarking that the 




Such reading is the same articulated by Advocate General Sharpston in her Opinion in 
Sweetman and Others
121
. This case versed again on the interpretation of the expression 
‘adverse effect on the integrity of the site’ in light of the Habitats directive, this time 
concerning a road scheme which would cross a specific protected habitat under Annex I 
to the said instrument, which would result in the permanent loss of a significant area 
thereof. The effects on the environment and the area of conservation of the consent for 
this project were raised, reaching the Court in a reference for preliminary ruling. The 
Advocate General started by referring to Waddenvereniging and 
Vogelbeschermingsvereniging, restating that the precautionary principle is integrated in 
the directive provision. Moreover, she notes, the ‘principle is relevant to establishing 
whether any competent authority can rule out any adverse effect on the integrity of a 




As is apparent, in spite of being recognized as potentially applicable as a gap-filling 
tool, in line with the interpretive function recognized to all general principles of EU law, 
the precautionary principle is denied any independent role to play here. It appears as 
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‘integrated’ in the directive, as the Court itself restates in the ruling
123
, further indicating 
that it is to be applied as means of assessing whether the objectives pursued by the 
directive are being reached
124
. Rather than appearing as an underlying value of the 
legislation at stake, it rather seems to be an instrument for appraisal of the attainment of 
the envisaged objectives.  It is relevant for the assessment of certain powers of the 
authorities applying the directives, but it is integrated in the instruments, having no use 
beyond the written text of the instrument where it is embedded. 
Also in this field there are references to 'specific expressions' of the principle. Here, 
however, they are rooted in the precautionary principle itself. Monsanto Agricoltura 
Italie
125
 concerned safety assessment of foods produced from genetically modified 
maize in light of the regulation concerning novel foods and novel food ingredients
126
. 
The validity of the measures at stake concerning the marketing of GMO’s was contested 
by the Italian government under the safeguard clause, referring to the precautionary 
principle. The Court stated, in paragraph 110, that the safeguard clause present in the 
regulation ‘must be understood as giving specific expression to the precautionary 
principle’. The consequence of this is that ‘the conditions for application of that clause 
must be interpreted having due regard to this principle’
127
. Elaborating on this idea, the 
Court restates that indeed the clause in question works as a specific expression of the 
principle. This dictates that ‘the principle must therefore, where relevant, be an integral 
part of the decision-making process leading to the adoption of any measure for the 
protection of human health based on Articles 12 and 13 of that regulation’
128
. 
Furthermore, the ‘principle must also be taken into account where relevant under the 
normal procedure, inter alia for the purpose of deciding whether, in the light of the 
conclusions concerning the assessment of risk, placing on the market may be authorised 
without any danger for the consumer’
129
. These statements of the Court are, however, 
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mitigated by the reference to ‘where relevant’. It seems apparent that, although the 
principle forms part of the system for the application of these instruments, it does not 
assume a preponderant role, nor is it used as a ground for validation of provisions. 
The same is patent in Commission v Netherlands, with reference to the protection of 
human health as a primary objective of the environmental policy of the EU, under 
article 174 EC
130
. The precautionary principle is here balanced against potential 
restrictions to freedom of movement of goods, under articles 30 and 36 EC. The Court 
starts by ascertaining that environmental policy ‘is to be based inter alia on the 
precautionary principle’ and that the requirements of such policy ‘must be integrated 
into the definition and implementation of other Community policies’, including the 
protection of human health (which reinforces the conception of the precautionary 
principle as being applicable in more than one field of EU law)
131
.The Court then 
observes that a degree of uncertainty ‘is inseparable from the precautionary principle’, 
which frames Member States’ discretion, but cannot justify that risk assessment is to be 
based on ‘hypothetical considerations’
132
. The correct application of the principle 
‘requires, in the first place, the identification of the potentially negative consequences 
for health of the proposed addition of nutrients, and, secondly, a comprehensive 
assessment of the risk for health based on the most reliable scientific data available and 
the most recent results of international research’
133
. 
Notwithstanding its presentation as an ‘underlying value’, stemming from the first 
paragraphs, the use of the principle seems to be framed by extremely specific 
requirements. Indeed, its ‘correct’ application dictates two very detailed obligations in 
this case for the Member State – which somewhat resembles exactly the type of 
requirements the Court stated made a principle too specific to qualify as a general 
principle of EU law, in Audiolux and NCC, amongst others. This follows from other 
cases, such as Briels, again a ruling concerning the interpretation of the Habitats 
directive
134
. After restating that the instrument in question ‘integrates’ the precautionary 
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principle, in paragraph 28, the Court affirms that ‘the application of the precautionary 
principle in the context of the implementation of Article 6(3) of the Habitats directive 
requires the competent national authority to assess the implications of the project for the 
Natura 2000 site concerned in view of the site’s conservation objectives and taking into 
account the protective measures forming part of that project aimed at avoiding or 
reducing any direct adverse effects for the site, in order to ensure that it does not 
adversely affect the integrity of the site.’ These obligations are specifically tailored in 
the directive’s provision – seemingly, the principle is absolutely absorbed by the written 
secondary law.  
1.4.2 A governance principle? 
Overall, it is apparent that the characteristics of the precautionary principle leave it in an 
indeterminate area, with some features pointing at a constitutional character, while 
others render it much more dependent on written law
135
. This ambivalence is moreover 
patent in the fact that the precautionary principle, unlike other unwritten 'general 
principles', finds expression in the Treaty. Article 191.2 of the Treaty on the Functioning 
of the European Union establishes that 'Union policy on the environment shall (...) be 
based on the precautionary principle'. The first inevitable comment is that, as was 
shown in the cases above, the principle has extrapolated the environmental law field, 
showing a degree of generalization which is common to general principles of EU law, 
potentiating a far reaching horizontal application throughout different policy areas
136
. 
However, it also seems that the level of entrenchment that this principle finds in written 
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sources, and the fact it is seemingly mimicked with the provisions of secondary law 
where it is expressed, opposes to its qualification as an independent, self-standing 
principle. 
The precautionary principle seems to be inherent to the systems it is designed to guide, 
relying on the provisions of secondary law to lay down the specific requirements in 
policy fields. This dependence is furthermore proved by the fact that some instruments 
contain a working definition of the principle, laying down the exact steps its application 
should follow
137
. It has been defended that its main function in the case-law of the Court 
'has been one of justification, attempted classification and moderation of a long standing 
tradition of judicial deference towards Community decision making operating in a 
context of scientific uncertainty'
138
.  
Arguably, it can hence be considered a directing principle - which does not fall into any 
of the categories proposed above, or rather might fall in both
139
. Indeed, addressed to 
both EU legislator and Member States
140
, the precautionary principle clearly does not 
function as a mere interpretative principle, rather prompting action and regulating the 
decision making stances. As Szajkowska notes, its expressions vary depending on the 
field of law concerned, since it may be 'expressed in different ways at different levels'. 
She furthermore states that, 'being a directing principle for public authorities, at the 
same time, however, it is concrete enough'
141
. It thus seems that this principle should 
rather be qualified as a type of governance principle. This naturally adds another 
classification to the already confusing existing ones. However, it seems that this 
particular principle, and maybe others, can be seen as a more technical type, oriented 
towards the action itself. 
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The attempt to define a general principle of EU law has proved to be a difficult task; 
however, this tool has been essential for the development of the EU as a polity, and its 
integration as an ever more complete system. The different classifications presented 
purported to provide a broad understanding of the concept which lays at the centre of 
this thesis, along with its essential features. The categories presented, however, still fall 
short of explaining the concept in its entirety: by reading the case-law of the Court, it 
becomes apparent that there will be entwined elements, along with principles which 
seem to fail to adhere to certain characteristics.  
Nonetheless, the functions to which general principles of EU law are usually attached 
will further serve as a departing point to the analysis of their mode of operation, and 
effects produced in the legal system. But first, a word on the terminology used to 








CHAPTER II: 'GENERAL', 'FUNDAMENTAL' OR 'PARTICULARLY 
IMPORTANT' PRINCIPLE?  
Foreword 
The previous chapter has presented the 'basics' in what comes to the definition, 
categories, functions and rank of general principles of EU law. However, before 
entering the analysis of the impact of the use of general principles as legal sources on 
the development of the EU, one must consider difficulties which stem from one 
essential factor: wording. 
Indeed, it seems that the terminology patent in the Treaties, the case-law of the Court 
and even the Charter is less than explicit, to the point of creating a degree of confusion 
which hinders the coherence of the system. The translations into different linguistic 
versions prove to equally contribute to this state of affairs. The wording thus falls short 
of making sense of the judicial constructions envisaged and achieved by the use of 




Bearing moreover in mind the important role played by the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights, which recently configures equally primary EU law, attention will be given to the 
division between rights and principles in this instrument, and how this has been 
reflected in the case-law. The matter of the co-existence of general principles under 
article 6.3 TEU and the Charter has not quite yet been 'solved', be it by doctrine or 
jurisprudential intervention, deepening the existing confusion. Indeed this latter topic 
relates only to fundamental rights protected as general principles, leaving other general 
principles of EU law aside. It must be recalled, however, that fundamental rights 
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represent a big part of the general principles doctrine, and thus their treatment in the 
case-law is intrinsically connected to the definition of such tools
143
.  
2.1 Terminology in the Case-Law 
The rulings of the Court which recur to general principles of EU law are tamed by a 
deep lack of consistency in the chosen wording. This problem, as will be showed 
further, is equally patent in written instruments which make reference to such tools. 
There seems to be no coherent stand in what comes to the qualification of certain 
standards or rules as general principles, which fosters misunderstandings and renders 
the task of predicting their application all the more difficult. Indeed, whereas in some 
cases the Court states clearly that a certain principle qualifies as a general principle of 
EU law, in many others its reasoning is confusing and other expressions are chosen, 
which dictates generalized perplexity. This is particularly so in cases relating to 
fundamental rights’ protection. 
The ‘complete’ expression, ‘general principle of European Union law’, has been used 
many times. In the beginning, with rulings such as Internationale Handelsgesellschaft, 
Stauder, Nold, and others, the Court seemed to be filling in the gaps left by the incipient 
regulation provided for the existing EU legislation in many areas, especially securing 
the need to respect fundamental rights. It proclaimed principles which stemmed, in its 
words, from the national constitutional laws and traditions of the Member States, as 
general principles of EU law, underlying the European polity. Recently, rulings such as 
Mangold, Kücükdeveci and Chatzi
144
 recur equally to this wording. 
Queries arise, however, on whether the Court refers to the same type of primary norms 
when using expressions that seem similarly significant. In fact, there have been 
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registered references to ‘fundamental principle of Community law’ (Johnston
145
), 
‘general principles of Community law’ (Hoechst
146
) and even to a ‘particularly 





when referring to the dispositions of the Framework Agreement establishing the 
principle of non-discrimination in relation to the distinction between fixed term workers 
and permanent ones, the Court stated, in paragraph 24, that such an agreement 
‘expresses a principle of European social law which cannot be interpreted 
restrictively’(emphasis added). 
Advocate-General Trstenjak expressed the opinion that these discrepancies represent 
solely a use of different wording, with no impact being caused in the value attributed to 
the principle
149
. Rather, it would represent a way for the Court to retain its flexibility in 
the utilisation of these interpretation tools, so as to ‘be able to decide on substantive 
matters which arise regardless of terminological discrepancies’
150
. However, and in 
spite of claiming to do it, the Court has failed to demonstrate how exactly it finds the 
legal basis of general principles of EU law in national constitutions and traditions and 
international instruments
151
. The approach is definitely not one of the search for a 
common denominator; rather, the Court seems to establish what it considers to be fair, 
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The aforementioned differences, as well as the lack of clarity in the reasoning, create 
uncertainty as to the weight the Court effectively attributes to different formulations
153
. 
The use of the term ‘principle’ should, however, in itself, signal a higher rank, a 
‘fundamental nature’: in the words of Simon, ‘the use in Community law of the term 
‘principle’, which is ‘specifically used in order to indicate the fundamental nature of 
certain provisions’, could not in any way be interpreted as amounting to a ‘vague 
declaration’ deprived, per ipsam, of any normative, obligatory content. On the contrary, 
the use of the term ‘principle’ denotes the existence of a normative aspect destined to 
produce, as such, despite its generality, legal effects.’
154
 
This seems to be confirmed by paragraph 28 of the ruling in Defrenne II, where the 
Court stated that ‘the word ‘principle’ is specifically used to indicate the fundamental 
nature of certain provisions’
155
 – it did not use the expression ‘general principle of 
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EU/EC law’. Perhaps that can partially explain the existing differences, with the Court 
enhancing the fundamental nature of the principle when it needs to apply it directly so 
as to deliver concrete results. Even in cases where the reasoning circles around the 
general principle, the Court does not always maintain the complete expression 
throughout the full text. Some rulings can give us an idea of how the expressions vary 
even within the same reasoning. 
In Del Cerro Alonso
156
, paragraph 27 of the reasoning refers to the principle of non-
discrimination as a general principle, whilst, in paragraph 38 the same principle is 
qualified as a ‘principle of Community social law’ (a quite similar formulation to the 




, the general principle of effective judicial 
protection (paragraph 29) receives the formulation of mere 'principle' (paragraph 33). 
The same is patent also in Kücükdeveci (when confronting paragraphs 21 and 27 with 




It is far from clear whether these differences are relevant per se. The binding force 
attributed to the Charter of Fundamental Rights could be an explanation for this, since 
the latter instrument includes most of the general principles invoked by the Court in the 
area of fundamental rights. Although it is not meant to represent an extension of the 
powers enshrined in the Treaty, according to its horizontal clauses
160
, the Charter can 
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arguably render direct application of general principles easier
161
. However, and 
notwithstanding the fact that this instrument is to become the primary source of 
reference of the Court in the matter
162
, its application does not seem unproblematic. On 
the one hand, the main question is whether self-standing general principles of EU law 
can coexist with their equivalent in the Charter or if rather they should be preempted by 
the legislative instrument
163
. On the other hand, and despite the recent developments 
relating to the interpretation of the scope of application of the Charter
164
, some doubts 
remain due to the distinction of rights and principles patent in the Charter’s provisions. 
2.1.1 The Fundamental nature of General Principles of EU law 
To understand the ‘fundamental nature’ attributed to general principles of EU law, their 
status and characteristics might provide a better starting point. It seems these features 
may be more important than the wording used by the Court. Indeed, the criticisms and 
confusion created amongst commentators are due not only to terminological aspects, but 
also to the lack of consistency in the use of principles as interpretative norms, with a 
bearing in the scope of application of the norms enshrining them. This is particularly 
flagrant when confronting some rulings: whilst having stated that general principles 
cannot have a degree of detail that requires legislation to be enacted at EU level, nor 
give rise to particular obligations, the Court has also applied general principles, through 
instruments of secondary EU law, to horizontal disputes
165
. It seems as such imperative 
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to understand which principles constitute ‘full-pedigree’
166
 general principles of EU 
law. Jippes and Audiolux
167
 can serve, for this purpose, as a departing point in 





, a case concerning cattle vaccination for control of the foot-and-mouth disease, 
provides some relevant insight on the reasoning the Court follows in order to determine 
what is to be considered, or not, a general principle of EU law. The questions raised 
related to the interpretation of directive 85/511 in light of the Convention for the 
Protection of Animals kept for Farming Purposes, to which the EU is bound. The parties 
sought guidance on the rules of compliance with respect for animal welfare, claiming 
the existence of a general principle of Community law which would guarantee animal 
welfare, protecting animals from undue pain and suffering. 
The Court started by stating that animal welfare was not among the objectives of the 
Treaty
170
. It furthered this assertion very thoroughly, by referring to the Protocol, the 
Convention, the Treaty provisions and secondary legislation. As to the Protocol, it 
affirmed 'it is apparent from its very wording that it does not lay down any well-defined 
general principle of Community law which is binding on the Community institutions'. A 
similar conclusion resulted from reading the Convention, since no 'clear, precisely 
defined and unqualified obligation' is imposed by it; the same could be said of article 30 
TEC. Finally, in spite of the existence of 'various provisions of secondary legislation 
referring to animal welfare', they contained 'no indication that the need to ensure animal 
welfare is to be regarded as a general principle of Community law'
171
. Tridimas has 
pointed out that this 'reactive' approach on the Court's part can be explained by the fact 
that no such principle existed in Community law or Member States law, at the time
172
. 
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What seems to flow from this ruling is that the inexistence of an express reference, with 
the terminological correspondence, determines the inexistence of a general principle. 
In Audiolux, some years later, the Court was questioned as to the existence and contours 
of a general principle of equality of minority shareholders, based on the preamble and 
articles of two directives (directive 77/91/EEC and directive 2004/25), as well as the 
European Code of Conduct, annexed to Recommendation 77/534. The Court of Justice 
started by promptly denying that the existence of such a principle could be inferred 
from the legislative references invoked
173
. Subsequently, it developed its reasoning in a 
way which allows us to extract some of the characteristics a principle should have so as 
to be considered as a ‘general principle of EU law’. In paragraph 34, the Court states 
that ‘the mere fact that secondary Community legislation lays down certain provisions 
relating to the protection of minority shareholders is not sufficient in itself to establish 
the existence of a general principle of Community law, in particular if the scope of 
those provisions is limited to rights which are well defined and certain’, adding, on 
paragraph 35, that the scope of the invoked directives is limited to ‘well-defined 
situations’. A contrario, it seems to flow from these paragraphs that general principles 
of EU law ought to bear a degree of uncertainty and be ‘slightly’ undefined. 
Moreover, the Court furthers in paragraph 42 that, being limited to very specific and 
well-defined situations, the provisions did not ‘possess the general, comprehensive 
character which is otherwise naturally inherent in general principles of law’ – this 
general character prevents them from applying merely to a circumscribed number of 
situations, for that would imply a limitation in scope. In addition, it seems that a true 
general principle of EU law, such as the principle of equal treatment (which nonetheless 
may have specific expressions, as the case law suggests), cannot give rise to particular 
obligations. Paragraph 57 states as follows: ‘it should be pointed out that the general 
principle of equal treatment cannot in itself either give rise to a particular obligation on 
the part of the dominant shareholder in favour of the other shareholders or determine the 
specific situation to which such an obligation relates’. It is furthermore added that the 
principle of equality can also not be so specific as to determine the choice between 
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different means of protection
174
. The contrary would amount to assuming that the 
principle could presuppose certain legislative choices, which is not the case for general 
principles. Indeed, the Court advances, general principles do not require any legislative 
instrument of secondary law to be drafted or enacted to specify their details: their 
formulation cannot be so specific as to determine a legislative choice
175
. As such, the 
Court concludes by denying the status of general principle to that of protection of 
minority shareholders: it lacks, in light of the above, both the constitutional character 
inherent to general principles, as well as an independence which detaches their 
existence from written legislation
176
. 
This reasoning was confirmed in the order in Cosimo Damiano Vino
177
, relating to the 
fixed term contracts. When asked about the implications of the principle of equal 
treatment and non-discrimination, the Court stated that 
‘un principe, tel que celui préconisé par la juridiction de renvoi, qui s’appliquerait aux 
différences de traitement entre les travailleurs à durée déterminée en ce qui concerne 
l’obligation d’indiquer les raisons objectives du recours à un premier ou unique contrat 
de travail à durée déterminée, présuppose des choix d’ordre législatif, reposant sur 
une pondération des intérêts en jeu et la fixation à l’avance de règles précises et 
détaillées, et ne saurait être déduit du principe général de non-discrimination. En 
effet, les principes généraux du droit de l’Union se situent au rang constitutionnel 
tandis que le principe préconisé par la juridiction de renvoi est caractérisé par un 
degré de détail nécessitant une élaboration législative qui se fait, au niveau de l’Union, 
par un acte de droit de l’Union dérivé’
178
  
It hence seems that the Court, although using legislative instruments to make the 
underlying principle operate, does not accept that principles are so specific as to require 
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their detailed tailoring by the legislator. In her opinion in Audiolux, Advocate General 
Trstenjak had noted that the fundamental importance of general principles is proved by 
the fact that they find ‘expression in primary law and in many rules of secondary 
Community law’
179
. This particular statement was fiercely criticized by Bengoetxea
180
, 
who claims that creating a test of importance based on the expression in positive law 
would amount to contradicting the widely proclaimed unwritten nature of general 
principles. 
This reading of the Opinion segment seems to be reductive: effectively, ‘finding 
expression’ does not necessarily entail positivisation, especially not when it comes to 
the jurisprudence of the CJEU. However, and in spite of providing more detailed 
justification on the finding, or not, of a general principle, these rulings are not decisive 
for the understanding of the matter. The Court is known to use the European law, 
primary or secondary, as a ‘specific expression’ of the principles applied; the important 
question is hence which type of ‘triggers’ are found to make it operate principally 
through a certain legal instrument. Furthermore, in many cases, the secondary law 
instrument which provides the anchorage for the principle application will be the one 
dictating the regime applicable to the parties, albeit it is the general principle which, in 
theory at least, underlies the decision. 
2.1.2 Beyond terminology – Lost in translation? 
Beyond the inconsistencies pointed out above, another issue assumes special relevance 
and can have a deep influence in the whole treatment of general principles, namely in 
what comes to academic analysis. With the original working language of the Court 
being French, it may come as no surprise that the English translation (as used notably 
throughout this work) can sometimes lose a bit of accuracy in the process
181
. 
A series of cases in the area of common agricultural policy and fisheries illustrate how 
small and apparently harmless changes in the expressions chosen to translate the 
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original version can have influence on the understanding of the tools at stake. The 
following are particularly relevant in what concerns the rank and basis, or origin, of the 
principle, as well as its connection to the written tool in question. The differences 
observed have natural reflection on case-law analyses, stirring the controversy. 
The Unitymark
182
 case is a good example. I shall here refer merely to the linguistic 
divergences, and as such will not go into depth of the legal analysis of the case, nor its 
facts. It suffices hence to refer to paragraph 53 of the ruling, where the Court states, in 
the original version, that 'le principe de non-discrimination ainsi que le principe de 
proportionnalité qui, en l’espèce, lui est étroitement lié font partie des principes 
généraux du droit communautaire et trouvent leur expression dans le domaine de 
l’agriculture, y compris la pêche, à l’article 34, paragraphe 2, deuxième alinéa, CE'. The 
same passage reads as follows in the English translation: 'the principle of non-
discrimination and the principle of proportionality which, in this instance, is closely 
linked to it are general principles of Community law and, in the field of agriculture, 
including fisheries, are embodied in the second subparagraph of Article 34(2) EC' 
(emphasis added in both excerpts). 
It can obviously be argued that this is a minimal difference, one which has no real 
impact, nor produces any type of 'damaging effects'. Indeed, it is minimal. However, it 
seems that it does produce some impact in what comes to the derivation of the principle, 
of its origin. The expression 'embodied' implies a deeper degree of entwinement, or 
appartenance, to, in this case, the Treaty provision. It might be argued that, per se, it 
does not make a difference, since it is primary law the one at stake in any case. 
Nonetheless, it should be recalled that general principles of EU law underlie even 
Treaty provisions, having the proclivity to alter the meaning, or read content, of certain 
articles. 
To find a (written?) expression in a rule seems, on the contrary, to entail a more precise 
indication of contours. A 'good' translation can be found, for example, in Franz 
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: the original version states that 'l’article 34, paragraphe 2, deuxième 
alinéa, CE, qui énonce l’interdiction de discrimination dans le cadre de la politique 
agricole commune, n’est que l’expression spécifique du principe général d’égalité'. 
The translation of this paragraph is more authentic: 'according to settled case-law, the 
second subparagraph of Article 34(2) EC, which prohibits all discrimination in the 
context of the common agricultural policy, is merely a specific expression of the 
general principle of equal treatment’
184
. These incongruences necessarily contribute to 
the terminological amalgam. 
2.1.3 Principles of Interpretation? 
The underlined inconsistencies in terminology leave room for many doubts as to what is 
to be regarded as a general principle of EU law. It was argued above that, many times, 
the uses of, for example, the terms 'fundamental' or 'general' principle will be 
indiscriminate, and be used with the same meaning as regards the legal strength 
attributed to the principle in question. In this line, it was equally argued that stress 
should be rather put on the subsequent reasoning, on the use of the principle and its 
mode of operation, for these will be the ones defining the category at stake. 
However, it seems that the Court and its Advocates General continue to struggle with 
this division. As was referred, in Audiolux the Court referred to the 'general, 
comprehensive character' of general principles of EU law, and in Cosimo Damiano Vino 
it proclaimed their constitutional character beyond doubt. Is there a 'lower' category of 
general principles of EU law
185
? Some latest cases in the taxation area seem to shed a 
bit of light on the matter. 
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a) The principle of fiscal neutrality (as a specific expression of the principle 
of equal treatment and non-discrimination in the field of taxation) 
The approach taken by the Court in the NCC case was very similar to the ruling in 
Audiolux
186
. However, here it becomes rather clear that the Court envisages that some 
principles will be used as ‘general principles of interpretation’ – we are here referring 
to legal tools or techniques, rather than sources of EU law. NCC was a construction 
project and engineering company. It engaged equally in sale of real estate, an activity 
which it derives from its building works. The regulations on VAT in Denmark establish 
that the sale of buildings which have been constructed on the company’s own account is 
to be exempted from VAT. As such, NCC was obliged to establish a proportion of the 
amount in the respect of which it would be entitled to deduct VAT. In doing so, it 
excluded from the calculation the turnover from the sale of buildings constructed on its 
own account, alleging that such activity should be regarded as an ‘incidental real estate 
transaction’, covered by the exemption in the Sixth directive. The Danish authorities, 
however, subsequently changed their practice, establishing that only part of the VAT 
would be deductible for NCC. 
NCC disputed this, considering full deduction was due. The case reached the Court in a 
reference for preliminary ruling, being that the national court asked, amongst other, 
whether such partial right to VAT deduction would be compatible with the principle of 
fiscal neutrality. 
The Court started by saying that the principle of fiscal neutrality ‘as an integral part of 
the VAT scheme, is a fundamental principle underlying the common system of VAT 
established by the relevant Community legislation’.
187
 It then added that it represents ‘a 
particular expression at the level of secondary Community law and in the specific area 
of taxation’ of the general principle of equal treatment. The latter is endowed, ‘like the 
other general principles of EU law’, with constitutional status. The same is not true as 
regards the principle of fiscal neutrality, for this principle ‘requires legislation to be 
drafted and enacted, which requires a measure of secondary Community law’
188
.The 
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reasoning is analogous to the one used in Audiolux, hinting at the fact that some 
principles cannot be considered as self-standing
189
: in this case, detailed legislative 
measures are required, for the principle of fiscal neutrality ‘cannot properly be relied 
upon to preclude the application of the provisions thus transposed’
190
 
It is interesting that the Court characterizes the principle not only as a specific 
expression of the general principle of equal treatment ‘in the specific area of taxation’, 
but also ‘at the level’ of secondary law. This raises two important questions: on the one 
hand, can the specific expressions of general principles be perceivable as attached to 
specific areas? Can a sectorial application dictate the type of particular expressions 
retrieved from a general principle and the way they will operate? 
On the other hand, when stating at the level of secondary law, the Court seems to point 
that this principle can be effectively defined as a type of unwritten secondary law, as 
such being deprived from a binding character, as opposed to general principles of 
constitutional status, which rank above in the hierarchy of legal sources and can be 
applied directly. Strikingly enough, however, there are cases where the principle of 
fiscal neutrality is used beyond this interpretative function and actually has an impact in 
the reading of a secondary legislation instrument, as will be shown below
191
.  
The restrictive approach taken by the Court as to what should be qualified as a general 
principle of EU law is moreover patent in Deutsche Bank
192
, still with reference to the 
principle of fiscal neutrality. The dispute concerned VAT tax exemptions in the service 
of management of investment funds, to be assessed in the light of article 135.1 of 
directive 2006/112. Advocate General Sharpston pointed that this article indeed aimed 
at securing the principle of fiscal neutrality. She introduced, however, a caveat: in her 
view, the principle of fiscal neutrality in VAT may not extend the scope of express 
exemptions without clear wording pointing to that end. That is so because the principle 
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of fiscal neutrality in VAT, albeit providing for an expression of the principle of equal 
treatment, ‘is not a fundamental principle or a rule of primary law which can condition 
the validity of an exemption but a principle of interpretation, to be applied concurrently 
with – and as a limitation on – the principle of strict interpretation of exemptions’
193
. 
The Court followed the Opinion of the Advocate General closely. It started by 
acknowledging that exemptions under the said article are to be interpreted in a strict 
manner, since they constitute ‘exceptions to the general principle that VAT is to be 
levied on all services supplied for consideration by a taxable person’
194
. As such, the 
service at stake could not be comprised therein. The Court then added that the principle 
of fiscal neutrality ‘cannot extend the scope of an exemption in the absence of clear 
wording to that effect’, since ‘that principle is not a rule of primary law which can 
condition the validity of an exemption, but a principle of interpretation, to be applied 
concurrently with the principle of strict interpretation of exemptions’
195
. 
Other VAT cases present the same approach. In LVK
196
, the Court reiterated that the 
principle of fiscal neutrality is a ‘reflection in matters relating to VAT’ of the general 
principle of equal treatment
197
. In the same line, in Finanzamt Saarloouis v Malburg
198
, 
the Court referred to the ‘common system of VAT’, where the principle of fiscal 
neutrality manifests itself through the envisaged deduction system. Furthermore, it 
reminds that such a principle ‘is not a rule of primary law but a principle of 
interpretation, to be applied concurrently with the principle on which it is a 
limitation’
199
. This formulation hints not only at the interpretive function of such kind of 
principles, but also at their secondary law rank, which can explain the need for 
concurrent application. 
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The nature of the fiscal neutrality principle was again decanted by Advocate General 
Villalón in Crédit Lyonnais
200
. The Advocate General characterizes it as a ‘fundamental 
principle underlying the common system of VAT’, elucidating that it is ‘sometimes 
regarded as a general principle of European Union law underlying’ the said system. He 
reminds, however, that the Court stated that, ‘unlike other general principles of 
European union law, the principle of fiscal neutrality does not have constitutional status 
and requires legislation to be drafted and enacted, which requires a measure of 
secondary Community law. It is not therefore a rule of primary law, but rather a 
principle of interpretation’, which is to ‘guide’ member states as regards the 
transposition of the directive, amongst other. The Advocate General further refers at the 
common system of VAT as ‘established by the Sixth directive 77/388’
201
– so here the 
general principle underlies a common system created by an instrument of secondary 
law. 
However, uncertainty remains, due to the effects sought in certain cases: there are 
situations in which the principle of fiscal neutrality is used, such as other general 
principles of EU law, as a way to extend the interpretation of a given article. In Orfey 
Balgaria, a case concerning building rights, the interpretation of article 65 of directive 
2006/112, which establishes the conditions for VAT to be charged in the covered 
transactions, was raised
202
. The Court stated, in paragraph 32 of the ruling, that 
secondary law has to be aligned not only with the Treaty, but also with general 
principles of EU law
203
. And, it furthered, the principle of fiscal neutrality is but a 
‘particular expression at the level of secondary law and in the specific area of taxation’ 
of the general principle of equal treatment
204
. As such, it decided, in paragraph 36, that 
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It seems, from the wording used by the Court and Advocates General, that there can be 
general principles of constitutional rank, and thus with primary law status, whilst others 
will rank lower, hence possessing a different binding force. The second of these two 
ranks places certain general principles at ‘the level of secondary law’. These principles 
are referred to as ‘principles of interpretation’ and seem to be, to a certain extent, mere 
‘ordinary’ principles, that is, weaker than general principles
206
. Only those identified by 




A thorough analysis may show the parallel existence of principles pertaining to 
secondary law or of mere policy, as referred above. The ‘particularly important 
principle of European Social Law’ formulation in Dominguez, contrasting with the 
Opinion of the Advocate General (who indicated that the principle could easily be 
recognized as a general principle of EU law due to its expression in national 
constitutional laws and traditions of Member States
208
), might be an indicator that, as 
hinted in Audiolux and NCC, the distinction lays in the role played by the legislation: 
‘general principles of Union law have a constitutional rank, as opposed to other types of 
principles falling outside the classification of general principles of EU law, since the 
former require detailed (policy-based) legislative fine-tunning’
209
. However, uncertainty 
remains, mostly due to the Court’s choice of wording, which hints at a deeper 
entwinement of sometimes indistinctively used tools. 
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b) ...and a general principle of interpretation 
The terminological confusion is moreover patent in another judicial construction: the 
principle of consistent or uniform interpretation. Indeed, the Court has qualified, in 
several rulings, the said principle as a 'general principle of interpretation', referring to it 
so as to guarantee that any Union measure can be valid in light of higher, primary 
law
210
. In fact, it often recurs to citing a ‘general principle of interpretation’ so as to 
guarantee that any Union measure can be valid in light of higher, primary law
211
. Here 
again there seems to be a fault in wording, rather pointing at a legal technique which is 
a necessary consequence of the status of EU law.  
Gordon and Moffatt summarize this doctrine of interpretation in a tripartite 
configuration of the principle; they identify a principle of uniform interpretation, a 
purposive principle and a derogation principle
212
. These three shape the approach of the 
Court, guaranteeing attention is being paid to any linguistic differences, that consistency 
with the whole of the system and its objectives is assured and, finally and respectively, 
that any derogations to EU law are to be interpreted narrowly. The authors furthermore 
note that 'reference to general principles of interpretation should not be confused with 
general principles of EU law which, as will be seen, themselves affect the general 
principles of interpretation in EU cases'
213
.  
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This seems to indeed be the case. Again, the wording used by the Court is misleading: 
whilst using the expression 'general principle', the Court, in these cases, is addressing a 
peculiar legal technique, not the substantive value of legal sources. As such, rather than 
ranking this principle side by side with the general principles of EU law, which 
undoubtedly also have an impact in interpretation, it should be presented alongside 
other techniques of interpretation, as the effet utile doctrine, to give but an example. The 
latter have, contrary to general principles of EU law, no bearing of substantive 
significance. It is, in this case, a matter of wording, used to promote effectiveness of EU 
law. 
In conclusion, general principles of EU law are, when applied, subject to the 'guidance' 
provided by this method. This being said, the two types of different concepts are not to 




2.2 Rights and Principles in the Charter: yet another hurdle?  
Enacted in 2000, in a pathway which resulted in the failure of the Constitutional Treaty, 
the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU gained added legal value with the entry 
into force of the Treaty of Lisbon. Although the Court of Justice and the General Court 
had already referred to its provisions as inspirations for case resolution
215
, it represented 
soft law until very recently. Now, having gained the same legal value as the Treaties, 
the Charter seems to be, however, still in need for normative filling. This is necessarily 
contained by the very clearly limiting so-called horizontal clauses, which state that the 
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It is worth recalling the wording of article 6 TEU:  
1. The Union recognises the rights, freedoms and principles set out in the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union of 7 December 2000, as adapted at 
Strasbourg, on 12 December 2007, which shall have the same legal value as the 
Treaties. 
The provisions of the Charter shall not extend in any way the competences of the Union 
as defined in the Treaties. 
The rights, freedoms and principles in the Charter shall be interpreted in accordance 
with the general provisions in Title VII of the Charter governing its interpretation and 
application and with due regard to the explanations referred to in the Charter, that set 
out the sources of those provisions. 
(…) 
3. Fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the European Convention for the Protection 
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and as they result from the constitutional 
traditions common to the Member States, shall constitute general principles of the 
Union's law. 
This article refers to both principles and general principles, emphasizing that 
fundamental rights necessarily integrate the latter category. In combination with the 
provision enshrined in article 52.5 of the Charter, which specifies the effect principles 
may or may not have, the terminology again seems to add to the confusion of concepts. 
In fact, if one is to assume, as it seems, that the Charter is composed of but fundamental 
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rights, such assertions could mean that all the rights in the Charter are to be protected as 
general principles of EU law
217
. The practice, however, has shown that the Court does 
not read it in this way. 
2.2.1 Fundamental rights... but not general principles? 
The formulation of article 52.4 EUCFR is very similar to the one historically used by 
the CJEU, in regards to the source and provenance: rights enshrined in the Charter are 
to be understood as stemming from the constitutional traditions of the Member States, 
and, as such, interpreted in conformity with such sources. Article 52.5 EUCFR, 
however, makes a clear distinction: the provisions of the Charter containing principles 
‘may be implemented by legislative and executive acts taken by institutions, bodies, 
offices and agencies of the Union, and by acts of Member States when they are 
implementing Union law, in the exercise of their respective powers. They shall be 
judicially cognisable only in the interpretation of such acts and in the ruling on their 
legality’. It is apparent that principles in the Charter are not necessarily general 
principles; many of the rights enshrined therein are, however, protected as being general 
principles of EU law. In addition, there are general principles which are not enshrined in 
the Charter and nonetheless seem to possess the same primary law, constitutional value: 
a look at the area of public procurement, for example, will allow for that conclusion
218
. 
The understanding of which regime is applicable to which titles of the Charter becomes 
hence especially difficult, with the Explanations of the Charter providing little 
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clarification, and the CJEU is left with the challenging task of defining their status on a 
case by case basis
219
. The rulings in Dominguez and Association de Médiation sociale 
provide precisely the proof that, despite the fact that most general principles are now 
recognized in the Charter, not all the rights enshrined therein will represent general 
principles of EU law
220
. According to the Court, certain principles will require such a 
degree of specificity provided for by a certain legislative yardstick that they cannot rank 
as primary law principles, but rather as ‘principles of secondary law and mere policy 
principles’
221
. Could the use of the expression ‘particularly important principle of 
European social law’
222
 hint at this? 
In both cases, the Opinions of the Advocates General provide ample discussion of the 
status to be attributed to the invoked rights. 
The reference in Dominguez related to the organization of working time. Ms. 
Dominguez had claimed, against her employer, entitlement to paid annual leave not 
taken in respect of a period when she was absent from work. The right to annual paid 
leave was raised with reference to article 31.2 of the Charter. Advocate General 
Trstenjak analyzed thoroughly the nature of the right enshrined in this provision. She 
noted, first and foremost, that it is to be recognized ‘as a particularly important principle 
of Community social law from which there can be no derogations and whose 
implementation by the competent national authorities must be confined within the limits 
expressly laid down by the directive itself’
223
. As such, this right is consistently given 
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expression by the provisions of an instrument of secondary legislation, the question 
hence being whether the incompatible national legislation can be set aside in light of it, 
either by direct application of the Charter article or using a principle-based approach of 
the Kücükdeveci-type. 
According to the Advocate General, the right to annual paid leave seems to undoubtedly 
be a fundamental right, due to its inclusion in the Charter; however, she furthers, it is 
endowed with a higher intensity of protection than the other rights contained in the 
Solidarity chapter, for the latter rather requires ‘a guarantee of objective law in that the 
rights granted there are ‘recognised’ or ‘respected’ – and as such qualify as principles in 
the sense of article 51.1
224
. When looking at the possibility of creating some sort of 
horizontal direct effect, however, she notes that the binding force of this article lays 
rather in a ‘guarantee element’, which would translate in the adoption of safeguard rules 
by the Member States
225
.  
She further states that it is ‘questionable’ whether such a right can have the force of a 
general principle of EU law
226
, recalling that the latter ought to be ‘substantively 
unconditional and sufficiently precise’. The first entails an unreserved and independent 
application of the principle, ‘without conditions attaching to it’, implying that it shall 
not be ‘subject to the taking of any other measure either by the institutions of the 
Member States or by the European Union’; the second rather requires the unequivocal 




This view is influenced by a restrictive reading of the addressees of the Charter, 
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The Court, on the other hand, seemed to have a different approach in mind. The first 
move made is an attempt to equate the right contained in article 31.2 either with articles 
20 to 23 or to article 27. Then, it considered whether the right enshrined in article 31.2 
is a right or a principle and whether it is sufficiently clear and precise to follow the 
regime attributed to the principle of equality and be invoked before a national court. It 
reached the conclusion that it was not. 
In reference to this ruling, it has been claimed that, therefore, a general principle of EU 
law will be the result of a ‘legally perfect rule’
229
, applicable per se. This assessment 
does not seem convincing, since the general principles applied directly by the Court to 
certain situations were not legally perfect nor would lend themselves to isolated 
application. This matter will, however, be further discussed. 
The reasoning in Dominguez, in what regards the characteristics of rights and (general) 
principles, was recently stirred by Association de Médiation Sociale, this time in 
relation to article 27 of the Charter. Association de Médiation Sociale (AMS) is a 
private association with no lucrative ends, whose main objective is to prevent 
delinquency in the area of Marseille, France. It employs young people through a system 
of ‘support employment contracts’, with view to their social and professional reinsertion 
(at the time of the proceedings, AMS had celebrated between 120 and 170 contracts of 
this kind). To undertake its activity, AMS has eight other workers, these with permanent 
contracts. Only the latter are taken into account in the calculation of its workforce, in 
accordance with article L. 1111-3 of the Code du travail, which has influence in the 
regime of representation of workers in the association (the minimum number of 50 
workers is required for the application of the directive establishing a general framework 
for informing and consulting employees in the European Community (directive 
2002/14) is hence not met). The local trade union (Union locale des syndicats CGT 
Quartiers Nord), in spite of the above, decided to create a division within AMS, 
nominating Mr. Laboubi, one of the eight permanent workers, as its representative. 
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AMS opposed it, arguing that it was not obliged by law to have such representation; it 
further proceeded to suspend Mr. Laboubi’s contract. 
In light of proceedings brought before it, the Cour de cassation abstained from taking a 
decision, preferring to address a request for preliminary ruling to the CJEU. It asked, in 
essence, whether the fundamental right to information and consultation of workers, 
recognized by article 27 of the Charter and given expression by directive 2002/14, can 
be invoked in a dispute between private individuals in order to establish the conformity 
of a national transposing measure. 
The approach suggested by Advocate General Cruz Villalón in his Opinion is a bold 
one. He began by stating that the matter at issue was essentially that of whether the 
Charter, when its content is given specific expression by a directive, may be relied upon 
in relations between individuals. To analyze the problem, he divided his Opinion in 
different sections. In his view, the fact that the wording of the Charter points to its 
application by Member States and EU institutions in nothing diminishes its aptitude to 
be applicable also between individuals; it would be an error to consider that the Charter 
somehow restricts ‘the effectiveness of fundamental rights between individuals’
230
. He 
hence reaches the intermediate conclusion that article 27 of the Charter may be relied on 
in such disputes
231
; however, he adds, it is important to consider whether it is a right or 
rather a principle, and in the latter case thus narrowed by article 52.5. 
In his view, the qualification as ‘fundamental right’ relates to the entire content of the 
Charter; he further adds that ‘the fact that specific substantive content of the Charter is 
described as a ‘right’ elsewhere in the Charter does not in itself prevent it from 
potentially belonging to the category of ‘principles’ within the meaning of Article 
52(5)’. Indeed, he concedes that social rights seem to be ‘rights by virtue of their subject 
matter’ but ‘principles by virtue of their operation’, criticizing the wording of the 
Charter in that it should have followed the expression used in article 51.1, ‘to promote 
                                                 
230
 Opinion of Advocate General Cruz Villalón in AMS, cit. supra, at paragraph 28 
231








He then goes on by looking at article 27, stating that it does not define any individual 
legal situations, hence requiring the public authorities to determine its objective content 
– as such, this article is a principle, in the sense of articles 51.1 and 52.5. Having said 
that, the Advocate General proceeds to analyze the regime applied to principles under 
the latter article: the need for implementing measures in order to promote such 
principles consists of, in his view, providing them with ‘sufficient substance’. He 
considers that ‘implementation’ has to mean a ‘specifically legislative 
implementation’
233
. Taking it a ‘step further’, as he himself acknowledges in the next 
paragraph, Advocate General Cruz Villalón states that ‘it is possible to identify, from 
among the legislative implementing acts referred to in the first sentence of Article 52(5) 
of the Charter, particular provisions which can be said to give specific substantive and 
direct expression to the content of the ‘principle’. That differentiation is essential, since, 
otherwise, in areas as extensive as social policy, the environment or consumer 
protection, the ‘implementation’ of a ‘principle’ would consist of nothing less than an 
entire branch of the legal system (…). That result would render nugatory and disruptive 
the function which the Charter confers on ‘principles’ as a criterion for interpreting and 
reviewing the validity of acts, since it would be impossible to carry out that function’. It 
is at this point that he makes a crucial statement relating to the way he understands the 
answer to the preliminary question put by the French court: in paragraph 66, he 
considers that ‘Article 3(1) of directive 2002/14 provides the content of the ‘principle’ 
with substantive and direct expression: the personal scope of the right to information 
and consultation.’ As such, ‘it may be referred to as an example of the substantive and 
direct expression of Article 27 of the Charter and, therefore, is capable of forming part 
of the content of Article 27 which may be relied on before the courts.’ 
The Court, however, did not follow the proposed solution. It pointed out, in paragraph 
45, that, as stemming from its wording, article 27 lacks the conditions to full 
effectiveness, for ‘it must be given more specific expression in European Union or 
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national law’. It then marks a stark contrast with the mode of operation of the principle 
of non-discrimination on grounds of age: the latter, enshrined in article 21.1, ‘is 
sufficient in itself to confer on individuals an individual right which they may invoke as 
such’, as proved by Kücükdeveci. The difference, the Court hints, lies in the nature of 
the right at stake: the analysis focused on whether the right, considered there clearly a 
general principle, needs a detailed instrument of secondary legislation to be put into 
practice. The directive applies the principle of equality to the field of employment law – 
arguably, it could have a simple provision stating its objective as such, and the right 
could be respected and applied directly.  
The workers’ right to information and consultation within the undertaking, as enshrined 
in article 27 EUCFR, is thus considered an incomplete right, which a worker cannot 
invoke per se. It stems from the ruling that further definition is needed as regards the 
conditions for such a right to be exercised in relation to the undertaking, some sort of 
governing whose objective is precisely to make the right enforceable. The existence of 
horizontal direct effect would, in light of this ruling, depend on the nature of the 




In Dominguez, in spite of finding that the hard core of the right in question seems to be 
self-sufficient, the Court decided it was not certain enough to be horizontally applicable. 
Again, this right was confirmed as a particularly important principle of European social 
law; however, and within the limits of the directive, Member States are found to be free 
to lay down conditions for its implementation
235
. The directive fulfils the purpose stated 
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in article 52.5 of the Charter, with the right in article 31.2 being ‘judicially cognisable 
only in the interpretation’ of the said instrument.
236
 
Read in this light, perhaps one could better understand the criteria advanced by the 
Court in Audiolux and NCC constructions, where it stated that a true general principle of 
EU law cannot require the enactment of a detailed legislative framework for it to be 
made applicable. On the other hand, it is still not clear what the role of the legislative 
instrument is: the directive seems to provide a framework for the real application of the 
principle. Would it suffice for it to state, as referred, the application of such principle to 
relationships in a certain area so as to make a general principle applicable
237
? Arguably, 
the role of the instrument is to guide the application of the principle with certain 
purposes – as such, it will serve as an assessment basis for concrete situations. This 
seems to be suggested by the wording of the Court in Test-Achats, when stating that ‘the 
comparability of situations must be assessed in the light of the subject-matter and 
purpose of the EU measure which makes the distinction in question (…) that distinction 
is made by Article 5(2) of directive 2004/113’ (paragraph 29 of the ruling, referring to 
the application of the principle of equal treatment)
238
.  
The recent ruling in Glatzel presents the first development of the AMS decision
239
. In 
this case, related to the rights of persons with disabilities as protected by article 26 of 
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the Charter, the Court further takes a stand, albeit implicitly, on the difference between 
rights and principles in light of the Charter. 
The Court starts by acknowledging the principle of equal treatment as a general 
principle of EU law, of which the principle of non-discrimination, as enshrined in article 
21.1 of the Charter, is a particular expression
240
. It then proceeds to consider article 26 
in combination with article 52.5, stating that, as stems from the latter and the 
explanations to the Charter, reliance on the first ‘is allowed for the interpretation and 
review of the legality of legislative acts of the European Union which implement the 
principle laid down in that article, namely the integration of persons with disabilities’
241
. 
It is clear here already that this right, although representing one of the sub-divisions of 
the prohibition of discrimination, is not self-standing enough to represent a right on its 
own. The classification as principle is furthered in paragraph 78, with an assertion 
anchored on a reference to AMS: ‘although Article 26 of the Charter requires the 
European Union to respect and recognize the right of persons with disabilities to benefit 
from integration measures, the principle enshrined by that article does not require the 
EU legislature to adopt any specific measure. In order for that article to be fully 
effective, it must be given more specific expression in European Union or national law. 
Accordingly, that article cannot by itself confer on individuals a subjective right which 
they may invoke as such’.  
It stems clearly from this paragraph that principles in the sense of the Charter do not 
require any sort of positive action by the Union, something which is aligned with the 
provision in article 19 TFEU. In order to endow it with effectiveness, article 26 needs to 
be given ‘more specific expression’ in European or national legislation, for which 
reason it fails to be invokable directly by individuals. Hence, it clearly represents a 
principle in light of the Charter. 
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2.2.2 A general principle in light of the Charter? 
The contrast of reasoning in these cases still fails to produce proof of the distinction 
between rights and principles and, moreover, of 'whether a provision is rights-
conferring or not', an additional distinction to the already problematic one
242
. Arguing 
that rights, such as the right to annual paid leave, are not sufficiently precise due to the 
fact that they require legislative configuration would imply accepting the same 
reasoning for other rights qualified as general principles. Indeed, if the decisive factor is 
that the implementation depends on the existence of a legislative instrument or, in 
general, a written framework for the application of the principle, then some of the 
statements made by the Court in this area may appear bizarre
243
. 
In cases such as Mangold and Kücükdeveci, where the Court found a general principle 
of EU law, the regime of the directive is the one framing the application of the said 
principle to the situation at stake. Can one argue that such a ‘principle’ in the sense of 
the Charter is that different from the general principle of non-discrimination on grounds 
of age? What does directive 2000/78 do that not represent a specific expression of the 
principle, exactly as the Court phrases it in Glatzel? It has been argued that the 
classification as ‘principle’ here is limited to the definition of the legal consequences of 
a norm. It seems bizarre that the same line of thought does not apply to the use of 
general principles as independent legal sources in the jurisprudence of the Court.
244
 
That occurs similarly in other areas, where extensive interpretation of the instruments in 
question takes place: the fact that, eventually, the Court concedes on the application of a 
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legislative piece’s framework is an antithesis to the assertion that no legislative action is 
needed in those cases. This shall be further discussed below. 
Peers and Prechal suggest that ‘the wording, purpose and the nature of the provision at 
issue must be looked into’, so as to define what constitutes a principle and a right under 
the Charter. However, they recognize that ‘what in the Court’s case law and, to an 
extent, also in the Charter, is called a principle, is not necessarily a principle for the 
purposes of article 52.5’
245
. Judge Safjan has defended that general principles of EU law 
and principles in the Charter are conflated, producing the same effects. His thesis is that 
if some principles from the Charter (or general principles, for that matter) become 
sufficiently determined by case-law, be it from the Court of Justice, the European Court 
of Human Rights or in the constitutional traditions of the Member States, they become 
equally sufficiently clear and transparent so as to be directly applied. This implies that 
such principles will hence become a direct basis for judicial protection
246
. 
This latter view is, in my opinion, highly debatable. What seems clear is that, in drafting 
the Charter, Member States wanted to secure what is generally recognized as social 
principles, which depend from legislative intervention and are subject to more 
conditions for application than fundamental subjective rights. In a way,  a type of 
programmatic rules, which would not be directly applicable to individuals, but entail 
rather some sort of positive action
247
. However, the wording chosen and the failure to 
make the distinction clear with regard to which specific provisions embody rights and 
which ones embody principles achieves merely more confusion, and opens leeway for 
the Court to deal with the issue on a case by case basis. This becomes furthermore 
problematic when the Court decides not to engage in the classification, as is patent in 
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. Here, albeit recognizing that the right to good administration as 
enshrined in article 41 of the Charter 'reflects a general principle of EU law', the Court 
does not dwell in the interpretation of such principle, which seems to have a limited 
effect in what comes to individuals
249
. 
Article 6 TEU itself poses a number of problems. In the first place, it is not clear 
whether it contains a hierarchy of sources: it has been argued that one could speak of a 
mere lexical hierarchy, with the sources being applied in a concurrent manner
250
. 
However, the Charter, despite representing the codification of the development of 
fundamental rights reached by case law
251
, does not exhaust the use of general 
principles and subsequent protection of fundamental rights under the latter epitome. It 
seems that fundamental rights can still be protected as general principles of EU law 
outside the scope of application of the Charter
252
. Moreover, this will imply 
acknowledging that, whilst the Charter does indeed have the value of primary law in an 
equal standing to the Treaties, general principles have been used before as a way to 
interpret and superimpose a result not expressly dictated by written primary law
253
, 
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While it is undeniable that general principles play a determinant role in the development 
of the EU and its integration, the attempt to define a general principle of EU law on the 
basis of its characteristics, categories or functions has proven to be a difficult task, as 
was noted in the previous chapter. Also in when it comes to the terminology used in the 
case-law, legislative instruments and academia, consensus is far from being reached. 
There seem to be multiple possible expressions to underline the value of the instrument 
used; whether those differences are relevant per se to the qualification and nature of the 
principle, remains unclear. This is equally furthered by difficulties stemming from the 
use of different concepts in some of the case-law translations. 
With primary law value having been attributed to the Charter of Fundamental Rights, 
the complexity of the topic deepened. In the first place, the Charter's division between 
rights and principles does not necessarily have any bearing in the understanding of 
general principles, which might, as has been seen, belong to both categories; secondly, 
albeit the Charter's horizontal provisions point at a distinction that would limit the 
application of the fundamental rights enshrined in the Charter, as well as delimitate the 
applicability of principles, it seems that they have equally allowed the Court to broaden 
their use. Finally, the fact that fundamental rights are still recognized as general 
principles of their own standing, which results from both the Treaty and the case-law, 
definitely broadens their potential scope of application. 
Albeit it might seem that, in the latest cases related to the interpretation of Charter’s 
contents and especially fundamental rights as general principles, the Court has strived to 
clarify its approach to the definition and effects of these instruments, there are still 
significant problems to be tackled. This becomes clear especially when contrasting two 
recent cases, Felber and Schmitzer
255
. In the Felber case the Court maintains the 
approach, anchoring the use of the general principle in the directive which endows it 
with a specific written expression; however, it abandons its classification as 'general 
principle’ in 'directive 2000/78, which gives specific expression, in the domain of 
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employment and occupation, to the principle of non-discrimination on grounds of 
age'
256
. Schmitzer, on the other hand, points at a blatant lack of terminological, as well 
as methodological, consistency. In this case, also relating to the general principle of 
non-discrimination on grounds of age, the Court stated that 'the right to equal 
treatment, which flows from the principle of non-discrimination on grounds of age 
within the meaning of Article 2 of directive 2000/78, constitutes a right which is 
capable of being relied on by an individual against a public authority'
257
. Albeit in terms 
of content the formulation restates the praxis of the Court in the matter, the terminology, 
when used in this way, poses many problems per se. 
In the first place, the positions are inverted when compared to former cases: non-
discrimination on grounds of age is a specific ground for the general principle; it derives 
from equal treatment, and not the opposite. Furthermore, here, equal treatment is 
characterized as a 'right', whilst the non-discrimination on grounds of age is called a 
'principle'. This deepens the already existing confusion. It hence remains unclear 
whether any conclusions can be derived from the wording chosen by the Court, since 
the case-law seems to remain tamed - also, but not only, in light of the new 
classifications brought in by the Charter of Fundamental Rights. Indeed, the dichotomy 
brought about by the coexistence of article 6.3TEU and the horizontal clauses of the 
Charter's seventh section seems to provide further leeway to the Court in what comes to 
establishing the scope of the fundamental rights and principles enshrined in the 
instrument. It does equally confer the Court the power to continue applying fundamental 
rights as general principles outside the contours laid down by the Charter. 
In light of all the above, it becomes apparent that neither the definition, nor the 
categories or terminology are a good departing point for the analysis of general 
principles of EU law. To remain circumscribed by these factors would result in denying 
the dynamic role general principles have played, and continue to play, in the European 
integration. There is a larger phenomenon to be identified with regard to the function of 
general principles within the structure of EU law, other than the usually depicted 
hierarchical relationship. The impact produced on the structural dynamics of EU law is 
                                                 
256
 Felber, paragraph 16 (emphasis added) 
257




especially visible when analyzing the modes of operation in which general principles 
are deployed by the Court, notably due to the interactions produced with other legal 
sources. If the role as grounds of judicial review is undeniable, the fact is that, when 
combined with other (written) legal sources, general principles have the proclivity to 
create results which would not be achieved by neither principle nor written rule in 
isolation. 
 Naturally, it may be questioned how the sample was reached, in light of the differences 
in wording. The aim of the present chapter was to highlight the feebleness of relying 
merely on the expressions used to address general principles; however, this will still 
serve as an indication to narrow the said sample cases. What seems to be essential is not 
to take the wording as an isolated element, that is, departing from the expression used 
by the Court, analysis rather the modus operandi, with the consequent assertion of 
whether the principle indeed can be considered a general principle of EU law, and the 
meaning of the application of that norm, whichever its value, in the situation at stake. 
The aim of the next chapter is to explore the ways in which general principles have been 
developed within the particularities of the EU legal system, analyzing them for their 








CHAPTER III: GENERAL PRINCIPLES AND THE STRUCTURAL 
DYNAMICS OF EUROPEAN UNION LAW 
Foreword 
The above chapters tried to provide an overview of what is understood as a general 
principle of EU law, the possible categories in which these principles can be divided 
and the functions they fulfill as legal sources of EU law. However, they also showed the 
difficulties inherent to the treatment of such an abstract concept. Beyond the usually 
accepted functions, the analysis highlighted that the categorization is varied, since the 
inception of EU law, and that none of the suggested categories seems to encompass 
completely the types of principles it purports to describe. On the other hand, the 
complexity of this issue is reflected in the differences presented by the terminology 
chosen by legislature, judiciary and academia alike, which, indistinct and confusing as it 
is, gets amplified by the different translations of passages which are used as determinant 
for the understanding of these concepts. 
It is undeniable that, in spite of the challenges faced, terminology still plays an 
important role; however, it should not be the only factor to trigger the analysis of these 
legal sources. Indeed, if the wording chosen provides little help in the understanding of 
the functioning of these tools, the mode in which they will operate further throughout 
the reasoning is what enhances their peculiarities. One cannot obviously discard 
terminology, since the analysis will still look at cases where principles are isolated as 
such; however, the use of adjectives such as 'general', 'fundamental' and 'particularly 
important', or even no adjective whatsoever, might not be the decisive factor for the 
qualification. As such, this analysis is anchored in cases where the figure of a general 
principle operates as such, even if it is only called 'principle' instead of a 'general 
principle of EU law'. The case-law will clarify this. 
The focus is thus turned from the substance of general principles of EU law to the way 
they are used, especially when combined with other legal sources. This assessment 
departs not from a focal point on a particular general principle as developed by the 
Court in substantive terms, but rather from the different possible interactions and the 




aim of this chapter is to explore the way in which the structure of EU law, and its 
development and legal sources used therein, have been envisaged and established with 
the help of general principles. 
3.1 The combination of legal sources in EU law 
European Union law is filled with peculiarities. One of the aspects to be immediately 
underlined is the fact that it represents an atypical form of international law: 'the Union 
legal order is essentially based on international law principles', its nature not requiring 
any 'departure' from the said canons
258
. These peculiarities arise especially from the 
type of intervention taken up by its judicial organ, the Court of Justice, and general 
principles appear, in this context, as 'instruments of intrusion', due to their flexibility in 
the possibility to encompass different effects and applications. The development of 
secondary legislation, on the other hand, has created both a new role and new 
difficulties for general principles. Indeed, whilst the absence of legislation on certain 
matters opened more leeway for the Court to develop a principle-based reasoning, the 
existence of legislation creates the need for its own perfecting and gap-filling. 
The understanding of the EU as a complex legal order implies the understanding of the 
underlying relationships present within the EU legal system. This is generally seen as a 
hierarchical structure, albeit a sui generis one: EU law is read from the perspective of a 
structured legal system, arguably walking towards the consecration of a federal system. 
Nonetheless, when writing about hierarchy of norms in EU law, one immediately 
encounters difficulties. Such a concept is not defined in the Treaties, even if the creation 
of EU law's primacy over national laws leaves little leeway for questioning the 
application of EU law in the legal systems of the Member States per se. 
General principles of European Union law necessarily play a role in these 
considerations, since they have been qualified as primary law, which endows them with 
the capacity to trump inferior norms. This facet has been extensively analyzed in the 
doctrine. They have been explored from the point of view of their primary law rank, and 
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of the main function they have fulfilled in line with that conception, which is that of 
serving as a standard for judicial review of other norms. But while the establishment of 
a hierarchy was a precondition for the successful affirmation of the European Union's 
legal system (and the role of general principles as primary law has been undoubtedly 
quintessential in that process), an equally important factor has, however, been 
neglected: there are other types of combination of norms in which general principles 
play a very important role. 
What is interesting, in this respect, is not the nature and structure of the principles per 
se, but rather the way they assume different functions and provoke different effects 
when combined with other sources. As suggested by Robin-Olivier, the effectiveness in 
the application of EU law seems to depend much more on the legal force of a certain 




Sankari notes equally that the special nature of the EU dictates the need for textual, 
contextual and teleological readings, as a combination of methods - which 'has become 
more nuanced as secondary legislation has developed'
260
. These nuances were also 
brought about by the use of general principles, which present one of the most interesting 
cases in what comes to the combination of norms in EU law, in this sense, with 
sometimes unexpected results stemming from their application. They are equally 
responsible for many of the breakthroughs in the advancement of the EU as a 
consolidated legal order, by means of the Court's intervention. 
3.2 General Principles and Normative Hierarchy 
The often used classification of EU law as a sui generis phenomenon is deeply 
connected to the need for a set of interpretive rules which allow for its reading in light 
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of other established legal orders, Member States' or the international legal order itself. 
The use of general principles for judicial adjudication has significantly contributed to 
this hierarchical reading. Their deployment as interpretative tools has been presented 
and analyzed within a sphere of primacy relations, with the complete superimposition of 
primary law being developed by the EU judiciary
261
. The affirmation of hierarchy has 
been essential for the conception of the EU legal system. The quasi-federalist approach 
has necessarily enhanced the strong top-down reading of the structure of the EU. 
However, as Guastini notes, these hierarchical relationships are mainly a creation of the 
interpreter, who reads the bulk of available law in line with the objectives aimed at, so 
as to affirm the legal order
262
. The focus on the objectives and primacy of EU law has, 
however, resulted in a very restrictive overview of EU law, one which has been 
oblivious to the possibility of exploring other types of relationships in EU law. A 
substantial part and important feature of EU law has been forgotten: the interaction of 
such norms in combined application. Indeed, often general principles, primary law rules 
vividly proclaimed as such by the EU judiciary and harshly criticized by the Member 
States, operate in intrinsic connection with other legal sources, achieving different 
results from those which could be envisaged with the isolated application of one of 
them. A theory that truly explores the plurality of legal sources and the different 
possible combinations of norms, with the effects produced therewith, seems to be 
missing. 
This work aims to present a certain number of those interactions and to analyze how 
general principles operate in such a combined form. The Court has indeed used general 
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principles to develop the reasoning in the cases brought before it. The way in which 
they are used and the functions they fulfil is not so clear. It seems that different areas of 
law will require equally different configurations of those legal sources, dictated not only 
by the objectives sought by the Court in the specific area to tackle, but also by the other 
available sources with which principles will be called upon to interact. The typified 
functions and categories have been addressed; my aim is to look at particularities, 
specific cases where the interaction assumes peculiar shapes, producing different 
effects. 
As legal sources, what is the position that general principles of EU law are to occupy in 
relation to other norms? This has a big impact in the definition of the outcome of such 
combinations. One should address here the points raised by Ziller in his article on the 
hierarchy of norms in EU law
263
. In fact, he makes, amongst other, three strong 
statements in relation to general principles. The first is that the formal position of 
general principles in this rank is the same as the case law of the Court (according to 
him, hence below primary law); secondly, he defends that general principles always 
rank higher than secondary law. Last, but not least, he states that general principles are 
binding in the same way primary law is, since they are used as means to interpret 
primary law
264
. He affirms, however, that 'there is little use in trying to establish a 
hierarchy between different general principles of EU law', since the only hierarchy 




I believe these statements are perhaps too bold and confusing, and cannot stand, at least 
not without further elaboration. The role that general principles play is varied and the 
different cases where principle based reasoning is used have their own nuanced 
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conceptions. In the first place, and joining the first and third statements, it seems to stem 
quite clearly from the case law that the Court has always qualified the 'general 
principles of EU law' as primary law. In fact, the Court clearly qualifies general 
principles of EU law as constitutional in character.  On the other hand, it seems highly 
unattainable to qualify general principles as ranking lower than primary law, but then 
defend that they have the same binding force, since they are used to interpret it. This 
problem arises otherwise due to the lack of consistent terminology and the use of the 
term 'principle' to address what should be labelled rather as guidelines or perhaps 
objectives. Such difficulties are heightened with the poorly drafted distinction brought 
about by the Charter between rights and principles, the latter not corresponding 
necessarily to general principles, as was seen above. 
The statement regarding secondary law seems, in light of the above, more feasible. 
Nonetheless, once again, it is not necessarily what stems from the Court's case law, 
again due to the lack of coherence in the approach to all issues of general principles. It 
was referred above that certain principles, sometimes qualified by the Court as general 
principles, seem not to have the force of primary law, rather being applied concurrently 
with secondary legislation: the principle will serve as a tool to evaluate the balance to be 
struck and the meaning to be given to the written rules without, however, imposing a 
different reading or being used as ground for validity.  Here the primary law status can 
definitely not stand. However, it is questionable whether these are indeed to be read as 
general principles of EU law at constitutional level, as envisaged by the Court.  
They will, in fact, many times, rank as primary law, as the Court defines them; they will 
serve to shape the reading of other primary law sources, as is the case of some rulings 
where they were employed to shape Treaty provisions; they will serve to trump 
secondary law, imposing a reading which sometimes counters completely what is stated 





3.3 A functionalist approach to the development of EU law 
As stated above, a great part of the process of European integration has been sustained 
by the use of general principles. This is mostly so since the Court has supported its case 
law in a reasoning prone to defend the objectives envisaged by the creation of the 
Communities. Functionalism as a legal theory breeds on the relationships established 
between an organization and its Member States
266
 – in the creation and development of 
the EC/EU, the underlying normative beliefs, the functions which the founding fathers 
had established as goals that the Communities were to fulfil, were the driving forces. 
They provided the normative underpinnings for the development of the legal system and 
its progressive inclusion of values other than those of the market. This integration was 
made in a self-referential way, that is, with a continuous interplay between national law 
and EU law. Semmelman defends that 'the determination of objectives at an EU level as 
the basis for EU functionalism allows for a more deferential approach towards the 
particularities of national laws when EU norms are implemented at the national level, 
because it avoids imposing a methodology that is not shared by all Member States'
267
. 
The Court's role was crucial here, since the reasoning based on values and objectives to 
pursue led progressively to a combination between a functionalist approach, in relation 
to market integration, and the protection of individuals – and it was with the use of 
general principles of EU law that we have reached this sui generis form of 




This translated in a teleological approach to the texts and to the underlying values. This 
is why the next section will assess the importance, in the rulings of the Court, of figures 
other than general principles, but which are deeply entwined therewith - and which 
inflated the consolidation of the legal system. 
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3.3.1 Values and Objectives of EU law 
Values and objectives of EU law are equally important concepts in the development of 
the legal system. While the denomination used is different, and in some aspects these 
concepts appear to be distinct from general principles, there are many occasions where 
they have been used indistinctly, and where they seem to overlap with one another
269
. 
Indeed, it is widely recognized that the values of EU law, namely as protected by article 
2 of the Treaty on the European Union, may serve as sources of EU law
270
. In the words 
of Bengoetxea, 'we can distinguish principles and values, but it seems difficult to define 
principles without a reference to the values they embody'
271
. 
This is naturally reflected in the scope of competences and their exercise, as well as the 
legal reasoning of the Court. As Beck notes, 'reliance by the Court on the objectives of 
Union law is likely broadly to favour an expansive interpretation of the relevant 
legislation or Treaty provisions, and thus generally an integrationist outcome to the 
question at hand, simply because the objectives generally refer to the values, purposes 
and ends of Union competence and legislation'
272
. Indeed, the overlap between the 
different concepts serves a certain flexibility, which necessarily accompanies the 
evolution of the EC and then EU as a polity. 
Albeit the founding Treaties might have had a markedly economic union tone, it was 
only a few years later that Pierre Pescatore pointed at the finalité of the Union as being 
something more vast
273
. The Court seems to have read it in the same way, as is patent 
namely from the first cases involving fundamental rights, where it acknowledged 
certain values other than the market ones were to be protected. General principles 
played a key role in this development, by endowing the Court with a degree of 
flexibility which allowed for a certain boundary stretching, and thus covering situations 
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which would not be a priori envisaged as falling under EU's jurisdiction purview. This 
is moreover patent in the recent years, already outside the realm of fundamental 
freedoms and internal market consolidations, and in presence of more and more 
complete written legal instruments. 
It is interesting to notice, however, that there seems to be an interpenetration of 
concepts, even when the Court used Treaty-based reasoning in fundamental freedoms 
cases. In fact, many times the justification is grounded on an underlying principle, often 
equated with values protected in EU law, or objectives it is to pursue. It is thus 
important to refer certain situations where the protection afforded depends on 
interchanging forms of general principles and values or objectives, or vice-versa. As 
Larik notes, 'objectives have always figured prominently in the primary law of the 
Union (...) while they were initially rather limited and focussed on specific areas, they 
have since expanded in the on-going course of deeper integration'
274
. This might be 
explained also in part by this interchanging role, with general principles making the 
objectives operative; qualifying them as such would also endow objectives with added 
legitimacy. Especially important is the primary law form and legal value they can 
provide, since values and objectives are not binding. 
Two things need hence to be addressed: firstly, how the values and objectives may be 
‘aligned’ with general principles; secondly, how they are used to legitimise the 
interpretation of secondary legislation in a very similar fashion to that involving 
principled reasoning. The interchangeable features of general principles and values and 
objectives of EU law is visible, namely, in International Mail
275
. This case concerned 
the liberalisation of postal services: International Mail provided 'outgoing cross-border 
postal services' for postcards sent from Spain, by setting specific letterboxes in the 
tourist locations. The labels purchased in such places would allow the customers to send 
postcards by using the service. This activity clashed with the existence of universal 
postal service provider in Spain. A preliminary reference was hence raised in relation to 
the reading of directive 97/67. 
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The Court started by pointing out that the directive makes explicit reference to the 
Treaty provisions. Then it proceeds to refer to the 'objective' of the directive's 
provisions, referring to article 86.2 of the Treaty as support for the interpretation: the 
gradual opening of the postal services sector to competition cannot upset the financial 
balance or provoke hindrance to the universality of this service
276
. As such, the 
discretion of the Member States is limited by the objectives pursued, the interests of the 
Community so being protected. This seems to be a classic case of reading of secondary 
law provisions as shaped by primary law. 
As in a principle based reasoning, the instrument of secondary legislation is used as 
expression for the primary law provisions. Moreover, it is the underlying principle or 
objective which points to the resolution of the matter referred to the Court. The 
similarities are undeniable here, with primary law dictating what the result ought to be, 
even in presence of written legal instruments which sometimes seem to point at a 
different resolution for the dispute. Ultimately, of course, this represents the corollary of 
the duty of consistent interpretation, in accordance with primary law. It is not hard to 
see how this can be easier to accept, in terms of legitimacy, than when the same process 
is undergone with the anchoring being based on a general principle of EU law. Indeed, 
whilst the latter may present vagueness and lack legal certainty in the eyes of the 
Member States, Treaty provisions possess the added value of written certainty and result 
directly and expressly from their will. 
This leads us back to the previous considerations: why this interchangeability of 
concepts, if not in binding legal value, at least as grounding bases? As Lenaerts and Van 
Nuffel note, recognition of 'the law' as a source for Union law legitimizes the Court of 
Justice to have recourse to general principles so as to interpret and apply European 
Union law
277
. Often, general principles do indeed seem to be extracted from, or 
assimilated to, the values and objectives of the Union
278
. On other occasions, general 
principles have lent themselves to be transformed into objectives, so as to allow for the 
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legitimization of certain competences. This is mainly due to the more 'operative' 
character of the former, as noted by Esteban, who claims that 'values have a more 
indeterminate configuration, whereas legal principles possess a more defined structure 




Blumann makes a differentiation between the concept of objective and principle, noting 
that the first identifies domains of action and ends to achieve, serving as a legal basis for 
action, whilst the latter operates in the sphere of the said action, being intimately related 
to the notion of powers to be exercised
280
. He recognizes, however, that comparisons 
are inevitable, and that, at best, there seems to be a certain 'porosité des frontières' 
between the two in EU law
281
. Rosas sustains that the values enshrined in article 2 TEU 
form 'the ideological basis for the more precise objectives set forth in article 3 TEU and 
the basic principles of the constitutional order enshrined in articles 4 and 5 TEU'
282
; 
Esteban notes that values and principles do in fact share key features, both serving as 
'the foundation for a group of other norms'
283
. 
Ultimately, the differences beyond the legal force appear to be blurred, and it is the 
relationship of synergy between the three concepts that has in much contributed to the 
harmonization of the system and integration of EU law. The Court has undoubtedly 
played a key role in this development, 'finding' a set of unwritten principles derived 
from this complex mixture of written sources, so as to bring coherence to the system
284
. 
General principles are perceived as embodying the very foundations of EC/EU law, the 
ideas behind its creation, while being dynamic enough to incorporate the changes and 
adapt to the evolution of the system
285
. The developments observed as regards to the 
scope of application of EU law are much entwined with the case-law using general 
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principles, with this call to the underlying values. This comes as no surprise, being that 
the Court has characterized the Treaties as a 'constitutional charter'
286
; and constitutional 
orders are based on certain values. 
Larik notes that, similarly to Member States' constitutional systems, objectives were not 
presented as an essential feature to the creation of the polity; however, they have been 
fortified throughout the years, in coexistence with constitutional principles, towards the 
'finalité' praised by Pescatore
287
. Interestingly, the Lisbon Treaty seems to represent 
both a widening movement, and a 'shift': the fact that, for the first time in the Treaties, 
the values of the Union are presented before its objectives 'symbolizes a paradigm shift 
from a legal entity that, in the first place, exists to strive for certain goals to one which, 
above all, expounds what it stands for'
288
. 
3.3.2 ... and Fundamental Freedoms 
Fundamental freedoms are equally often equated with general principles of EU law. 
This is an interesting fact, bearing in mind especially the conception of four freedoms 
present, at the time of their enactment in Europe, on the other side of the world. Indeed, 
the 'four freedoms' proclaimed by Roosevelt in 1941 were very different from those 
envisaged as goals of the European Communities, in 1950
289
. Albeit maybe an indicator 
of the existence of a separate system of fundamental rights protection, this 
conceptualization is probably also a symptom of the need to stress the economic union 
goals pursued as main aim of the Communities. The common market would produce the 
unity envisaged after the shattering provoked by the two wars. 
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This can explain the qualification of the four fundamental freedoms as general 
principles. Indeed, they are values which are essential to the conception of the system, 
underlying all the initial norms of the Treaties. This has been expressed by Pescatore in 
the early years, when addressing one of the possible categories of principles: 'ceux qui 
sont propres au droit communautaire  (...) quelques principes du droit matériel, comme 
ceux de libre circulation, de libre établissement...'.
290
 It seems, indeed, that the four 
freedoms are here considered as one of the possible principles underlying the structure 
of EC law. 
This was further underlined by the Adbhu case
291
, as well by Advocate General 
Maduro
292
. The Advocate General makes this remark in relation to article 30 of the EC 
Treaty, qualifying the freedoms therein enshrined as a general principle of Community 
law. It should be underlined that, in light of the functionalist approach stressed above, 
and the primordial objectives of the Communities, this qualification makes absolute 
sense. The freedoms were envisaged as free trade provisions, based on the GATT 
model, and, as such, they intended to protect internal market claims; article 30 EC is the 
perfect example of a free trade agreement provision. It seems that these provisions were 
designed to regulate market integration in its utmost economic sense, not as norms 
constitutional character. The interpretation of the Court, and the succession of rulings 
tackling issues which departed from the exercise of the freedoms, has made them into, if 
one can say it, items of the economic constitution. Can they be called general principles 
in the sense that constituted the essential values underlying the system created in Rome? 
Perhaps. 
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In the Wolff/Müller case, on the other hand, a reference had been made to the Court 
concerning the interpretation of directive 96/71 on the conditions for posting workers in 
the framework of provision of services
293
. The questions raised related to responsibility 
as guarantor of the payment of the minimum wage in a situation of subcontracting for 
construction. The national legislation ought, in the Court's view, to ensure that 'workers 
posted have available to them adequate procedures in order actually to obtain minimum 
rates of pay'. In terms of compliance with the directive, however, the Court recognized 
that Member States have a margin of appreciation to determine the adequate procedures 
to be undertaken. However, it furthered, in employing such margin of appreciation, 
Member States are to observe the fundamental freedoms as guaranteed by the Treaty
294
. 
Here, it becomes equally apparent that the mode of operation present is similar to the 
mode deployed in the principled reasoning of the Court, that is, whilst acknowledging 
the application of the legislation, and even the leeway left to the Member States for 
compliance, there are overarching principles which should guide such action. In this 
case, the freedom to provide services is to be secured. 
Nowadays, albeit the concepts seem to be distinct, we see them being pitted against 
each other, whichever name one decides to use. Indeed, the swift change from 
protection of mainly market values to a progressive integration of fundamental rights 
protection (which, in reality, derives from the consolidation of the freedoms) has 
relegated freedoms to a more contracted role, connected to this paradigm change 
between the pursuit of the objectives, which seems now to be in a second plane in 
relation to the values to be protected and promoted. Mortelmanns notes that 
'fundamental rights (...) have a more general scope than fundamental freedoms, which in 
fact are limited to the realization of the internal market and which therefore have a 
different and more limited objective'
295
 - and it is well known that fundamental rights 
are general principles of EU law expressly recognized as such. 
Again, it is a matter of distinction between concepts which interpenetrate in the layers 
composing EU law. This blurriness is again proof of the fact that taking general 
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principles as a concept and category per se, attending to etymological and origin 
elements, fails flat of enquiring into the deeper implications of their use for EU law and 
its development. 
3.4 What Role for General Principles? – with a little help from 
legal theory 
Until now, the structural dynamics of EU law have been considered in relation to the 
finalité they are to fulfill and other concepts, which intertwine with general principles of 
EU law. This has presented principles in their facet of underlying values. However, they 
are expressly used by the Court in its rulings, which raises questions about the practical 
applicability of such vague concepts. It was defended above that general principles of 
EU law fill their purpose in combination with other norms. But how is that done? Do 
they have a binary structure, which allows for a decisive two-step application? Or are 
they rather vague ideas inflating the reasoning? The difference between principles and 
rules proposed by legal theorists may be a useful point of departure in the analysis of 
concrete cases of the Court. 
3.4.1 Principles or Rules? Principles as Rules? 
Principles and rules are not the same and, as such, do not lend themselves to the same 
type of application, nor do they operate in a similar way. This is what legal theory tells 
us. My work, however, is based on the premise that, in European Union law, there is a 
deeper degree of assimilation of these two concepts and, as such, no stark contrast can 
be found in many of the rulings of the Court of Justice
296
.  
In legal theory, principles are traditionally opposed to rules and qualified as structurally 
distinct concepts, with different normative functions. Many authors have descanted on 
this subject, for what it is worth recalling some of the basic conceptions put forward as 
regards this dichotomy. Pierre Pescatore borrowed a classification used by Esser, and 
Dworkin’s is also very similar: rules and principles have completely different logical 
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structures, being strictly separated elements. This distinction, according to Dworkin, is 
based on the ‘all-or-nothing’ character of rules
297
. 
Alexy calls principles a type of 'optimization requirements', stating that they are 
especially distinct from rules when cases of conflict are in question: 'principles are 
norms which require that something be realized to the greatest extent possible given the 
legal and factual possibilities'
298
. Indeed, whilst rules, in his view, will have to be 
invalidated so that one of them can prevail, in the case of conflicting principles, a 
balancing exercise takes place. This means that one of the principles must be 
outweighed - albeit it is not deemed invalid per se, nor a priori inferior to the principle 
to which it gives leeway. As such, 'principles require that something be realized to the 
greatest extent (...). They are thus not definitive but only prima facie requirements. (...) 
Principles represent reasons that can be displaced by other reasons'
299
.  He does affirm, 
however, that principles can be 'reasons for decisions and concrete ought judgments'
300
, 
recognizing that both principles and rules are types of norms
301
. 
Guastini presents rules as conditional statements connecting a legal consequence to a 
category of facts; principles, he says, are more complex and have two essential 
characteristics: a fundamental character and a certain amount of uncertainty
302
. Beck, 
moreover, states that while ‘a rule is more specific and designed to deal with particular 
situations, a principle may be described as a general rule or pervasive standard which 
applies across a field of law’
303
. 
Principles are, in conclusion, usually labelled as having a fundamental character and a 
certain degree of vagueness. They represent a system’s axiological bases and their 
                                                 
297
 Dworkin adopted an approach very similar to the one portrayed by Esser: see Josef Esser, Grundsatz 
und Norm in der Richterlichen Fortbildung des Privatrechts, 1956 (‘Grundsatz und Norm in der 
richterlichen Fortbildung des Privatrechts by Josef Esser’ - Review by: Friedmann, Wolfgang G., 
Columbia Law Review, Vol. 57, No. 3 (Mar., 1957), pp. 449-451, and Dworkin, R., Taking Rights 
seriously, Harvard University Press, 1978. 
298
 Alexy, R., A Theory of Constitutional Rights (translated by J. Rivers), OUP, 2002, p.47 and ff 
299
 Ibid, p57 
300
 Ibid, p.60 
301
 Alexy, R., ‘On the Structure of Legal Principles’, Ratio Juris 13: 294-304, at p.295 
302
 Guastini, R., La sintassi del diritto, G. Giappichelli, Torino, 2011, at p1 
303
 According to Beck, G., The Legal Reasoning (cit. supra) at p. 194: ‘a rule is more specific and 
designed to deal with particular situations, a principle may be described as a general rule or pervasive 




generic and non-absolute character allows them to be concretized in various ways. 
Rules, on the other hand, are conditional statements which connect a certain legal 
consequence to categories of facts, due to their binary structure. Pierre Pescatore's view 
is one drawn from a mix of these theories; however, he also defends the existence of a 
balancing exercise to be struck by the Court whenever two conflicting principles are 
triggered in the ruling. 
In EU law, however, this distinction is not as clear cut. The profusion of legal 
instruments dictates the existence of both written and unwritten principles, as well as 
rules with a more vague character, blurring the division. Many of the unwritten 
principles have moreover become written in the case-law of the Court, even in the cases 
such evolution has not transpired into the Treaty.  
3.4.2 (Un)Balancing? 
 Both for Esser and Dworkin, principles and rules have different logical structures;  
Alexy, moreover, conceives principles as imperatives that can be fulfilled to varying 
degrees, whilst rules are definitive, ie, can be fulfilled or not. For all these conceptions, 
principles seem to naturally involve balancing and a contingent relation of precedence 
whenever conflict is present.  
But what if principles and rules are not as different? Jakab sustains that principles 
should not be conceived as structurally different from rules, but rather as rules of special 
importance
304
. Rules and principles would thus have the same type of normativity, with 
the latter’s scope being simply more uncertain because of the vague expressions used in 
the linguistic form. As such, no real balancing occurs when principles are applied in 
legal reasoning: the relevant principles are interpreted in such a way that the case in 
question will only fall within the scope of one. The decision then becomes one on how 
to interpret a certain rule, which deserved to be labelled as principle due to its particular 
importance. 
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Could this be applicable to the rulings of the Court of Justice? The assessment of a case 
would, following this approach, be made in relation to the content of the principle in 
question: it is not prohibited to restrict the content of a principle, but it is rather 




General principles, as structural decisions, become very important general rules, due to 
their value. The use of the designation ‘principles’ expresses this importance, whether 
envisaged by the legislator or by the judiciary. From the moment they become written, 
the differences fade. The discretion is still greater in relation to principles; however, that 
same discretion is necessarily restricted from the moment the principle in question is 
held as binding by the judiciary
306
.  
The current state of affairs in what concerns the EU legal system is marked by a 
proliferation of rules and principles which are sustained by the judiciary, be it the CJEU 
or national courts as its representatives when applying EU law. The crystallization of 
the general principles in the area of fundamental rights’ protection in the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights, as well as its primary law rank
307
, are proof of exactly that 
phenomenon. The sui generis EU system is consequently composed of both written and 
unwritten rules and principles. Principles necessarily influence the reading of all 
instruments of written EU law and the Court, as Bengoetxea notes, applies them in 
order to deliver concrete results and with a binding effect
308
. 
It seems that in certain cases the decision is made with reference to an interpretation of 
a certain rule so as to give it precedence over others, rather than configuring an exercise 
of balancing different principles. The principle applied represents a particularly 
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 Bengoetxea, J., Case note on Audiolux (cit. supra), at p.1185: ‘for a principle to be a truly general 
principle of EU law, it would need to be capable of delivering some concrete result; (…) it appears that 
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important rule, hence its designation; however, the general principle is applied so as to 
reach a specifically envisaged result. A look at some specific rulings can allow for a 
closer understanding of this, in order to question whether the mode of operation of 
principles in the Court's rulings is closer to that of rules.  
Omega can be used as an example of how a conflict of principles is resolved by giving 
precedence to a certain principle in detriment of other, rather than from a strict 
balancing operation. In this ruling the Court identified two conflicting principles: that of 
freedom to provide services and that of human dignity. Jakab argues that, especially in 
relation to fundamental rights, the provisions do not concern the prohibition of 
fundamental rights’ restrictions, but rather prohibitions of their breach (a restriction to 
the content of the right which is not justified). As such, the balancing of the principles 
in question is a matter of restrictive interpretation of one principle in light of the other, 
and not a balancing exercise. This is precisely what happens in the ruling in question. 
Although the Court starts by ascertaining the importance of the fundamental freedom, 
immediately afterwards, in paragraph 31, there is s shift to enhance the discretion 
enjoyed by Member States in relation to the measures which can be used as a 
derogation. In fact, the Court proceeds, this general principle of EU law does not require 




At this point in the ruling it is clear that a certain precedence is envisaged and pre-
established by the Court when deciding which principle is to be applied. This is further 
proved in paragraph 37, where the Court quickly dismisses the necessity for the 
principle to be fruit of a ‘conception shared by all the Member States’ as regards its 
protection (similarly to what happens when it decided to apply the general principle of 
non-discrimination on grounds of age in Mangold, something recognized merely by two 
Member States). The CJEU uses here a reading of human dignity as a general principle 
of EU law, stemming from its teleological reading of the Union’s foundations, so as to 
be able to apply the principle directly.  The sort of approach taken presents a principle 
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which might initially represent a certain general value, but then turns it into a rule which 
has concrete repercussions. It seems that ‘abstract principles are thus transformed by the 
Court into a specific rule that is to be observed and enforced before national courts’
310
. 
This type of a priori choice seems to be moreover patent in Belgacom
311
.The Court is 
therein faced with the clash between the principle of legal certainty and the principle of 
equal treatment, in its specific expressions of non-discrimination and transparency. This 
case concerned agreements concluded for the transfer of broadcasting service activities 
and television subscription contracts, without a call for tenders, between Belgacom and 
other inter-municipal associations. In paragraph 40, the Court is quite clear in showing 
an a priori choice of principle. Indeed, there seems to be no balancing operated in light 
of the particular circumstances of the case; the Court instead  blocks immediately the 
application of the principle of legal certainty when faced with the principle of equal 
treatment, stating that, albeit the 'principle of legal certainty, which is a general 
principle of European Union law, provides ample justification for observance of the 
legal effects of an agreement (...) that principle may not be relied on to give an 
agreement an extended scope which is contrary to the principles of equal treatment and 
non-discrimination and the obligation of transparency deriving therefrom. It is of no 
import in that regard that that extended scope may offer a suitable solution for putting 
an end to a dispute which has arisen between the parties concerned, for reasons outside 
their control, as to the scope of the agreement by which they are bound'. 
It is apparent from this excerpt of the case that, when confronted with the principle of 
equal treatment, the principle of legal certainty is bound to fall. There is no indication, 
in the reasoning, of a balancing of the principles; on the contrary, it is quite clear that 
the general principle of equality, even in its specific expressions, will prevail. In this 
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light, it seems that, in the EU legal system, principles behave more like concrete rules. 
In fact, in shaping the interpretation of the Treaty and secondary legislation, they tend to 
evolve and become more and more a rule-type of instrument
312
.   
By using an anchorage basis in certain legal instruments, the Court transforms what 
would be abstract principles into rules with concrete modes of operation.  
3.5 Modes of Operation 
Until this point, this work has been analyzing the concept of general principle and the 
impact its use as a reasoning tool has had in the development of the European Union. 
Albeit there seems to be some consensus on the functions general principles exert as 
legal sources, the same is not true when it comes to the categories of principles 
proposed by the doctrine, and especially as regards the terminology used by the case-
law, legislature and academic analyses. In fact, as was shown, even the use of different 
languages in the EU and the translations of the cases may become a problem on the 
understanding of what can be referred to as a general principle of EU law. The lack of 
coherence stemming from the case law equally undermines the efforts to come to a 
definition. 
In face of these difficulties, and the existence of other concepts that are used with such a 
degree of entwinement that it becomes difficult to distinguish them from one another, 
my work purports to shift the focus from the categorization and definition stance to an 
operative and more dynamic look at these tools. As such, instead of looking at specific 
general principles and the influence they have had, when individualized, in the case law 
of the court, I have opted for focusing on the modes of operation of these tools in the 
case law of the court. By mode of operation I am referring to the interaction of 
norms, as a result of which one deeply affects the interpretation of the other. This 
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is possible, as referred above, with regard to hierarchical relationships - but not only. 
The legal techniques the Court has used to make general principles applicable in certain 
cases are varied and assume different forms. Often, they will also be deeply entwined 
with the functions attributed to general principles
313
.  
The following table purports to expose the modes of operation which I have isolated 
through case law analysis and their potential effects. This is the structure I have 
followed in my approach to the topic, which dictates that the principles are not 
considered in their facet of freestanding norms, but rather, and strictly, in combination 
with other sources. This table thus presents an attempt to make a correspondence 
between the functions usually attributed to general principles of EU law and the modes 
in which they operate in the case law, especially in interaction with other (written) legal 
sources, as well as the effects produced therewith.  
 Departing from the functions, I have isolated three different possible 
interactions
314
, one within their role as grounds for judicial review, and two other 
anchored on the hermeneutical function. In the first one, the focus is on the technique 
used to assess the validity or conformity of the norms under review. This is done in 
relation to EU secondary law, where general principles represent the standard of 
primary law against which the legality of these is assessed; and national law, in order to 
determine the compatibility of national law with EU law. The validity assessment is 
guided, at EU level, by the Rule of Law, whilst in relation to Member State law it 
represents a consequence of primacy. 
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In the part, the interpretive or hermeneutical look at general principles is rather focused 
on the substance or scope of the norms at stake, not their validity. As such, the impact 
will be different here from the one achieved in the first part. It is precisely within this 
latter function that the analysis of modes of operation of general principles in 
combination with other legal sources has guided my findings. 
It should be noted that gap-filling function has been omitted, since I believe that, 
ultimately, it can be traced back to the hermeneutical function. I find it especially so due 
to doubts raised on whether one can speak of gap filling when to real 'gaps' seem to 
exist (this will obviously depend on the definition of gap, but I am addressing here the 






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































This table represents the different types of interactions of general principles of EU law 
and other legal sources as structured throughout the next chapters. I shall not deal with 
the validity control, since much has been written about it. Instead, I will focus on the 
other modes of operation identified in relation to the interpretive function. The first 
chapter, chapter IV, will deal with what could be considered the more 'traditional' type 
of mode of operation of general principles of EU law. It will deal with their use in 
reading written instruments, either of primary or secondary law level, with the 
interaction resulting in an expansion or contraction of the scope of application ratione 
materiae of EU law. 
Chapter V will then turn to the same type of operation, but this time with impact on the 
scope of application ratione personae. Here lie the most controversial cases on the 
potential horizontal direct effect of directives and/or general principles of EU law. 
Finally, Chapter VI will deal with a different type of interaction: while the first two 
were mostly dual relationships, which dealt with the general principle, on the one hand, 
and the written source of EU law (even if national implementing law is at stake), on the 
other, the relationships analyzed in this chapter, especially in what comes to private law, 
will have a strong component of national law. This means that national laws and legal 
concepts assume a much less muted role here than in the other two modes of operation. 
The areas chosen are examples of areas where EU law has been expanding its reach, 
although many doubts remain with regard to the legitimacy of these claims. Here, in the 
progressive creation and development of both an European private law and an European 
criminal law, general principles are particularly visible in the way the regulate the way 
national courts and authorities are to read and interpret EU law - but by restricting the 
written scope of the instrument at hand in favour of general principles of national origin. 
Whereas general principles of EU law are generally inspired by national constitutional 
laws and traditions, here the connection seems to be stronger, with the Court using 
principles directly from the legal systems of Member States and somewhat provoking 





The aim of this chapter was to serve as an opening for the presentation of the identified 
modes of operation of general principles of EU law when combined with other legal 
sources. The framework of analysis is thereby launched, showing that the EU legal 
system should not be seen as a static and rigid hierarchic complex of rules, but rather, in 
fact, a product of different combinations. These combinations take place not only at the 
level of legal sources available, but also at the level of the methods of interpretation 
used by the judiciary. 
This endows EU law with a set of dynamics which are not easy to grasp, especially in 
view of the evolution the system has suffered since its inception. Concepts such as 
fundamental freedoms and values and objectives of EU law have been juggled with one 
another, in an attempt to build a strong internal market and, more recently, a space of 
fundamental rights aimed at individuals, who are not seen as mere production factors 
anymore. 
General principles have played an undoubtedly important role in these developments. 
And even nowadays, when the amount of other legal sources available seems profuse, 
covering all areas of influence of EU law, they are still being used. That is precisely the 
premise from which this work departs: that the role of general principles has also 
adapted throughout the evolution of the system. As such, the importance of these tools 
gains a special place in the interpretation of the scope of EU law when they are applied 









CHAPTER IV: GENERAL PRINCIPLES AND OTHER LEGAL 
SOURCES: IMPACT ON THE SCOPE OF APPLICATION RATIONE 
MATERIAE 
Foreword 
General principles are used, in EU law, as strong interpretation tools, sometimes 
providing for interpretations that would not, at first glance, be foreseen. This might lead 
to a type of ‘creative’ interpretation of EU law, one that can be shaped with an 
extremely thin connection to the legislative instrument in question, be it a directive or a 
Regulation. Indeed, the Court has done so in certain cases and, by anchoring the 
reasoning on a general principle of EU law, has reached conclusions that seemed very 
unlikely in light of the wording, hence extrapolating the scope defined in the 
instrument
315
. This type of interpretation, guided by a teleological approach, can have 
several configurations, impacting on the scope of application of EU law in varied ways. 
General principles have an important role to play as regards the interpenetration of 
different norms and levels of EU law. They have been used, in this respect, in order to 
render EU law applicable in areas not meant to be covered by it, as such contributing 
‘towards the pervasive effect of EU law within national legal systems’
316
. Indeed, this 
strong interpretive facet seems to have been overlooked in the light of their integrative 
function in case of lacunae; the first, however, bears a critical impact in the definition of 
the ways EU law is applied
317
.  
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4.1 Directives and regulations applied beyond their scope by 
means of a general principle of EU law 
The mode of operation analyzed in this chapter touches upon different areas of EU law, 
as the reading will reflect. The different sectors will be looked at not in function of the 
use of a specific general principle, but rather based upon the mode of operation chosen 
by the Court to make such principles applicable by reading them jointly, or in the light 
of, a certain instrument of written EU law. This examination intends to show that, in 
certain cases, the principle based reasoning of the Court will have an impact on the 
scope of application of EU law which will reflect on the subject matter envisaged. 
Hence, situations which would not be considered to be covered a priori will be 
perceived as nonetheless encompassed by EU law. 
The case law analysed below shows that general principles are still exceedingly being 
used as tools for the interpretation of written instruments. However, in both general 
cases or in more specific areas, the interpretation reaches sometimes a level of creative 
reading which necessarily detaches the application of the instruments from that of the 
principle as such. This can be traced as far back as the Casagrande case which is 
perhaps the best starting point in understanding the structural impact general principles 
can have and have achieved within the application of EU law, especially in what comes 




In very brief terms, Mr. Casagrande, an Italian national son of emigrants in Germany, 
had lived since his birth in Munich. After his father passed away, his mother applied for 
a monthly grant which was provided to families with low income by Bavarian law, so as 
to guarantee that Mr. Casagrande could stay in school. The application was denied, 
however, since the municipality sustained that only German nationals would be eligible. 
Mr. Casagrande contested the decision, alleging that the law represented discriminatory 
treatment and was therefore incompatible with Regulation No. 1612/68, for which it 
should be declared void. Indeed, article no. 12 of the Regulation stated that 'the children 
of a national of a Member State who is or has been employed in the territory of another 
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Member State shall be admitted to that State’s general educational, apprenticeship and 
vocational training courses under the same conditions as the nationals of that State, if 
such children are residing in its territory'
319
. The Staatsanwaltschaft of the Bayerisches 
Verwaltungsgerischt München alleged that the right to be admitted to educational 
courses under the same conditions as nationals was guaranteed for children of workers 
of other Member States; however, this right did not entail a right to receive individual 
educational grants
320
. Article 7 of the Regulation was considered not to be called into 
question, since 'the prohibition on discrimination contained in this provision relates only 
to employment and is for the benefit of the workers themselves, so that advantages 
intended for members of their family are excluded from [its] scope.'
321
  
The Opinion of Advocate-General Warner was very bold, suggesting that the Court 
should rule favourably to the plaintiff. He proposed that a 'wider' interpretation was to 
be adopted, albeit the European Community, at the time, did not have 'a power to 
legislate about educational matters as such':  it had the 'power to legislate for the 
freedom of movement of workers, which includes power to legislate about the education 
of their children'
322
. He defended furthermore that article 12 of the Regulation should be 
interpreted as meaning that all educational advantages were to be applied to children of 
nationals of other Member States, provided they resided in the correspondent 
territory
323
, inspired by the 'spirit of Regulation No. 1612/68'
324
. 
The Court followed this Opinion closely. It began by stating that, although it could not 
pronounce itself on national legislation, it was, however, competent to interpret article 
12 of the Regulation and consider whether educational grants were to be brought within 
the scope of the article
325
. It then proposed a reading of the said article in the light of the 
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recitals of the Regulation, considering that the fifth recital's reference to the 'elimination 
of obstacles to the mobility of workers' and effective integration of their family in the 
host country’s society necessarily meant that children of migrant workers should be 
given the exact same conditions in what relates to access to educational grants
326
. It 
hence concluded that 'article 12 refers not only to rules relating to admission but also to 
general measures intended to facilitate educational attendance'
327
. Subsequently, the 
Court addressed the statement made by the Staatsanwaltschaft that both educational 
policy and grants were matters outside the scope of EC law, since they pertained to 
Member States’ competences. Here the Court truly takes a bold approach, which clearly 
stirs up the definition of powers as regards their existence and exercise
328
 - paragraph 12 
of the ruling reads as follows: 
'Although educational and training policy is not as such intended in the spheres which 
the Treaty has entrusted to the Community institutions, it does not follow that the 
exercise of powers transferred to the Community is in some way limited if it is of such 
nature as to affect the measures taken in the execution of a policy such as that of 
education and training' 
As Weiler notes, this sole paragraph has a deeper significance, for it enlarges 'the 
language from Community institutions to the Community as a whole and hence from 
secondary legislation to the entire Treaty'
329
. But the Court went further, stating, in 
relation to article 12 of the Regulation, that 'although the determination of the 
conditions referred to there is a matter for the authorities competent under national law, 
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they must however be applied without discrimination (...)'
330
. This is so since 
Regulations are directly effective, thus the source from where the conditions of 
application are derived 'is irrelevant'
331
. Lenaerts remarked that, although the previous 
lack of provisions on the matter 'should normally have meant that the Community was 
not to touch educational policy (or individual aspects of it)'
332
, this did not deter the 
Community from exercising its powers whenever education was at stake in connection 
with other aspects regulated by EC law
333
. Regulation No. 1612/68 was thus interpreted 
by the Court in light of the general principle of equality and non-discrimination. 
Although the national court sustained that such prohibition of discrimination, as 
enshrined in the provisions of the regulation, related merely to employment and 
workers' personal benefits, the Court understood that such limitation was not in respect 
of the said principle. This resulted in the accordance of a much wider meaning to the 
provisions at stake, allowing them to encompass a category of people which would not 
fall under their scope under a literal or historical interpretation. This case can be 
considered to establish a first example of this mode of operation, with the Court 
defending the possibility for action in an extension of the scope of application ratione 
materiae.  
But the examples of this mode of operation are not few. In Impact
334
, the provisions of a 
directive and its respective framework agreement were deemed to apply to situations 
that seemed, at first sight, to be excluded. The reference was brought by an Irish trade 
union, representing civil servants, against government departments which employed the 
latter concerning pay and pension conditions of fixed-term workers, relying on clauses 
of the framework agreement
335
 annexed to directive 1999/70/EC. Two different 
principles were at stake here: the principle of effective judicial protection, regarding 
access to specialized national courts, and the principle of non-discrimination, relating to 
employment conditions. As regards effective judicial protection, the Court stated that it 
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configures a general principle of Community law
336
. As such, although neither the 
directive nor the implementing provisions designated the national courts having 
jurisdiction over matters covered during the referred period (that between the 
implementation of the directive and the entry in to force of the implementing national 
provisions), the Court considered that, even in the absence of express powers, 
specialized courts should be available for individuals wanting to bring an action. 
Doubling the competent courts depending on the period of reference would involve an 
immense burden for the workers and hence be contrary to the general principle of 
effective judicial protection. And even though it leaves the final choice to the Member 
State, the CJEU reminds it of the indirect effect of EU law – when interpreting national 
law in light of the directive, it is bound by the general principle
337
. 
The Court then turned to the issue of whether the concept of ‘employment conditions’, 
embedded on Clause 4 of the framework agreement, could include remuneration and 
pensions
338
. Whilst in previous case-law the Court had clearly stated that working 
conditions cannot encompass pay
339
, here it stated that ‘excluding from the term 
‘employment conditions’ for the purposes of that clause financial conditions such as 
those relating to remuneration and pensions, effectively reduces – contrary to the 
objective attributed to that clause – the scope of the protection against discrimination for 
the workers concerned by introducing a distinction based on the nature of the 
employment conditions, which the wording of that clause does not in any way 
suggest’
340
. It furthermore added that, even if before it was considered appropriate to 
exclude determination of the level of wages from harmonisation, this reasoning ‘cannot 
however be extended to any question involving any sort of link with pay’
341
. Moreover, 
although this question fell outside the competence of the Community legislature, the 
exercise of the competence by national authorities was bound by the general principle of 
non-discrimination. 
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It is quite patent in this case that the interpretation given by the Court is strongly shaped 
by the reading of the general principles as given expression in the directive and 
framework agreement. The use of both general principles allowed for the provisions in 
question to be applied to something which was, at first sight, excluded from their scope 
and hence rendering them applicable (or at least urging the national court to read 
national provisions in conformity, giving rise to indirect effect). The general principle 
was extracted from the directive’s objective, triggered by the latter’s provisions; 
however, the principle stands independently. It needs a ‘trigger’ so as to be invoked, but 
past that moment, it is applied as such, although the application is shaped by the written 
norms. 
Such use of general principles as ‘tools’ for an ‘extensive’ or creative interpretation of 
directives is also visible in cases like Del Cerro Alonso, DEB or Chatzi
342
. 
Del Cerro Alonso concerned the interpretation of the same framework agreement and 
directive at stake in Impact, relating to fixed-term workers and economic benefits 
arising from the length of service. Ms. Del Cerro Alonso claimed the existence of 
discrimination between temporary and permanent staff in the public health service. The 
Court underlined the principle of equal treatment and non-discrimination as one of the 
general principles of Community law, before stating that the directive provisions were 
of general application since they enshrined ‘rules of Community social law of particular 
importance’
343
. It furthermore added that the principle of non-discrimination, as ‘a 
principle of Community social law’, was not to be interpreted restrictively
344
. It is 
apparent that the scope of application of the directive is determined by the general 
principle of non-discrimination, in spite of the wording used being that of ‘principle of 
Community social law’, rather than general principle of EU law. 
This approach is very similar to the one proposed in DEB, where the raised question 
was whether the principle of effective judicial protection requires legal aid to be granted 
to legal persons which cannot make an advance payment in respect of costs before the 
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court, in the context of a procedure for pursuing a claim seeking to establish State 
liability under the provisions of directive 2003/8/EC
345
. The CJEU starts by reminding 
that the principle at stake ‘is a general principle of EU law stemming from the 
constitutional traditions common to the Member States’
346
, which is not only enshrined 
in the European Convention on Human Rights, but also in the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the EU. Appealing to all those sources
347
, the Court stated that the fact that the 
directive did not make any reference to the provision for legal aid to be granted to legal 
persons could not lead to the conclusion that they were excluded from its scope. 
Similarly, the principle of effective judicial protection should be interpreted as allowing 
for such possibility
348
. Also here it becomes clear that the scope of application of the 
directive – its ‘large’ applicability – was determined by the principle, proving that 
general principles serve as tools for the expansion of the scope of application of EU 
law. 
Chatzi provides a slightly different example, since the final solution is not one of direct 
application of the principle; however, a similar type of operation is used in the 
reasoning of the CJEU. In this reference, anchored in directive 96/34/EC and the 
framework agreement annexed thereto, the Court was asked to pronounce itself on the 
matter of parental leaves, specifically those relating to the birth of twins. It must be 
borne in mind that this directive intends to lay down minimum requirements on parental 
leave, in promotion of family life and equal opportunities and treatment between men 
and women. However, the Court, in spite of ultimately having redirected the solution to 
be given to the national court, seems to have embarked upon a very creative 
interpretation of the instruments –viewing the minimum requirements as maximum 
ones. It started by acknowledging that ‘the principle of equal treatment for men and 
women, which forms part of the social provisions of the Treaty, is of general 
application’
349
; Community measures must thus be interpreted in conformity with 
‘primary law as a whole’, including the principle of equal treatment, which has to be 
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respected when implementing a directive
350
.This principle configures a general 
principle of EU law (as well as a fundamental right enshrined in the CFREU) and 
establishes that ‘comparable situations must not be treated differently and that different 
situations must not be treated in the same way’
351
. As such, it could never lead to a 
result where parents having twins would be entitled to two parental leaves, rather 
meaning that situations which are not comparable to one another must be treated 
differently. Leaving the resolution as to the concrete measures to establish that 
difference to the national court and legislature, the Court nonetheless provided very 
clear guiding steps
352
. Again, an instrument of secondary legislation was given a very 
specific interpretation by the Court, in light of the underlying general principle. 
The Court has followed the same type of approach when reading regulations. Sturgeon 
is a good example, again on the principle of equality, now relating to the right to 
compensation of passengers of delayed flights
353
. At stake was regulation no. 
261/2004/EC, which was framed to give a right to compensation to passengers in 
cancelled flights, but clearly distinguishing these situations from those of passengers 
with delayed flights (it should be noted that ‘flight delay’ was not even defined by this 
instrument, as the Court noticed in paragraph 29). The situation in question concerned a 
delay of more than 25 hours in a return flight from Toronto to Frankfurt, having the 
passengers alleged that such a delay would, in fact, represent a cancellation, which the 
air company refuted. 
The CJEU, invoking the principle of equal treatment, considered that the situations of a 
passenger with a delayed flight and one whose flight has been cancelled are 
comparable
354
, stating moreover that the aim of the regulation at stake was to prevent 
both types of situations, in order to increase protection to all air passengers
355
. This 
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reading of the regulation in light of the principle of equal treatment represented a quite 
extensive enlargement of its scope of application, which was not well received by air 
carriers and national courts
356
. In fact, the preparatory works leading to the enactment of 
the regulation had clarified the intention of Member States to distinguish the two types 
of situations.  
Similarly, in France and Others v Commission, the Court acknowledged that the 
regulation in question (the Merger regulation) did not provide a textual solution for the 
case
357
. The case concerned again the control powers of the Commission in case of 
concentrations between undertakings potentially leading to the establishment of a 
dominant position in the market. If the instrument was to be interpreted historically, a 
reductive approach would have been the one chosen. However, in the light of an 
underlying principle and the purposes of the regulation, ‘the fact that the Community 
legislature did not expressly provide in the regulation for a procedure safeguarding the 
right to be heard of third party undertakings alleged to hold a collective dominant 
position together with the undertakings involved in the concentration cannot be 




4.1.1 Restriction of the scope ratione materiae? 
All the above may erroneously lead to the assumption that the CJEU merely uses its 
principle-based reasoning as a means to extensively read the instrument in question and 
make the principles operate through its provisions beyond the envisaged legislative 
scope. While it is undeniable that the Court has often opted for a constructive reading of 
the written instruments, appealing to their teleological bases in order to expand and 
supplement the latter, in certain situations the contrary has happened. Let us hence look 
                                                 
356
 Contra, defending that this is a valid, free of criticism, interpretation of the Court, see Lenaerts and 
Fons, 'To Say What the Law of the EU Is’ (cit. supra), at p. 7: 'Stated simply, the ECJ will never ignore 
the clear and precise wording of an EU law provision'; and, at p. 16, in relation to Sturgeon: 'where an EU 
law provision may be subject to several interpretations, the ECJ must give priority to that which 
guarantees compliance with primary EU law and ensures its effectiveness.'  
357
 Judgment in France and Others v Commission, C-68/94 and C-30/95, EU:C:1998:148 
358




at cases where a restrictive interpretation was the result of the principle-based reasoning 
of the Court, such as AM&S
359
. 
This case dates back to the 1980’s and concerned the powers of the Commission to take 
on investigations in undertakings relating to competition matters. Regulation 17, whose 
aim was to ensure compliance with articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty, established that the 
Commission was entitled to scrutinize all the relevant documents, including 
communications between the company and its lawyer. The investigating powers were 
laid down in article 14 thereof, establishing that the Commission was entitled to analyze 
all business records, with no distinction. The claim made before the Court contended 
that this entailed disrespect to the principle of confidentiality between lawyer and client.  
The Court stated clearly, in paragraph 27, that ‘although interpretation of the 
Regulation, in light of its wording, structure and aims, empowers the Commission, that 
power is subject to a restriction – the need to protect confidentiality’. This was anchored 
on the statement that ‘Community law, which derives not only from the economic but 
also the legal interpenetration of the Member States, must take into account the 
principles and concepts common to the law of those States concerning the observance of 
confidentiality’
360
. Here the move is different – Regulation 17 ought to be read, 
according to the Court, in accordance with the principle, but this teleological approach 
resulted in a restrictive interpretation rather than, as seen in the cases shown above, an 
extensive reading of the legislation
361
. This restriction has two readings to it: while 
indeed it significantly restricts the material scope of the said provision, the fact is that 
such restriction is transposable on the powers of the Commission, which become less 
broad. As such, it can be argued that, while restricting the material scope of the rules 
contained in the Regulation, the Court's teleological interpretation in fact aimed at 
enhancing fundamental rights' protection as an underlying aim to its reading
362
. 
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The significance of this principle should be further explained, especially in its facet of 
protection of business secrets. In Akzo Chemie UK
363
, the Court mitigated again the 
literal reading of the rules in question. When referring to the lifting of professional 
secrecy in the communications of the Commission, it acknowledged that the latter could 
communicate certain parts of the information ‘in so far as it is necessary to do so for the 
proper conduct of the investigation’
364
. However, it furthered, ‘that power does not 
apply to all documents of the kind covered by the obligation of professional secrecy’, 
since the Commission is required to ‘have regard to the legitimate interests of the 
undertakings. It is so because the provisions protecting business secrets, ‘although they 




This case is mentioned in a later ruling, SEP, this time on the interpretation of article 10 
of the same Regulation
366
. This article establishes that the Commission is obliged to 
‘transmit to the competent authorities of the Member States a copy of the applications 
and notifications together with copies of the most important documents’. However, the 
Court restricted the interpretation to be given to the wording present here, by stating that 
‘Article 10(1) must be interpreted in the light of the general principle of the right of 
undertakings to the protection of their business secrets, a principle which finds 
expression in Article 214 of the Treaty and various provisions of Regulation No 17, 
such as Articles 19(3), 20(2) and 21(2)’
367
. The ‘general principle of the protection of 





 case provides a striking example of what could be seen as a case of 
'missed' combination between a general principle and a written source. This case 
concerned two Romanian nationals, Ms. Dano and her son who were living in Germany 
but were refused financial benefits by way of basic provision from the Leipzig 
Jobcenter. Their successive applications were always refused, which resulted in an 
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action before the Social Court. This court, albeit considering that no entitlement was 
found, raised 'doubts as to whether provisions of EU law, in particular Article 4 of 
regulation no. 883/2004, the general principle of non-discrimination resulting from 
Article 18 TFEU and the general right of residence resulting from Article 20 TFEU, 
preclude those provisions of German law'
370
.  
The Court recurs to the formula of 'specific expression', but in relation to article 18 
TFEU, stating that the principle of non-discrimination is specified not only by article 24 
of the directive in what comes to EU citizens who have exercised their freedom of 
movement, but also in article 4 of the regulation at stake
371
. The 'non-discrimination 
guarantees' are hence interpreted through the lens of primary law
372
; however, there is a 
departure from the latter, since the essential conditions to be taken into account are 
those of the secondary law instrument
373
: 'so far as concerns access to social benefits, 
such as those at issue in the main proceedings, a Union citizen can claim equal 
treatment with nationals of the host Member State only if his residence in the 




This is an odd reasoning. The Court seems to be oblivious to the impact of one source 
on the other, appearing to avoid their combined application. Indeed, it leaves the general 
principle completely aside in the reasoning, using only the directive to decide the 
application of EU law. This shows that the Court’s proclivity to use the combination of 
sources in order to achieve certain outcomes may dictate exactly the inverse when 
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4.1.2 The impact of this mode of operation in the Public Procurement Field: 
Peculiarities of transparency as an expression of equal treatment 
Much like in other sectors of EU law, the public procurement field has also presented a 
platform for the Court to develop its principle-based reasoning, especially in connection 
with its core directives
376
. Also here the soil seems to be fertile enough for the Court to 
use general principles in a way to interfere with the subject-matter of secondary law 
instruments, and even with the application of certain Treaty provisions. Article 2 of 
directive 2004/18 overtly establishes some principles which are to be made applicable 
in the relationships governed thereby. It reads as follows: 
Article 2 
Principles of awarding contracts 
Contracting authorities shall treat economic operators equally and non-
discriminatorily and shall act in a transparent way. 
 
It hence establishes, as applicable to the relationships and situations governed by the 
directive, the principle of equality and non-discrimination. Again, there are references 
to specific expressions of this principle, provided for by the provisions at stake; the 
main one is the duty or obligation of transparency. The objectives of public 
procurement legislation seem, however, to be distinct from the aims sought in the cases 
above. 
a) Cases 
The case law where the principle of transparency is used as an expression of the general 
principle of equal treatment can provide further detail on the peculiar way this mode of 
operation assumes in the area. Commission v. Denmark
377
 concerned a tender proposal 
for the construction of a bridge. The Commission contended that there was a breach of 
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‘the principle that all tenderers should be treated alike’ for there had been certain factors 
which favoured a sole tenderer in the negotiations. As such, the Commission deemed 
the contract to be contrary to the Treaty provisions and directive 71/305/EEC. The 
Danish government argued that, as such ‘principle’ is not mentioned in the provisions of 
the directive, and it hence would constitute a different legal basis, this could not be 
accepted. 
The Court, however, interpreted the fact that the directive made no mention of the 
principle as no hindrance to the latter’s application. In relation to the arguments relating 
to the establishment of a new legal basis, the Court stated that ‘although the directive 
makes no express mention of the principle of equal treatment of tenderers, the duty to 
observe that principle lies at the very heart of the directive’
378
. Again, it is the principle 
underlying the instrument which applies, somewhat broadening the scope of what 
would be regarded as encompassed by the latter. The violation is assessed in light of the 





, on the other hand, the Court furthered the need to respect the general 
principle even if the contracts are excluded from the scope of the instrument, enhancing 
the obligation of transparency which stems from the principle
381
. In this case, 
concerning the pecuniary interest of a contract in a procedure for the award of public 
service contracts in the telecommunications sector in Austria, the Court stated clearly 
that ‘notwithstanding the fact that, as Community law stands at present, such contracts 
are excluded from the scope of directive 93/38, the contracting entities concluding them 
are, none the less, bound to comply with the fundamental rules of the Treaty, in general, 
and the principle of non-discrimination on the ground of nationality, in particular’
382
. 
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It furthered, in the following paragraphs, that such a principle necessarily implies ‘an 
obligation of transparency’ as a condition for the compliance, establishing which other 
requirements are to be followed for this assessment. As such, and albeit leaving it to the 
national court to evaluate the materiality of the compliance with such requirements, the 
Court makes it quite clear that it is the principle which dictates the result to be achieved, 
even if the situation is excluded from the scope of EU law
383
. 
Roughly ten years later, the Concordia case
384
 presented another opportunity for the 
Court to apply the equality principle in a public service contract. At stake this time was 
the awarding of a contract, by the city of Helsinki, for the operation of a route in the 
urban bus network where one of the categories of criteria set for the punctuation was the 
operator’s ‘quality and environment management’. Concordia, which came below in the 
qualifications and hence did not receive the contract offer, argued that such criterion 
was ‘unfair and discriminatory’ for it would only apply to a certain type of vehicle, 
detained by the winner
385
. The matter was referred for conformity assessment with the 
public procurement directives 93/38/EEC and 92/50/EEC. 
The Court started by analyzing, in paragraphs 53 and following, the criteria referred in 
the provisions, stating that they ought to be in conformity with the procedural rules laid 
down in the directive and, moreover, with ‘all the fundamental principles of Community 
law, in particular de principle of non-discrimination’
386
. The criteria are thus to be 
aligned with it. Furthermore, the Court notes, in paragraph 81, that ‘the principle of 
equal treatment lies at the very heart of the public procurement directives’ and hence it 
is to be applicable to the consideration of which criteria are to be applied in the case
387
. 
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The idea that the principle of equal treatment and non-discrimination is fundamental in 
this field is reiterated in the Sea case
388
, with the additional assertion, by the Court, that 
fundamental principles are to always be applied therein. The Court hence restated the 
Telaustria ruling. In this case, the dispute emerged from the tendering procedure for a 
contract for the service of collecting, transporting and disposing of solid urban waste in 
the Italian territory of Comune di Ponte Nossa. The question posed was essentially 
whether the case in the proceedings concerned a service concession or a public service 
contract, the latter falling under directive 2004/18. 
The Court minimized the question as such, stating in paragraph 33 that both situations 
could be encompassed by the directive. It reaffirmed the need to use the Treaty 
provisions and the directive, ‘and also the general principles of which the latter are 
specific expression’
389
, so as to interpret its previous case-law, recognizing 
subsequently that, ‘despite the fact that certain contracts do not fall within the ambit of 
the Community public procurement directives, the contracting authorities concluding 
them are bound to comply with the fundamental rules of the Treaty’
390
. Academic 
commentators seem to accept this approach, as was already referred above. 
This need of compliance with the fundamental principles of EU law is extended also to 
the choice of the relevant criteria for the authority to decide to contract with a relevant 
tenderer. In EVN AG and Wienstrom, a case concerning a tender procedure for 
electricity supply, the decision of the contracting authority of giving preference to 
renewable energy sources was challenged
391
. The participants in the tender procedure 
contended that the choice of the most economically advantageous candidate could not 
take into consideration ecological criteria. 
The Court analyzed the situation, stating that such a criterion could in fact be used in the 
choice procedure. It stipulated merely that the criterion at stake should be ‘linked to the 
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subject-matter of the contract’, could ‘not confer an unrestricted freedom of choice on 
the authority’, should be ‘expressly mentioned in the contract documents or the tender 
notice’ and, above all, and in line with the Concordia case, was to be aligned ‘with all 
the fundamental principles of Community law, in particular the principle of non-
discrimination’
392
. It then went on affirming that the conformity with ‘both the 
procedural rules and the fundamental principles laid down in community law’ was an 
essential requirement; its non-observance would result in the whole procedure being 




The potential to expand the public procurement directives field, and not merely its 
guiding directives, with recourse to general principles, is quite visible in this trend of 
cases. Indeed, not only do they serve as strong interpretive tools for these instruments, 
the heart at which they lie, but they seem to have the proclivity to be applicable to 
contracts which fall outside their scope whenever some connection is found. This can be 
illustrated by the Azienda Sanitaria Locale di Lecce case
394
. 
Here at stake was a consultancy contract established, between the Azienda Sanitaria and 
the Salento University, in view of the study and evaluation of the seismic vulnerability 
of hospital structures in the Italian province of Lecce, which the appellants deemed to 
be a public service contract, whilst the defendants claimed that it consisted of a ‘mere 
cooperation agreement between public administrations in respect of activities of general 
interest’, where the role of the University would be part of its ‘institutional activities’.  
The application of the public procurement directive in question was necessarily attached 
to the premise that the threshold for economic interest therein proposed was met, which 
the Court reiterates in paragraph 23 of the ruling. However, it proceeds to state that, in 
case the directive is considered not to be applicable for failure of the situation to meet 
such level, the general principles of the FEU apply, ‘provided there is a certain cross 
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border interest’ (an expression already used before, in the Brescia
395
 case). It proceeds, 
in the following paragraph, to state that it is immaterial what rule brings the situation 
under the scope of application of EU law, for the interpretation to be given would not 
vary.  
On the one hand, it is quite unclear what can represent this ‘certain’ interest: the 
jurisprudence does not lay down any criteria, in a way which seems concurrent with the 
Court’s reading of the scope of application of EU law as encompassing ‘measures that 
otherwise fall under the purview of EU law’. The vagueness in these expressions 
necessarily endows the Court with additional leeway as regards the interpretation of 
their scope. On the other hand, it seems also that the underlying principle of equal 
treatment, with the consequent obligation of transparency attached therein, will prevail 
in the assessment. In this sense, the mode of operation of principles in this area seems to 
have the same characteristics presented above, with the Court using secondary law as a 





 reaffirmed the importance of this component in the application of the 
general principle of equality in the public procurement area
398
. Here the Court addresses 
nationality as a specific expression of this principle, in a way which is closer to the case 
law on fundamental rights. Here, however, the anchor provisions pertain rather to the 
Treaty. This case concerned the award of the management of two car parks in the 
municipality of Brixen to a particular (company) with affiliation to the municipality. 
The process was undergone without a call for tenders. 
In spite of deciding that the situation in question did not come under the scope of the 
legislative instruments on public procurement at the time, since public service 
concessions are excluded, the Court nonetheless proceeded to give an answer to the 
                                                 
395
 Judgment in ASM Brescia, C‑347/06, EU:C:2008:416, at paragraph 58 
396
 Treumer, S., ‘Recent Trends’ (cit. supra), p.17-28, at p.27 ‘secondary community law is used as a 
lever for the development of primary law. (…) When reading obligations into primary Community law, 
the Court uses adjacent or merely proposed secondary community law as a lever.’ 
397
 Judgment in Parking Brixen, C‑458/03, EU:C:2005:605 
398
 See also judgment in ANAV, C‑410/04, EU:C:2006:237, at paragraph 20; Medipac, cit. supra, at 
paragraph 34; Asociación Profesional de Empresas de Reparto y Manipulado de Correspondencia, C‑




situation at stake. In addition to referring to the obligation of non-discrimination on 
grounds of nationality established by article 12 EC, the Court made reference to the 
Treaty provisions in articles 43 and 49 EC, ascertaining them as ‘specific expressions of 
the principle of equal treatment’. It then furthers that ‘the prohibition on discrimination 
on grounds of nationality is also a specific expression of the general principle of equal 
treatment’, with the caveat that, in the field of public procurement, ‘the principle of 
equal treatment of tenderers is to be applied to public service concessions even in the 
absence of discrimination on grounds of nationality’
399
. Then it restates the impact of 
the duty of transparency – the latter implies and, at the same time, ensures the 
application of the referred principles by the public authorities. 
Also here, the Court acknowledges that situations not falling within this field of EU law 
are nonetheless capable of being subject to the application of the same principles. 
Indeed, although the application of the public procurement directives might depend on 
the existence of a contract, it doesn’t mean that this field is exhausted in that 
application. In fact, national legislation will be likewise precluded in the absence of 
such a contract due to its antagonism to Treaty articles and ‘the principles of equal 
treatment, non-discrimination and transparency associated with them’, which are still 
applicable, independently
400
. The Treaty provisions at stake here, 12, 43 and 49 EC are 
then qualified as ‘specific expression’ of general principles
401
. 
Coditel, relating to public service concession contracts, is also solved in the same 
manner. Indeed, the piece of secondary legislation in question (directive 92/50/EEC) is 
set aside as non-applicable and full application is given to ‘the rules set out in Articles 
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It has been argued that the principle of transparency should be seen as a principle which 
can be individualized from equal treatment
403
. Here again the difference versus other 
specific expressions or grounds for discrimination seems to be highlighted: it seems 
inconceivable that non-discrimination on grounds of nationality, or even age, can be 
considered separately from the principle of equal treatment. Transparency, however, 
does come up as a somewhat different expression: Prechal and De Leeuw argue that 
‘while, on the one hand, there is a very close link between the principle of equal 
treatment and transparency, on the other transparency also has, in certain respects, a 
more specific meaning of its own. (…) it seems to go beyond of what non-
discrimination requires’
404
. This is arguably highlighted by the fact that the public 
procurement directives make express reference to transparency as a requirement 
stemming from the principles to be applicable to the procedures. 
The mode of operation of this particular principle, or of the specific expressions of the 
general principle of equal treatment in the field, seems to have affected EU law in an 
interesting way. Indeed, the case law above shows that, when applied jointly with 
directives, once again the principle impacts on the subject matter defined by the scope 
of application of the instruments. However, when the court decides that the matter falls 
outside of the scope of the directives, it moves to the Treaty provisions, rather 
transforming them in the anchorage for principle application
405
. This happens equally in 
what concerns other expressions, or factors of discrimination, as can be illustrated by 
the case-law
406
. Commission v. France
407
 indicates that ‘the principle of equal 
treatment, of which Article 59 of the Treaty is a specific expression, prohibits not only 
overt discrimination by reason of nationality but also all covert forms of discrimination 
which, by the application of other criteria of differentiation, lead in fact to the same 
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. Again this points to the specific sectorial objectives of public procurement 
law, which are to secure first and foremost the fundamental freedoms protected by the 
Treaties. 
b) New directives, same aims? 
It should be noted that the year 2014 brought about three new instruments in the public 
procurement field. The existing directives were replaced, and an additional instrument 
was created – the directive on concession contracts
409
. The period for transposition of 
these instruments is still ongoing, but it is worth mentioning the important changes 
envisaged, which lie especially, for the purposes of this analysis, on the fact that there 
has been an attempt of codification of the public procurement case-law of the Court. 
Particularly the latter instrument makes the principles of equality, non-discrimination 
and consequent transparency need quite visible, by keeping them in article 3 (whereas 




It is quite clear from the preambles that there has been an effort to codify the case law 
of the court, and to indicate that interpretation should be made according to the rulings. 
However, interestingly enough, its wording remains striking in what comes to general 
principles, in a way, perhaps in deference to the particular aims pursued in this area of 
EU law. Indeed, it is therein affirmed that 'respect of the principles of the Treaty and in 
particular to the principle of freedom of movement of goods, the principle of freedom of 
establishment and the principle of freedom to provide services and to the principles 
deriving therefrom, such as the principle of equal treatment, the principle of non-
discrimination, the principle of mutual recognition, the principle of proportionality and 
the principle of transparency'
411
. The conception present here is hence that these general 
principles of EU law derive from the fundamental freedoms. Albeit this can be seen as 
an indication of matters already addressed in chapter III, of intertwinement and 
interchangeability of concepts, bearing in mind the objectives of EU law, this statement 
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is certainly more blatant than usual. A possible explanation is naturally the niche 
addressed. Indeed, the specific connection of public procurement to the achievement of 
the internal market is undeniable. 
Indeed, when looking at the principle of transparency as a specific expression of the 
general principle of equal treatment and non-discrimination, it becomes clear that not 
only the rationale, but also the essence to be protected are quite different. Whilst in the 
other cases in this chapter equal treatment is perceived as creating specific expressions 
which configure particular non-discrimination grounds, here the obligation or principle 
of transparency seems to operate a bit differently. When the Court refers to the principle 
of equal treatment and its specific expressions in the area of fundamental rights 
protection, it seems that the aim is one of strengthening individual protection and 
fostering the European citizenship domain. The area of public procurement, however, 
was developed with view to internal market regulation and so as to secure economic 
freedoms and their consolidation. The case law shows a clear concern with free 
movement of services and fair competition, in which the principle of non-discrimination 
on grounds of nationality gains accentuated relevance. That can be illustrated by the 
ruling in Pressetext
412
, where the Court states that ‘the principal objective of the 
Community rules in the field of public procurement is to ensure the free movement of 
services and the opening-up to undistorted competition in all the Member States’
413
. As 
such, so as ‘to pursue that two-fold objective, Community law applies inter alia the 
principle of non-discrimination on grounds of nationality, the principle of equal 
treatment of tenderers and the obligation of transparency resulting therefrom’
414
.  
Although the Court refers to equal treatment and non-discrimination in these cases, it is 
the transparency requirement which gains special relevance, by providing the criterion 
against which the situation is to be assessed
415
. In addition, the formulations used by the 
Court seem to be more vague than in other ‘specific’ factors, with ‘the relationship 
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between equal treatment and transparency [not being] entirely clear’
416
. This stems from 
the fact that the Court has acknowledged the application of this general principle also in 
areas outside the scope of application of the public procurement directives
417
, something 
which is widely recognized by the doctrine, who asserts that since ‘the principle is 
directly based on the Treaty, it is hardly surprising that [it] is applicable to all 
procurements covered by the Treaty’
418
. Notwithstanding this assertion, it is also 
questioned whether the Court should have the power to create obligations for authorities 




The mode of operation of general principles of EU law presented in this chapter is one 
of the most commonly observed in the case-law of the Court. The relationship of 
principles, as primary law, and other written norms has shown great proclivity to impact 
the scope of application of the latter. However, in spite of the many criticisms to the 
constant ‘expansion’ of the ratione materiae scope of application of EU law via this 
mode of operation, the truth is that, as was shown, the impact can be one of contraction 
as well.  
Many commentators have noted that the Court tends to use general principles in this 
manner so as to keep the compatibility of secondary law instruments with primary law, 
without having to declare them unlawful. Syrpis defends that this is usually done by 
'straining the interpretation' of secondary law 'so that it is brought in conformity with 
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primary law' (what he labels as a 'constitutionally orthodox position'). However, he 
notes, the Court has also ensured that primary law prevails by simply deciding that 
secondary law is inapplicable in a given situation, and thus setting it aside, or reasoning 
on the basis of the principle of proportionality and its direct application to the national 
implementing law in question
420
. 
This reconciling of the underlying rationale with the letter of the instrument comes 
sometimes as a forced exercise, as was discussed for example in relation Sturgeon: there 
is a blatant detachment from the text in order to set its compatibility with the general 
principle of equal treatment. Syrpis equally distinguishes situations where, he argues, 
secondary law will 'take priority over' primary law. I do not see these as absolutely 
distinguishable situations. In fact, my understanding of the cases analysed in this 
chapter is that the mode in which general principles of EU law operate in combination 
with written instruments can have, as referred above, both a restricting and an 
expanding impact on the scope of application of the measure at stake. However, this 
stems from the necessary reading on the basis of an, albeit many times unwritten, 
primary law norm.  
The 'significant impact' secondary law can have in primary law interpretation can 
perhaps be explained as an attempt to frame the principle in such a way which it may 
effectively be applied to the situation at stake
421
. It is irrefutable, in any case, that this 
mode of operation has a deep impact in the functioning and development of EU law. It 
dictates the way secondary legislation is to be read and applied in the national context 
and, in that sense, it provides the added legitimacy of primary law stance. 
The case of public procurement is particularly interesting, especially due to the contours 
assumed by the principle of transparency, as an expression of equal treatment. The 
public procurement directives expressly refer to transparency as a requirement 
applicable in the procedures, what makes of this expression a peculiar one, an almost 
self-standing principle on its own, as noted by Prechal and De Leeuw. The Court has 
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hence developed a particular facet of the principle of equal treatment in the framework 
of the public procurement procedures, but still uses the general principle in a way that 








CHAPTER V: GENERAL PRINCIPLES AND OTHER LEGAL 
SOURCES: IMPACT ON THE SCOPE OF APPLICATION RATIONE 
PERSONAE 
Foreword 
The case-law presented in the previous chapter has shown how rulings based on general 
principles can have a deep impact in the scope of application of European Union law. 
The cases analyzed present proof that the use of these tools can provoke expansion and 
contraction of the scope of application of the instruments in terms of ratione materiae, 
that is, influencing the definition of the subject matter covered by certain written 
instruments. This, as is patent from the above, happens in spite of what is expressly 
written, bearing a deep impact in the interpretation of the range of situations which can 
be covered by the latter. 
This type of interaction between general principles and written instruments can, 
however, be said to represent much of the 'traditional' function of general principles: 
their interpretive aptitude renders them especially attractive tools for the Court to 
address questions raised on the reading of written legislation so as to surpass any 
existing gaps, or even go further. This use is more easily reconciled with the powers of 
the Court, and, in spite of being often criticized, does not clash directly with any 
previous case law. In fact, an extension of the scope of application as regards the subject 
matter covered by the instruments is precisely what has made EU law advance since the 
core rulings in Internationale, Stauder and Nold. 
However, this chapter purports to analyze the same type of technique, but this time with 
a different result: an impact on the scope of application of the written instruments in 
question with regard to their application ratione personae. Certain pieces of legislation, 
however deemed applicable in terms of the subject matter covered in the situations 
raised, would nonetheless not be considered applicable to the relationship at stake if a 
general principle of EU law had not been used. The impact on the type of relationships 
covered has raised many questions, namely for its potential conflict with previously 
settled case-law of the Court. Indeed, while relationships between individuals and 




between private parties. This is especially true in what comes to the possible effects of 
directives. As such, before entering the analysis of this strand of cases, it is imperative 
to give a brief account of the conducting lines of the Court’s jurisprudence on that 
matter. 
5.1 Excursus: directives – their direct effect and the lack thereof 
Directives are perhaps the most controversial instrument of EU law in what relates to 
their effects on national law
422
. Despite the well-known formulation ‘a directive shall be 
binding, as to the result to be achieved, upon each Member State to which it is 
addressed, but shall leave to the national authorities the choice of form and methods’
423
, 
the jurisprudence of the Court has given different and debatable interpretations to these 
words, provoking fierce reactions amongst the critics and creating a sometimes difficult 
task for national courts, when confronted with a claim based on those instruments. One 
of the accusations the CJEU has faced after cases where it recurred to principle-based 
reasoning is that of the attribution of horizontal direct effect to directives, an effect 
which was always denied, by the very Court, to these instruments
424
. Many have seen 
general principles as a manouevre de diversion of the Court to temper its consistent 
jurisprudence on the matter, with the consequent decision to, ultimately, admit that 




To start but with a brief explanation, direct effect can be roughly defined as the aptitude 
of a norm of EU law to be applied in proceedings taking place in national courts. It can 
be either vertical, and thus binding upon the State, or horizontal, in which case EU law 
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will be applicable in proceedings between private individuals. The Court established 
from the outset that directives were to have vertical direct effect, but could not be relied 
upon against individuals
426
. In Marshall the Court alluded to article 249 (now 288) of 
the Treaty, relying on the binding nature of the instruments in relation only to the 
Member States to which it is addressed
427
. This jurisprudence was tempered by the so-
called ‘Foster-test’. Foster
428
 shaped the extension of vertical direct effect by presenting 
a broad conception of State, in order to include organizations or bodies which are 
subject to its authority or control, or otherwise had special powers – including tax 




Pfeiffer brought about yet another nuance, by establishing that inconsistencies between 
national law and a directive must be settled in favour of the latter, in name of the 
effectiveness of EU law
430
. National law is thus to be read in the light of the Directive; 
however, this applies to all national law and not only the implementing provisions, and 
is binding on all competent authorities
431
.  This ‘indirect effect’ of directives was 




 settled that this 
obligation of consistent interpretation was due also in proceedings between private 
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parties. The outcome is very similar to horizontal direct effect since, in reality, private 
parties’ obligations are, in substance, determined by the directive; nonetheless, the 
immediate source is still national law. 
This interpretative obligation should be set off by the expiry of the time limit for 
implementation of the directive in the national legal system – application ratione 
tempore. However, the Court established in Inter-Environnement Wallonie
434
 that any 
measures liable to undermine the result envisaged by European Union law, even in the 
period of transposition, should be avoided. This follows from the primacy of EU law, 
rather than directly from the instruments in question, as the Court points out in 
paragraph 48 of the ruling in Kücükdeveci: it is demanded by article 288 TFEU, as well 
as by the need to guarantee effectiveness to EU law. 
At least two other types of situations have to be referred to concerning directives: that of 
the so-called ‘incidental effect’ and State liability for non-compliance/implementation. 
The first category occurs when a directive per se does not impose a direct obligation on 
the individual, but the non-compliance of the Member State at stake leads to the setting 
aside of national law. This, in its turn, results in the imposition of contractual 
obligations that would not exist if the previous national law was the one in force
435
. The 
other type of situation is that raised by the failure of a Member State to comply with, 
and hence fail to implement or correctly implement, a directive
436
. This method 
surpasses the need for horizontal direct effect, since, if a correct implementation had 
been applied, the obligations would be imposed through national law. So, after the 
expiry of the period for implementation, if a Member State has failed to fulfill its 
obligation of doing so, it may be held liable for damages
437
. 
The recognition of such effect does not raise many problems in and of itself. Failure to 
comply with the obligations ought to be sanctioned, since the contrary would 
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tantamount to denying protection to European citizens for a failure of their Member 
State. Many doubts are otherwise raised in what concerns the effects of the directive 
before the expiry of the period for implementation. The notion of direct effect demands 
that provisions are sufficiently certain, precise, unconditional and clear so as to be 
invoked directly; nonetheless, it seems that, per se, a directive remains deprived of 
being invoked in proceedings between individuals
438
. 
This finding has been put into question in cases where directives operate as a trigger for 
the application of general principles of EU law, to which they lend 'specific expression'. 
Before addressing that issue, however, a look at the potential effects of general 
principles and other types of written trigger instruments is imperative. 
5.2 'Trigger' instruments 
General principles of EU law are widely accepted as having primary law value. As 
such, the question raised in this context is necessarily whether they can have direct 
application in both types of situations exposed above, that is, vertical and horizontal 
direct effect. The recognition of the latter poses numerous problems, due to the often 
unwritten nature of the principles and their inherent vagueness. Their application 
becomes furthermore complicated when it is dictated by the regulatory framework of 
directives which, as seen above, are deprived of horizontal direct effect as result of their 
nature, and as asserted by the constant jurisprudence of the Court. Indeed, as will be 
exposed, the application of general principles of EU law is usually ‘limited’ or shaped 
by the regulatory written frameworks provided by another instrument; moreover, even if 
the measures in question would not necessarily imply EU law application, the Court 
resorts to ‘trigger’ instruments
439
, which anchor the scope of application ratione 
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5.2.1 Principles operating through a Treaty provision 
Before engaging in the analysis of the rulings where general principles were applied 
through secondary legislation, one must note that the principled reasoning of the Court 
is not confined to such instruments. Indeed, the technique analyzed in this chapter, that 
of the direct application of general principles to individuals and relationships between 
private parties via a written regulatory framework, is perceivable already in written 
primary law.  
Although Treaty provisions have the highest rank in the hierarchy of sources in EU law, 
the jurisprudence of the Court has shown that the prominent place which general 
principles of EU law occupy can challenge that assumption. Effectively, they have been 
used to interpret the core of certain Treaty provisions and challenge their apparent 
meaning. ‘Discovered’ by the Court as underlying values, they have altered the reading 




Defrenne II is a good example. This ruling was considered ground-breaking for 
arguably establishing the direct effect of article 119 EC (now 157 TFEU), a provision 
which was specifically addressed to Member States. Indeed, the Court stated in this case 
that the fact that Member States are the addressees of the provisions does in no way 
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prevent the rights in question from being conferred to individuals, and hence directly 
relied upon. This decision was reached by considering the nature of the principle 
enshrined in the Treaty provision – the principle of equality between men and women. 
Article 119 was interpreted in the light of an underlying general principle, said to form 
‘part of the foundations of the Community’
442
. However, what seems to be at stake is 
rather a direct application of the general principle of equal treatment, having its specific 
expression in a Treaty provision. In other words: paragraph 19 of the ruling is very clear 
in showing that what is implemented is not the provision per se, but its teleological aim. 
This aim is provided by the general principle therein ‘contained’: ‘article 119 is 
mandatory in nature’. Invoking the principle through the Treaty provision was hence 
essential to guarantee EU law’s effectiveness
443
. 
The exact same process is undergone in Angonese
444
 (with express reference to 
Defrenne II in paragraph 34 of the ruling). In question was a matter concerning freedom 
of movement of workers under article 48 (now article 54 TFEU). The Court states that 
the Treaty provision ‘lays down a fundamental freedom’ and ‘constitutes a specific 
application’ of the general principle of non-discrimination, similarly to article 119
445
. 
As a consequence, and in spite of the non-applicability of the Regulation implementing 
the provision, the latter is directly applicable to private individuals. Once again, 
horizontal effect is given not to the Treaty article but to the principle, ‘mandatory in 
nature’, of which it is a specific expression: the Court isolates and makes applicable a 
latent general principle, rather than worrying whether the provision in question is 
sufficiently clear and precise to produce direct effect
446
. 
5.2.2 Principles operating through secondary law instruments 
The overview of the legal effects of directives made in the beginning of the chapter fails 
to address the question which has been raised more often lately: that of the legal effect 
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of directives combined with general principles of EU law, or of self-standing general 
principles in case of directives that ‘flesh-out’ and enshrine them
447
. As noted, situations 
where vertical direct effect is concerned do not seem to represent a problem in terms of 
application of EU law, since the situation comes under EU law scope both ratione 
materiae and ratione personae. Cases like Marshall, Palacios de la Vila, Wolf or 
Petersen are labeled ‘easy cases’, since the applicant’s claim was brought towards the 
State or its emanations, with no horizontal relationship being at stake
448
. As the latter 




Could the same underlying rationale which shaped this type of reasoning be the one 
justifying the newest developments, where the CJEU faces situations entailing potential 
horizontal direct effect? Indeed, Mangold and Kücükdeveci seem to fall accordingly in 
terms of ratione materiae under the scope of EU law – in both cases the situations were 
somehow covered by EU norms, or within a certain area of substantive EU law 
interest
450
. Nonetheless, ratione personae, and hence creating potential horizontal 
application of EU law, they have raised much controversy
451
. The Court was 
immediately accused of attributing what it had always denied to directives: horizontal 
direct effect.  
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In 2003, Mr. Mangold, aged 56, had signed a fixed-term employment contract with a 
lawyer, Mr. Helm. According to the German law at the time it was prescribed that the 
conclusion of fixed-term contracts had to be accompanied by a justification, unless the 
contract at stake concerned a worker who was 52 years old or older. This limit had been 
temporarily lowered from 58 to 52 until the end of 2006. Mr. Mangold contested the 
terms of his contract before the local Employment Court, alleging that the law was in 
breach of directives 1999/70/EC (on fixed-term contracts) and 2000/78/EC (the 
Framework directive)
452
. The national Court made a reference for preliminary ruling to 
the CJEU, which stated that implementation of the directive was not restricted to the 
measures created with that end in view, but rather spread to all the domestic measures 
intended to pursue the objectives laid down therein
453
. As to the implementation period, 
the CJEU first started by reminding its Inter-Environnement Wallonie doctrine, 
according to which Member States should refrain, even before the expiry of the 
implementation period, from taking measures which are contrary to the spirit and 
objectives of the directive
454
. 
Then, the Court proceeded to state that the directive, ‘in second place and above all’, 
did not itself lay down the principle of equal treatment (whose source is to be found in 
constitutional traditions of Member States and in international instruments), merely 
providing a framework for its application
455
. Interestingly, in the next paragraph, where 
the principle of non-discrimination on grounds of age is proclaimed a general principle 
of Community law
456
, there is a shift in the anchoring of the reasoning back to directive 
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1999/70. Indeed, the Court refers to the Framework directive, in paragraph 74, as laying 
down the framework to the application of the principle; however, and using the 
conjunction ‘thus’ to reinforce the elevation of the latter to the status of general 
principle of EC law, it then interprets the scope of application of EC norms and 
principles with reference to a different instrument. 
Notwithstanding the fact that the ‘trigger’ is provided by the existence of measures 
which implement directive 1999/7 (and hence fall within the scope of application of EC 
law), again there is a shift in paragraph 76 back to the Framework directive. The Court 
here considers that legal protection of EU citizens dictated that observance of the 
principle could not be made conditional on the transposition deadline, for that would 
prejudice its full effectiveness. The use of the conjunction ‘consequently’ is merely a 
diversion, for these three paragraphs do not present such a connection. Effectively, 
although the principle is anchored in directive 2000/78, the piece of legislation which 
provides the connection with the scope of application of EU law (the ‘trigger’ 
instrument) is a different one. And the Court further enhances ‘the legal protection 
which individuals derive from the rules of Community law’ and their effectiveness in 
paragraph 77, by referring to disputes ‘involving the principle of non-discrimination in 
respect of age’ – without making clear what is the extension this ‘involvement’ 
encompasses. 
Kücükdeveci appeared years later as a restatement of the former ruling, in spite of all the 
criticisms (inclusively from inside the Court
457
). The CJEU reaffirmed therein the 
existence of a general principle of non-discrimination on grounds of age, with precise 
contours being laid down in the Framework directive. This Directive was to be seen as 
having the purpose of laying down a general framework for, and giving specific 
expression to, the general principle
458
. This time, the facts had occurred after the expiry 
of the period for transposition, so measures implementing the directive would 
necessarily be brought under the scope of EU law. However, the measures in question 
were not aimed at implementing the instrument: they affected the conditions of 
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dismissal and should hence ‘be regarded as laying down rules on the conditions of 
dismissal’
459
. The link created seems to be rather tenuous, despite the connection made 
between the paragraphs. 
The national court had further asked whether the matter was to be analyzed by reference 
to primary law or to the directive. Facing this, the Court clearly stated that the general 
principle, as given expression in the directive, should be the basis for examination, for 
the directive itself could not impose obligations between private individuals
460
. Then, in 
spite of proclaiming EU primary law as the law to be applied, the Court nonetheless 
reiterates that the interpretation should be made in the light of the directive, its wording 
and purpose, so as to ensure full effectiveness to the principle
461
. Moreover, in cases 
where national legislation was found to be contrary to the general principle, primacy of 
EU law dictates that the former should be disapplied
462
.  
Again, there seem to be swift shifts in the paragraphs: the Court starts by stating that the 
situation in question is to be assessed in the light of the principle (EU primary law); 
however, the application of the latter is to be made according to the wording, purpose 
and results prescribed by the directive. This operation enhances the importance of the 
trigger instrument, for it results in an application of the underlying general principle 




It should be added that the Court referred, as before, to the constitutional traditions 
common to the Member States and to international instruments; it did, furthermore, 
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recur to article 21 of the Charter of Fundamental rights of the European Union, but 
without basing the ruling in it
464
. This aspect is particularly striking: why would the 
Court chose the general principle enshrined in the directive instead of a principle/right 
clearly stated in an instrument with the same legal value as the Treaties? Whereas in 
Mangold the Charter was not available yet with the same legal force, here this is not the 
case. The answer is thus not easy, nor definitive, but it might represent a statement of 
the Court versus the horizontal clauses enshrined in this instrument and hence guarantee 
application of EU law whenever a general principle in the form of the one at stake is 
found to be applicable. 
a) The 'deadline for implementation' question 
Mangold and Kücükdeveci, although very similar (to the point of the latter being labeled 
Mangold II
465
), have one fundamental difference: the deadline for the expiry of the 
period of implementation of the directive in question had not yet occurred in Mangold, 
whereas in Kücükudeveci it had. How could the directive’s regime be enforced in the 
first situation? It is argued that the application of general principles cannot be 
conditioned or contained by a deadline imposed to an instrument of secondary law – it 
has to be considered relevant in all situations where EU law is deemed applicable
466
. In 
Mangold, the ‘trigger’ was presented by directive 1999/70/EC, since directive 
2000/78/EC had not yet come to full implementation; as such, provided that the first 
                                                 
464
Kücükdeveci, paragraph 74. See Laulom, S., ‘Non-discrimination en fonction de l’âge: un principe 
général du droit de l’UE’, in Forum Réflexions – Semaine Sociale Lamy, nº1432, 08.02.2010, p.5-9, 
available at http://www.wk-rh.fr/actualites/upload/SSL1432_non_discrimination.pdf, at p.6: ‘Pour fonder 
sa décision, la Cour reprend le même raisonnement que dans l’arrêt Mangold. Elle estime que la Directive 
2000/78 ne consacre pas elle-même le principe (…). La Directive ne fait donc que concrétiser le principe 
de non-discrimination en fonction de l’âge que doit être considéré comme un principe général du droit de 
l’Union. (...) La Cour ajoute un autre élément plus convaincant qu’elle ne pouvait pas utiliser à l’époque 
de l’arrêt Mangold: la Charte des droits fondamentaux de l’Union européenne.’ 
465
 See Frisch, J., ‘Kücükdeveci – a European Case’, where it refers to a blogger, Eurostein, who stated 
the following: 'I am afraid Kücükdeveci is Mangold II: an even bolder, but simultaneously also more 
porously argued decision.' (original article, Mangold II, no longer available on adjudicatingeurope.eu) – 
available athttp://julienfrisch.blogspot.pt/2010/02/kucukdeveci-european-case.html 
466
 Dougan, M., ‘In Defence of Mangold’, in Arnull et al. (eds), A Constitutional Order of States? (cit. 
supra), pp. 219-244, at p.235: ‘provided the deadline for transposition of the Directive has passed, and 
disputed national measures fall within the material scope of application, there will be no need to show 
that they constitute implementing provisions’. It thus seems that, before the deadline, interpretation in 
conformity was launched due to the existence of a ‘trigger’, Directive 1999/70, since the measures at 
stake were not implementing provisions. See also Ellis, E., and Watson, P., EU Anti-Discrimination Law 
(cit. supra), at p.128/129: ‘the principle of non-discrimination on grounds of age was not used to oust a 
directive but rather to fulfill the traditional function of general principles as a tool for the review of union 




instrument contained a link to EU law, the question is not of application of directive 
2000/78/EC, according to the Court, but of the general principle of non-discrimination 
on grounds of age it enshrines. The contours of the principle are, however, drawn by the 
directive’s provisions. 
It should be noted that this is not the first time a directive is said to be an expression of a 
general principle – P v S provides a clear statement in that sense
467
; but the shape of the 




As regards the issue of the expiry of the deadline for the implementation of the 
directive, it seems that the quality of ‘trigger’ for such instruments will be required only 




Deadline for transposition has 
expired 
Deadline for transposition has 
not yet expired 
 
Implementing the Directive 
Irrelevant Irrelevant 
 
Any measures having a bearing on 
the substantive area of the directive 
Measure automatically brought 
within the EU law scope 
Need for ‘trigger’ to anchor the 
‘invokability’ of EU law 
 
It seems that, when the national measures in question are designed to put into effect the 
directive, the fact that the deadline for transposition has not yet expired will not prevent 
the Court from exercising its adjudication powers upon them, in light of the Inter-
Environnement Wallonie case law. On the other hand, when the measures in question 
are not implementing EU law, but somehow fall within the scope of its areas of 
application (ie. there is some sort of substantive EU law impact on the matter), the fact 
that the deadline for transposition has expired will imply that even such measures will 
be brought under EU law’s scope of application, and hence its purview possibilities. 
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When that timespan has not yet elapsed, however, the Court requires a ‘trigger’ 
instrument so as to establish a connection. This will correspond, for example, to the role 
played by directive 1999/70 in Mangold. 
The reasoning in Defrenne II can be used analogously. In that case, in paragraph 64, the 
Court states that ‘no implementing provision could adversely affect the direct effect of 
the article’. Comparatively, in Mangold, there was no need for implementation of the 
directive since the principle had direct effect in itself. Furthermore, paragraph 54 in 
Defrenne states that the Treaty provision does not lay down the principles – similarly to 
what was stated in relation to the directive, in Kücükdeveci, where the secondary law 
instrument merely provided further details on the material scope. Hence, the principles 
underlying a certain provision seem to be made applicable independently of the nature 
of the trigger at stake
469
.  
b) Direct application of the principle... or the directive's regime? 
On a different note, in Mangold and Kücükdeveci the principle is not only applied 
through the directive, but rather entails additionally an application of the directive’s 
regime to the situation at stake
470
. These cases would not have been as controversial had 
the situation involved an organ of State, i.e., had they concerned vertical relations. In 
such a case, EU law would be deemed directly applicable: had the parties involved 
represented a claim against public authorities or other State emanations, the rationale 
used would have potentially been the one used in Marshall. This case seems to be, 
however, the key aspect to the development of the latter approach. In fact, paragraph 48 
of Marshall is very clear: ‘a directive may not of itself impose obligations on an 
individual and that a provision of a directive may not be relied upon as such against 
such a person’ (emphasis added). Here lays a minimal detail which can potentiate a 
different reading of the case law. The words of the Court are clear – a directive may not 
of itself impose obligations on an individual. Of itself means solely, intrinsically, 
                                                 
469
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considered alone, ‘when nothing in addition can be identified’
471
. The opposite can be 
said to occur, thus, when the instrument is combined with a general principle, when it 
bears the principle underlying the values expressed in both its recitals and articles and 
settles its contours. Indeed, by saying ‘of itself’, the Court must a contrario accept that 
not alone (ie, in combination with a general principle) a directive may have the capacity 
of imposing obligations on individuals.  
That implies accepting that the directive’s regime may be applied when giving 
expression to a general principle, hence guaranteeing EU law’s effectiveness
472
. It 
seems that, in using the expression ‘of itself’ in Marshall, the Court might have opened 
space for its own circumvention. 
But how should the degree of entwinement between the two norms be assessed in this 
type of combination? Audiolux can again serve as a yardstick to look at this operation, 
as can Römer
473
. Without repeating the factual situation, it suffices to recall that the 
CJEU stated that it is not sufficient that secondary legislation lays down certain 
provisions relating to well defined rights for those to qualify as general principles of EU 
law
474,475
. As such, it is clear that general principles with very specific content cannot be 
inferred from directive provisions – only self-standing principles underlying the 
legislative instrument can be applied through its framework
476
. 
This means that the existence of the principle is completely independent from the 
directive, due to its constitutional primary law character; however, the principle finds 
expression in the directive provisions, without gaining very specific contours, so as to 
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maintain the possibility for broad application. Mere reference to the principles in the 
preamble will hence not suffice to indicate, per se, that they enshrine a certain principle 
and define its particular features.  
Römer can also shed some light on the fine-tuning of the technique used by the Court as 
regards this type of operation. Although there is no application of the general principle 
of non-discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation to the situation referred, the 
Court still built a careful reasoning around it, even before defining whether the case 
came within the scope of EU law or not. Application of the principle was closely tied to 
the directive and its transposition deadline, which had not yet expired, as well as to 
article 13 (now 19 TFEU)
477
. Paragraph 63 is quite clear in stating that since the 
provisions were not implementing provisions, the situation was deemed not to be within 
the scope of EU law. Possibly, had another instrument existed in complementarity with 
directive 2000/78, as it did in Mangold, the ‘trigger’ could have been created
478
. 
Does this mean that the application of the general principle depends on full the 
transposition of a directive in a Member State’s legal order? In Mangold whilst the 
‘trigger’ directive (directive 1999/70) supported the application of the general principle, 
the other (directive 2000/78) provided the effective framework through which the latter 
was applied. This shows that only within a provided framework will a general principle 
have application, independently from its self-standing characteristics. This might 
happen when the subject matter falls within the scope of a directive, even if no 
implementing provisions are at stake. The purpose of the directive is to ‘flesh-out’ the 
principle, laying the conditions of application that the principle will subsequently fulfill 
in order to be effective (and horizontally directly effective, as a source of primary 
law)
479
. This view is expressed in some way by Advocate-General Trstenjak in 
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Rosenbladt, although it is not particularly developed
480
: the Advocate-General seems to 
think that the Court, in such cases, will apply the principle under the conditions set out 
by the directive, even if the latter does not of itself apply to the situation referred. 
While both the substantive law and its direct horizontal application are triggered by the 
legislative instrument, with the primary law-value general principle applying to the 
matter in question, the substance of the principle does not seem to be determined 
autonomously but rather with reference to more detailed rules provided for by the 
directive
481
. This is reiterated in a recent case, Commission v Vanbreda, where the Court 
stated: 
‘Where they take account of the provisions of a directive laying down a general 
principle of EU law, the EU Courts cannot, however, disregard the content of those 
provisions, notwithstanding the fact that they do not apply as such in the case in 
question. More particularly, to the extent that it is apparent from the provisions of such 
a directive that the EU legislature sought to establish a balance between the different 
interests involved, the EU Courts must take account of that balance in their application 
of the general principle thus laid down.’
482
 
Arguably, the facts are looked at with the directive serving as a ‘magnifying glass’, 
while the derivation of legal consequences reports back to primary law. 
Notwithstanding that fact, the directive’s provisions, as the Court constantly recalls, can 
have horizontal direct effect if they are clear, unconditional and the individual invokes 
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them in case the directive has not been transposed or been so incorrectly (even if such 
provisions are not applicable when the governed relationship is one between private 
individuals, for that would endanger the principle of legal certainty). 
c) Effects achieved  
The function of the written instrument in these cases seems hence to be a different, 
bipartite one: it triggers the substantive field of EU law related to the matter, working 
then as a normative basis for its application. Being that, all by itself, the directive cannot 
impose obligations in these cases, the question is rather whether the provision at stake is 
self-sufficient to vest a ‘droit subjectif’ in such a way that its respect can be claimed per 
se before a national court. The combination is here deep, with a high level of 
intertwinement of the directive with the principle must be high, since the first shapes the 
way the latter’s substance will show. The general principle constitutes the rule of law 
applicable and directly effective on national law, but this connection is so strong that 
one may question whether the horizontal direct effect of a general principle is possible 
without an ancillary legislative instrument
483
. 
On the other hand, it should be noted that this application leads to the ‘exclusion’ of the 
application of the national rules – this is demanded by the primacy of EU law
484
. It is 
questionable, however, whether the inexistence of national conflicting rules to be 
displaced can dictate the non-application of a principle
485
. 
This approach is confirmed in other cases. In Prigge the Court stated (in relation again 
to directive 2000/78) that, ‘where they adopt measures which fall within the scope of 
the directive, which gives specific expression, in the domain of employment and 
occupation, to the principle of non-discrimination on grounds of age, the social partners 
must respect the directive’
486
. This is the wording used also in Hennigs and Odar
487
. As 
                                                 
483
 See Muir, E., ‘Of Ages in’ (cit. supra), at p.57/59; see also Spaventa, E., 'The Horizontal application' 
(cit. supra), at p.208/209: ‘general principles (…) are applicable whenever the situation falls within the 
scope of Union law, regardless of whether the trigger is the Treaty or a directive, and regardless of 
whether the litigation is vertical or horizontal’; and Safjan, M. and Miklaszewicz, P., ‘Horizontal Effect 
of the General Principles of EU law in the sphere of Private Law’, ERPL, 3-2010, p.475-486 
484
Muir, E., ‘Of Ages in’ (cit. supra), at p.39 
485
 See reference to Audiolux in Spaventa, E., 'The Horizontal application' (cit. supra), at p.213 
486




such, it seems that, in spite of the substance of the general principle being of primary 
law level, the application will follow the directive’s regime, ‘the existing normative 
framework set out by the EU legislator’
488
.This is in direct opposition with statements 
which claim that true general principles of EU law with constitutional status are 
applicable on their own, without needing further legislative intervention
489
. Indeed, it is 
a fact that the application of a vague principle is extremely difficult, if not impossible, 
in its unwritten, uncertain shape, whose contours vary; a legislative framework has to be 
used one way or the other. This is why the assertion that horizontal direct application of 
general principles of EU law is possible as such seems to be implausible
490
. 
Muir has used three cumulative criteria to assert the generality of a principle of EU 
law
491
. First, the general principle in question must be well circumscribed, although 
general (not rendered applicable by general considerations but to a specific type of 
situations, although not as detailed as to dictate a particular choice); secondly, it must be 
substantiated through secondary legislation and, finally, the sole purpose of the directive 
is to give effect to the principle, to act as its expression. It thus seems that a general 
principle will not have its own scope of application as an isolated source of EU law.  
This suggests general principles need a framework for application, which is, in the 
analyzed cases, an instrument of secondary legislation which ‘fleshes out’ and shapes 
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the contours of the principle. Principles are then applicable through the ‘shaping’ 
directives, but only when some sort of trigger allows for the situation to be linked to EU 
law. Moreover, although their contours are presented by the directive, the general 
principles cannot be so precise as to give rise to specific obligations – so as to keep their 
general application tamed, according to the cases referred above. 
This type of operation, consisting of extracting an underlying value from a provision in 
a legal instrument, which acts as a specific expression of the first, seems not to be 
exclusive for invoking general principle. Indeed, it might also consist of reference to 
another norm, which value and application will be shaped according to the reference 
trigger. Viamex
492
provides a good example of that. In this case, an obligation derived 
from a directive was imposed on one of the parties. However, the legal basis was 
provided by a regulation: this instrument contained an express reference to the 
directive’s provisions, hence making them directly applicable, in spite of their lack of 
direct effect. It so seems that a directive will be capable of being applied between 
private individuals due to a reference to its provisions as binding made by a regulation. 
With the existing references being made and accepted between two instruments of 
secondary EU law, it is hard to see how this operation can be denied to a similar 
application of general principles, which constitute primary EU law and hence have a 
higher legal value.  
In this respect, reference must be equally made to the reasoning in AMS
493
. In this 
ruling, the Court discussed whether the right at stake was to be considered a right or a 
principle, or even a general principle, as was seen in chapter I. Moreover, however, the 
direct application of the principle was raised. Advocate General Cruz Villalón asserted, 
in his Opinion, that ‘the Charter confines the justiciability of ‘principles’ to their (…) 
refined state as rules and acts’. The latter, which are but a specific substantive and direct 
expression of the first, are ‘incorporated into the criterion for assessing the validity of 
other acts implementing that ‘principle’. Moreover, he affirms that it is in the light of 
such criterion (the wording of the principle and the acts which provide its ‘specific 
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substance and direct expression’) that the validity of other implementing acts is to be 
assessed
494
. An example of these implementing acts would be, in his opinion, the rule 
enshrined in article L.1111-3-4 of the French Labour Code. 
This rather elaborate construction lead the Advocate General to conclude that the fact 
that the instrument giving specific expression to the principle in question is a directive 
and cannot constitute any sort of hindrance. Indeed, after recalling the case law of the 
Court on the impossibility for directives to be relied upon by private individuals, he 
asserts that certain (not numerous) provisions are ‘capable of giving specific substantive 
and direct expression to the content of a principle’; as such, he reiterates that he would 
see no problem in allowing for certain exceptions to this rule since this would be an 
extremely individualized ad hoc function of the instruments – which he equates to the 
approach already followed in cases such as Mangold, Kücükdeveci and CIA Security
495
. 
He thus stated that, ‘on the basis of the second sentence of article 52(5) of the Charter, 
article 27 of the Charter, given specific substantive and direct expression in article 3(1) 
of directive 2002/14, may be relied on in a dispute between individuals, with the 




The Court nevertheless recalled, referring to Pfeiffer and Kücükdeveci as regards the 
potential effect of the directive at stake, that ‘even a clear, precise and unconditional 
provision of a directive seeking to confer rights or impose obligations on individuals 
cannot of itself apply in proceedings exclusively between private parties’, and AMS, in 
spite of its social objective, was a private association
497
. It then questioned whether the 
situation at stake was any similar to the one in Kücükdeveci, that is, whether ‘Article 27 
of the Charter, by itself or in conjunction with the provisions of directive 2002/14, can 
be invoked in a dispute between individuals in order to preclude (…) the application of 
the national provision which is not in conformity with that directive’
498
. In spite of 
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considering that, since the national provision at stake was a measure conceived to 
implement directive 2002/14, article 27 of the Charter was applicable to the case, the 
Court still concluded that the article could not be invoked in a dispute between 
individuals so as to displace the national legislation at hand
499
. As such, the Court seems 
to have closed the door for the Advocate General’s proposal of permitting an exception 
to the lack of horizontal direct effect of directives. 
The mode of operation under analysis in this chapter, however, can be seen as, rather 
than a veiled attribution of horizontal direct effect to directives, a consequence of EU 
law’s primacy. General principles, qualified as primary law norms, seem to be capable 
of vertical and horizontal direct effect
500
. However true this assertion might be, it is a 
fact that, as noted, by fostering their direct application through the regime of an 
instrument which is lower in rank, the Court is creating a confusion between the effects 
of legal norms. Albeit enhancing the legal certainty of an instrument which is unwritten 
and vague by providing it with a regulatory framework for application, the Court runs 
the risk of confining directives to a mere ‘decorative’ function
501
.  
5.3 Other general principles? 
Could Mangold and Kücükdeveci 'open the door' for all the grounds of discrimination 
referred to in article 19 TFEU to become overtly general principles of EU law, not 
merely as specific expressions of the general principle of equality? Can this be done 
only provided there is a secondary law instrument in the case in question? It is hard to 
predict how the Court's case-law will progress in this matter. The Runevič-Vardyn and 
Wardyn case raised questions with regard to the principle of non-discrimination on 
grounds of nationality and, specifically, racial or ethnic origin as a discrimination 
factor
502
. In this case, it has been noted that 'the fact that the situation of the couple did 
not fall within the scope of the directive did not exclude their situation falling within the 
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scope of EU law as such'
503
. There are many indications in what comes to the 
importance of this ground of discrimination, since reference is made not only in article 
19 TFEU, but also in article 21 of the Charter and indents number 2 and 3 of directive 
2000/43's preamble; in addition, 'the protection of the rights of members who belong to 
minority groups, as well as the protection of human rights, belong to the values of the 
European Union (art.2 TEU)'
504
. Could this be a missed opportunity for the recognition 
of a general principle of equality on the grounds of ethnic origin?  
This is not, however, the only ground for discrimination which has been at stake, as of 
lately. Take the FOA case
505
, which raised the question on whether obesity can be 
considered a disability and, if so, whether it can configure a prohibited ground on which 
to discriminate. The Court denied the existence of a general principle of non- 
discrimination on grounds of obesity, since such ground is not referred to in the 
Treaty
506
. Moreover, it stated, in relation to article 19 TFEU, that 'it follows from the 
case-law of the Court that this article only contains the rules governing the 
competencies of the EU and that, since it does not refer to discrimination on grounds of 
obesity as such, it cannot constitute a legal basis for measures of the Council of the 
European Union to combat such discrimination'
507
. Nonetheless, the Court recognized 
that, in certain cases, obesity can indeed configure a disability
508
 – and it seems that it 
has not 'closed the door' to the recognition of a general principle on grounds of the 
latter. Could this be an indication that only grounds expressly stated in the competence 
conferring provision are to be regarded as specific general principles, or specific 
expressions of the general principle of equal treatment and non-discrimination?
509
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There is indeed a discrepancy between the factors contemplated in article 19 TFEU and 
article 21 of the Charter. While the first seems to be closed, referring to 'sex, racial or 
ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation', the latter is 
potentially open-ended, with its reference to 'any ground such as sex, race, colour, 
ethnic or social origin, genetic features, language, religion or belief, political or any 
other opinion, membership of a national minority, property, birth, disability, age or 
sexual orientation'. 
How are these two to be put in accordance? It should be recalled that both cases concern 
primary law; the fact that the Charter does not extend the scope of application of the 
Treaties, in line with its article 52.3, does not diminish the potential of the grounds 
enshrined in article 21 to be seen as fully fledged fundamental rights, depending on how 
the Court will address further the division between rights and principles. This will 
inevitably trigger considerations on their potential direct application.  
The truth is that the Court seems to have become adamant to make use of specific 
general principles whenever another option is available, preferring to indicate the 
Charter reference and leave the matter for the national court to decide. 
5.4 Application of secondary law framework as a way to 'contain' 
primary law application? 
This chapter has so far analyzed the potential effects achieved by general principles 
when applied with recourse to the regulatory regime of a secondary law instrument. The 
particulars of the 'specific expression' technique, however, raise questions which were 
not yet addressed. Indeed, the latest cases show a tendency to 'contain' the application of 
general principles, by rendering it confined to the written framework or regime provided 
for by the ancillary instrument
510
.  
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It should be noted that this technique is not new. In fact, one look at early cases in the 
80's will confirm that the principle of non-discrimination has been claiming multiple 
'specific expressions', be it in Treaty provisions or secondary legislation. In Morson, a 
freedom of movement case, the Court stated that 'the rule prohibiting discrimination on 
grounds of nationality which article 7 of the Treaty enunciates in general terms and to 
which article 48 gives more specific expression'
511
; in Van Walsun, article 3 of 
regulation 3063/78 was found to be but a 'specific expression' of the principle enshrined 
in article 40.3 TEC 'in the light of the particular facts of the allocation of the quota in 
question, regard being had to the objectives of economic policy which are pursued in 
the context of the common organization of the market in beef and veal'
512
. Nonetheless, 
its use in the recent principle-based cases might show that the technique is being 
adapted, so as to provide a framework of legal certainty for the application of the 
principle (or perhaps to counter the accusations of lack of legal certainty). 
A first reading will already reveal that this type of restricting trend seems to be parallel, 
or at least presents substantial similarity, to the one encountered in cases connected to 
the fundamental freedoms
513
. Alpine Investments is a good example, albeit it presents 
the technique a contrario
514
. When realizing that the secondary legislation at hand could 
not be applicable to the case, since its scope of application would not encompass the 
situations in question, the Court referred to primary law, in the form of Treaty 
provisions. The Court noted that neither of the directives in question (directives 
93/22/EEC and 85/577/EEC) was applicable to the matter at stake; as such, the 
questions were addressed 'solely in the light of the Treaty provisions on the freedom to 
provide services'. 
The same is patent in Inspire Art: when noting that the analyzed rules could not be 
encompassed by the Eleventh directive, the provisions 'must therefore be considered in 
                                                                                                                                               
exception which is relied on by the Member States. (...) The interpretation of primary law in this way 
takes place either because the national court has made a link with secondary law, as in Bluhme, or 
because the ECJ has done so itself, as in Preussen.' 
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 Judgment in Morson and Jhanjan, 35/82 and 36/82, EU:C:1982:368, at paragraph 14 
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the light of articles 43EC and 48EC'
515
. This happens, according to the analysis of the 
Court, when no complete harmonisation has taken place in the field of law in 
question
516
 if, however, such harmonisation has occurred, the national measures are to 
be 'assessed in the light of the provisions of that harmonising measure and not in the 
light of primary law'
517
. This shows that, had the secondary legislation available covered 
the matters in analysis, primary law would not have need to be deployed, due to the 
existence of more specific provisions. 
How does any of this apply to the mode of operation analyzed in this chapter? 
In line with Prigge, Tyrolean Airlines reiterated that social partners adopting measures 
under directive 2000/78, 'which gives specific expression, in the domain of employment 
and occupation, to the principle of non-discrimination on grounds of age', were to 
respect that directive
518
. As such, the Court furthered, the questions were to be 
examined 'solely in the light of directive 2000/78'; that is, albeit the general principle, as 
primary law, is the underlying applicable law, the question analyzed falls within a 
certain written framework which provides it with 'specific expression'. A contrario, one 
could argue, in line with the fundamental freedoms cases referred to above, that had it 
been the case that no specific written expression was available to deepen the primary 
law reference, the latter would have been directly applied
519
. 
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This seems to result as well from the recent Vital Pérez
520
 case. This case concerned a 
claim of discrimination on grounds of age as regards the maximum age established to 
access the police force in Spain. The Court recognized that the situation was to be 
analyzed in light of the general principle of prohibition of discrimination on grounds of 
age. Notwithstanding, it furthered that this principle, enshrined in the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights, 'was given specific expression by directive 2000/78 in the field of 
employment and occupation' and 'enshrined in article 21 of the Charter'; for this reason, 
'when it is ruling on a request for a preliminary ruling concerning the interpretation of 
the general principle of non-discrimination on grounds of age (...) the Court examines 
the question solely in the light of that directive'. It thus becomes quite explicit that, if 
the primary law (the general principle per se or as enshrined in the Treaty/Charter) finds 
an anchoring expression in written secondary law, it is the latter the one applied. This is 
moreover confirmed by the fact that the Court urges social partners, in these cases, to 




It is interesting to note, additionally, that the Court has applied the type of reasoning 
explored here also in relation to directives in cases where the deadline for the 
implementation period had not yet expired. In Finalarte, again the Treaty provisions are 
applied to the matter at stake, but this time due to the fact that the directive had not yet 
been implemented
522
 (which does fall at odds with the reasoning in Mangold, for 
instance, where the not-yet-expired deadline for implementation did not prevent the 
Court from applying the general principle, as it seems plausible, but however framing 
the situation with the aid of the written framework of the directive
523
).  
This use of the 'specific expression' technique leaves space to wonder whether the Court 
is not using it to contain the potential uncertainty stemming from the application of 
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unwritten principles, or to at least counter potential accusations in that sense. If indeed, 
in line with the fundamental freedoms cases, once there are specialized legislative 
instruments providing a regulatory framework, the Court will opt for using them rather 
than the underlying primary law, this could mean added legal certainty and 
predictability to the Court's principle-based reasoning. 
In the field of fundamental freedoms, this was especially the case after harmonisation of 
the fields in question. When faced with fields of law where the existing regulation had 
been harmonised at European level, the Court has assessed the matters at stake in light 
of the provisions of secondary legislation and not the relevant Treaty articles 
anymore
524
. The only caveat to this type of operation is that, nonetheless, when 
exercising the powers established through secondary legislation, the Member States 
must nonetheless respect the Treaties
525
.  
It could thus be argued that, when 'specific expressions' of primary law have their 
contours regulated in a written framework, their application is framed and assessed in 
the light of the latter, but always with due regard to the primary rules or principles in 
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Harmonization, however, cannot be said to exist or be envisaged as regards non-
discriminatory measures, namely in the field of employment and occupation. Vital 
Pérez may represent the corollary of a line of cases where the Court indicates that it is 
eager to 'contain' the application of general principles, endowing it with added legal 
certainty. Could a total parallel be drawn in relation to the field of fundamental 
freedoms?  
The status of these areas is often considered the same, with fundamental rights and free 
movement rights being protected alike. The approach taken in the reasoning of the 
Court seems equally similar, at least in what concerns the legal source to apply: 
whenever there is secondary law laying down the regime for the applicability of the 
relevant norm of primary law, the former is applied over the latter, or at least its regime 
seems to lend the contours which allow for the application of the latter. This helps to 
eliminate uncertainties in what comes to the rule of law, by framing the application of 
often contour-blurred norms. This 'contamination' of both areas of EU law raises, of 
course, many questions. Indeed, if both seem to have the same status, why is the 
internalization so different?  
In the first place, the fundamental freedoms seem to have given more leeway to the 
Court in terms of legitimacy. In fact, while the fundamental rights competence was 
'acquired' later, and as a consequence of the freedoms, these are one of the essential 
features of the construction of the Communities and internal market. They are the field 
where the Court can rule par excellence; no other jurisdiction is as well positioned to do 
so. Fundamental rights protection, on the other hand, has occurred as a spill-over effect, 
and the Court's arguable competence is not at all the only existing one. Here, it 
competes with several other instances. Moreover, the asymmetries of power present in 
                                                                                                                                               
scope of the directive can there be any justification for assessing it under the provisions of the Treaty.' 
See moreover judgment in Tedeschi, 5/77, EU:C:1977:144, at paragraph 35: 'Where, in application of 
Article 100 of the Treaty, Community directives provide for the harmonization of the measures necessary 
to ensure the protection of animal and human (...) recourse to Article 36 is no longer justified and the 
appropriate checks must be carried out and the measures of protection adopted within the framework 
outlined by the harmonizing directive.'  In case of minimum requirements’ directives, Member States are 
allowed to introduce more stringent measures, provided they are aligned with primary law. The 
compatibility with the Treaty will, however, dictate that no assessment will be made in relation to general 




relationships involving fundamental rights, namely non-discrimination and equality, are 
stronger, with need for added protection of the Union citizen. 
This 'recent' move of the Court towards an anchoring in the written instrument can 
potentially be explained by the proliferation of written norms. Indeed, if the protection 
of fundamental rights started off as the stage for principled reasoning, the Charter and 
the Treaty now expressly guarantee the protection. This might also be a way for the 
Court to signal to national courts that interpretation of fundamental rights in accordance 
with EU law is made easier and possible, due to the written framework which now 
forms a basis for the application of general principles. Naturally, a harmonization of the 
field cannot be expected; as such, this type of 'containment' of the application of general 
principles leaves leeway for the Court to decide 
5.5 Rationale underpinning this mode of operation  
From the reading of the cases analyzed in this chapter, it seems that this type of 
interaction operates in a very specific niche. In fact, the direct application of general 
principles of EU law to horizontal situations, altering the scope ratione personae of the 
written instruments combined therewith, is especially visible in the fields of labour and 
employment law.  
An explanation proposed to this peculiar configuration is Micklitz's theory on access 
justice (Zugangsgereichtigkeit), which he defines as the mission, for the European 
Union, 'to grant access justice to those who are excluded from the market or to those 
who face difficulties in making use of market freedoms'
527
. In his view, the social 
aspects of the European legal order have been gradually established since the creation of 
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. Consequently, 'the dominating normative construct in EU labour, 
anti-discrimination and consumer law is (...) the result of a market driven European 
integration through regulatory law'
529
. The legislative movement was, in his view, 
'meant to bring the consumer and the worker into a legal position where she or he is 
equipped with the necessary set of rights so as to participate and reap the benefits of the 
internal market and the most competitive economy'
530
. This narrative thus focuses on 
the understanding of the evolution of the European Communities, first, and the Union, 
after, as a constant, still ongoing, process. Micklitz notes that consumer law is a recent 
addition, compared to the social facet, which has been developed throughout the past 50 
years. Anti-discrimination, however, has existed as an underlying value since the Treaty 
of Rome in the areas of labour and employment law, which is reflected in both the 
legislation and case-law of the Court
531
. According to Micklitz, it operates as a 'bridge', 
connecting labour law and consumer law
532
.  
In developing this line of thought, Micklitz uses Mangold and Kücükdeveci as examples 
of the model of access justice. He claims the doctrine stemming from these cases, with 
the recognition of potential horizontal application of a general principle, 'lies at the heart 
of the European principle of access justice, as it would allow to guarantee access of EU 
workers to the labour market, access of EU consumers to the consumer market and 
access of EU citizens to all sorts of services, so long as they come under the scope of 
EU law.'
533
 The aim is hence not to seek redistributive justice, as happens at national 
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level, but rather guarantee that EU consumers and workers are equipped with the set of 
rights to participate in and enjoy the competitive benefits of the internal market. The 
regulatory aims are hence turned towards the guarantee of a social dimension to market 




With particular regard to the anti-discrimination directives, Micklitz claims that they 
'allow for the establishment of equal access conditions', but that the rules enshrined 
therein 'cannot be used to establish equal standards for men and women at the most 
favourable level'
535
. This seems to suggest that indeed the objective sought by the 
legislation may be one of ‘access justice’, and not the application of social justice 
throughout the Member States. 
While the argument is convincing, in particular due to the peculiar nature of the EU, 
developed around the concretisation of an internal market, it incurs the risk of 
presenting a too reductive approach. It is true that, from the 50's, the nationals of the 
Member States have operated as economic factors, whose fundamental freedoms 
dictated the ever stretching dimension of the Community market. Notwithstanding, it is 
apparent that the development of the case law has equally accompanied the affirmation 
of the individuals as free-moving citizens of the European Union, whose genuine 
enjoyment of rights is to be safeguarded, sometimes independently from the existence 
of a cross-border factor
536
. 
It is, indeed, true that the interplay between fundamental rights and fundamental 
freedoms has not always tipped the scale in favour of the first. The Viking and Laval 
                                                                                                                                               
compliance test with the Charter of Fundamental Rights governed by access justice as the overall 
horizontal yardstick.' 
534
 Ibid., at p.23 
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saga can attest the difficulties found by the Court in that realm
537
. Nonetheless, the 
recent developments, together with the now certain accession of the Union to the 
European Convention on Human Rights, as dictated by Lisbon, seem to foster the 
understanding of the Union as a fundamental rights polity. The fact that such 
progression has made its way through areas such as employment and labour law can 
arguably be explained by the fact that these were the areas triggered more frequently, 
due to their natural connection to the exercise of the fundamental freedoms. This is 
especially true in light of the fact that European citizenship is thought of as the corollary 
of the status to be achieved and enjoyed by the nationals of the Member States. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has focused on one of the most controversial areas of use of the principle-
based reasoning by the Court. The growth of fundamental rights claims in connection 
with secondary law instruments, and the way such rulings have been anchored on 
general principles, which were applied to the situations at stake, raised doubts with 
regard to the ever denied horizontal direct effect of directives. 
Notwithstanding that fact, these cases are a prime example of how the combined 
application of norms, even of different ranks, in EU law, can lead to results which 
would not have been achieved by the isolated application of each of them, individually. 
Indeed, the situation allows for the invocation of the general principle due to the 
existence of a factor which is capable of bringing it to the scope of application of EU 
law – the so-called ‘trigger’. The latter provides the bridge between the general 
principle of EU law and the legislative instrument to be applied, permitting the 
combination process. Some doubts, however, remain, with regard to the conditions in 
which this operation is developed. 
 On another note, it has been questioned whether the application of the framework of 
the written secondary law instrument as a way to shape the general principle of EU law 
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to which it gives expression can be seen as an attempt, on the CJEU’s part, to somewhat 
‘limit’ the application of the principle – or, in other words, allow for added certainty in 
the application. This was done in parallel with a look at the regime applicable to 
fundamental freedoms’ case-law, where harmonization dictated that the parties would 
have to invoke the secondary law instrument rather than the Treaty provisions. It is 
unclear whether the same can be said in relation to the cases analyzed here, especially in 
the absence of the harmonization possibility; however, it might be that the Court is 
trying to make it easier for individuals and national courts to shape the application of 
general principles. 
Finally, the potential reasons underlying this mode of operation were discussed, with 
reference to a theory of ‘access justice’. The findings, nevertheless, seem to indicate 
that something beyond the economic factors of equal market access seems to be at the 
core of the Court’s rulings, especially in light of the position ‘citizenship’ as a status has 




CHAPTER VI: GENERAL PRINCIPLES AS TOOLS TO STRUCTURE 
THE RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN EU LAW AND NATIONAL LAW, 
VIA SECONDARY LAW 
Foreword 
In the previous chapters, the analysis of the interaction of general principles with other 
legal sources was focused on the effects achieved therewith, and the impact on the 
scope of application of EU law in what comes, first, to the subject matter covered and, 
secondly, to the relationship brought within that same scope. The focus of this chapter is 
a different one, but it nonetheless purports to show yet another type of interaction of 
general principles with other legal sources. This is the case where general principles are 
used by the Court as a tool to structure, via the available secondary legislation, the 
relationship between EU law and the actions of national authorities towards its 
application or implementation. 
While one can argue that, in fact, the topic of this chapter also covers the relationships 
tackled in the previous ones, if taken generally, it should be noted that the roles are a bit 
different here. Indeed, the peculiarity of the mode of operation isolated in this chapter is 
the role played by national law. In the previous chapters the latter assumed a more 
muted role, being subject to the application of EU law in a more passive way. Indeed, 
national law was invoked as an inspiration to the general principles deployed, but there 
was a certain distancing of the sources – the link was not very direct. This is not the 
case of the areas analyzed here. In what comes to both general principles of civil law 
and general principles of criminal law, albeit there is a clear European law component, 
the role assumed by national law is much more active, with the legal instruments of the 
Member State providing for a direct and concrete reference to the principle at stake. 
This analysis will first start with what could be called a new trend on general principles 
– the creation or discovery of general principles of civil law. In these cases, the Court 
abandons the dual relationship between the principle and the written instrument at stake, 
as seen above, inserting a third element in the game: national legal concepts. The 
relationship is hence more of a ‘triangular’ nature and the effects are different, with a 




The second strand of interesting cases in what comes to this mode of operation of 
general principles is that observed when criminal law matters are brought within the 
scope of EU law. Indeed, it is know that criminal law is a thorny issue and that much 
has changed post treaty of Lisbon, but the cases analyzed provide us with examples of 
general principles being used to help national authorities in the implementation of EU 
law with a very restrictive reading of the objectives contained therein. 
This analysis will ultimately show equally that general principles of EU law are not 
necessarily a tool used for unbridled expansion of EU law and extension of its scope of 
application. As judicial devices, they serve several different purposes - and here their 
restrictive capacity is clearly visible. They provide an orientating function, pointing at 
the underlying objective which shall be given prevalence in the application of EU law. 
However, more than that, they guide national authorities in this application, permitting a 
narrow reading which safeguards certain values and objectives of the EU. 
6.1 General Principles of (European?) Private Law 
When reading the interactions presented in the previous chapters, one might question 
whether this type of ‘behaviour’ of the general principles would be confined to very 
specific expressions thereof contained in secondary law instruments or Treaty 
provisions. As regards the mode of operation, it has been argued that two types of 
situations are usually at stake: one where the principle is used as a strong interpretative 
tool which allows for a modification of the scope of application of the instrument; the 
other relating to the direct application of the principle to a situation, triggered by the 
existing regulatory framework and affecting a horizontal relationship. In both cases, the 
instruments used in combination with the general principles are said to be an expression 
of the latter. 
In recent years, however, a different mode of operation seems to have started surfacing 
the rulings of the Court. Indeed, especially connected to the development of consumer 
law, principles typically found in the national legal systems, relating to the structure of 






. Presented as ‘general principles of civil law’, they pave the way for a different 
type of principle based reasoning of the Court: the ‘dual’ relationship observed in the 
previous two chapters gives the floor to a more blatantly ‘triangular’ one, with a 
potential of correction of national law by EU law which can lead to further development 
of the scope of application of the latter. 
6.1.1 General principles with impact in private relationships: a clarification 
The debate on General Principles of EU law and European Private or Civil law is often 
tamed by obscurity. In the first place, the conception of the EU as a private law actor is 
a more recent thing than the consideration of the system as a constitutional one
539
. On 
the other hand, most of the literature, when addressing European civil law, looks at the 
influence of the general principles in private law relationships in general, independently 
of the nature of the principles at stake. A quick look at scholarly articles on the matter 
will allow the conclusion that many of the titles which seem to promise an insight on 
the matter dealt with in this chapter, will be, after all, concerned with the application of 
general principles of EU law in disputes between individuals in general. They do not 
necessarily focus on civil law matters per se, nor on the principles typically drawn from 
national private law concepts. This gives rise to a ‘melting pot’ of extremely different 
case scenarios, where rulings such as Defrenne or Mangold are addressed as raising the 
same sets of problems as the cases which will be dealt with in this section. 
In my view, this approach is wrong. Whilst it is undeniable that both situations have a 
bearing on the relationships of private parties, and the fact that one can potentially 
assume that all the principles at stake have constitutional status in the EU law 
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, it is also true that the mode in which they are retrieved from their 
respective sources differ. Indeed, the civil law principles here addressed concern 
contractual relations established at national level, mainly connected to consumer law 
issues. They are treated with reference to the national civil codes or other civil law 
legislation
541
, being associated with a particular branch of law. Other general principles 
with a bearing in substantive individual relationships, as presented in chapter IV, have a 
different formation. In spite of their presentation often being connected to fundamental 
individual rights (cf., namely, the general principles protected as fundamental rights 
under the Charter and article 6 TEU) and in which sense they configure, indeed, private 
rights, they stem from constitutionally protected values. These depend on public 
recognition and are opposable to individuals and public authorities alike. Their 
application is made with anchorage in a public law instrument – other written sources of 
EU law, as seen above – to nevertheless impact on a relationship between private 
individuals. Their pervasive nature dictates so. 
For the sake of clarity, and so as to avoid any confusion, I shall adopt here a distinction, 
put forward by Reich
542
 and mentioned (although somehow not exactly followed) by 
Groussot and Iidgard
543
, between general principles of EU law which have an impact of 
civil law relations (and hence potential horizontal direct effect between private parties – 
the Defrenne, Mangold, Kücükdeveci line of rulings) and general principles of EU civil 
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See Purnhagen, K., ‘Principles of European Private or Civil Law? A Reminder of the Symbiotic 
Relationship between the ECJ and the DCFR in a Pluralistic European Private Law’, in ELJ, 2012, 
Vol.18 (6), November 2012, p.844-867, at p.851 
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 In this sense, see as well Comparato, G., and Micklitz, H-W., ‘Regulated Autonomy between Markey 
Freedoms’, in Bernitz, U. (et al.), General Principles of EU law and European Private law (cit. supra), p. 
121-153, at p.125 and ff. 
542
 Reich, N., General Principles of EU Civil Law, Intersentia, 2014, at p.6. Reich, however, puts the 
emphasis of his analysis on ‘the acquis communautaire, that is to general principles not of civil law in the 
EU or principles common to the Member States based on a comparative analysis (…), but to the specific 
contribution of civil law provisions of EU law, whether primary or secondary law in the ‘shadow’ of the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights’ (p.13).  
543
Groussot, X., and Lidgard, H., ‘Are there general principles of community law affecting private law?’, 
in Bernitz, U. (et al.), General principles of EC Law in a process of development (cit. supra), p.155-175 , 
at p.163: ‘two main situations can be distinguished. First general principles may be proactive in the 
context of European private law, e.g. in such fields as competition law or the law of civil remedies, where 
judicial review of legislation is in question. Secondly, general principles may be applicable to relations 




law as retrieved from, and mimicked through, national legal systems which I shall 
address in this chapter
544
. 
It has been pointed out that there should be a differentiation made between civil law and 
private law, in order to resolve the conceptual confusion patent above. In my opinion, 
the problematic of this area does not lay here. It should be noted that, in most Member 
States, the definitions of private law and civil law are concurrent. The term ‘civil law’ is 
mainly used to mark the distinction versus the common law systems. Bearing in mind 
the hybridity present in the EU legal system, it seems implausible to try to establish 
such a distinction, since the Union polity is composed of elements typical of both 
systems. I shall hence indistinctively use the reference to general principles of civil or 
private law when addressing this category of principles which find their core in national 
legal systems. 
6.1.2 Origin of the general principles of civil law 
As seen above, I have focused on the way the Court of Justice has in its rulings 
‘discovered’ and used general principles of EU law traditionally seen as constitutional 
in status. However, especially as regards the newly formed consumer law acquis
545
, the 
principle-based reasoning of the Court seems to be paving its way also in relation to 
general principles seen as belonging to ‘traditional’ private national law
546,547
. Before 
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 See, in this sense, Mak, C., ‘Hedgehogs in Luxembourg? A Dworkinian reading of the CJEU’s case 
law on principles of private law and some doubts of the Fox’, ERPL, 2-2012, p.323-346, at p.335, where 
she refers to principles of private law (Hamilton, Messner) and principles of EU law affecting matters of 
private law (Audiolux, Mangold, Kücükdeveci). She furthermore notes that 'like the principles recognized 
in Hamilton and Messner, these latter principles [of the Common Framework of Reference] appear to be 
of a mainly private law nature, as opposed to, for instance, the ones based on fundamental rights that were 
at issue in Audiolux and Mangold’ ( at p.341) 
545
 Semmelmann, C., ‘The general principles of EU law in light of the public-private-distinction’, in 
Besson, S., and Pichonnaz, P. (eds.), Les principes en droit européen – Principles in European Law, 
(2011) Zurich, Schulthess 
546
 See Hesselink, M., The General Principles of Civil Law: Their Nature, Roles and Legitimacy 
(September 22, 2011), Amsterdam Law School Research Paper No. 2011-35, at p.9: ‘the Court is 
effectively developing, in dialogue with the Member State courts, European private law principles. This 
raises the question whether these principles should be categorised as European in the strict sense of being 
part of EU law (and if so, which part) or merely in the broader sense of belonging, as background 
principles, to the developing multi‐level system of private law in Europe or to a common European 
private law space.’ Also by Hesselink, M., ‘Private Law Principles, Pluralism and Perfectionism’, in 
Bernitz, U. (et al.), General Principles of EU law and European Private law (cit. supra), p. 21-44, at p.23: 
‘although it is not entirely clear what exactly the Court means by (general) private law principles, the 
wording adopted by the Court nevertheless seems to have been a deliberate choice. The specific 





analyzing their characteristics and functions in comparison with the broadly recognized 
general principles of EU public law, one should note that it is undeniable that the 
influence of national laws of Member States is much more visible in the framing and 
application of these civil law concepts. Their nature, as their very own terminology, 
points to a closer link to the national legal systems – a perhaps more entrenched, direct 
and locatable origin. On the other hand, however, the fact that they are retrieved from 
national laws and then Europeanized can also provide the Court with a more legitimate 
leeway to create European principles of private law which can arguably, in the end, 
represent a detached version of the original national laws. 
The general principles of EU private law, seem, on their part, to have been shaped 
primarily by national laws, and then incorporated as such by the EU adjudicatory 
system
548
. Due to their intrinsic connection to the national legal systems, they can 
arguably be used as a departing point for a cross fertilization movement amongst 
Member States, as opposed to a hierarchical intervention of the European Union. They 
stem from national practices and are then incorporated by the Court in its rulings as a 
                                                                                                                                               
particular, the principles of the binding force of contract, of good faith and of unjust enrichment’. See 
Weatherill, S., Case Notes ‘The ‘principles of civil law’ as a basis for interpreting the legislative acquis’, 
ERCL, 1/2010, p.74-85, at p.81/82: ‘Is the Court doing for EU private law what it did long ago for EU 
fundamental rights? (…) So are Hamilton and Messner the first stirrings of a judicial shaping of the 
general principles of EU private law, on the well-known model according to which were judicially shaped 
EU fundamental rights (and some other principles of public law too)?’. See also Bernitz, U., Groussot, X., 
and Schulyok, F., ‘Vision, Essence and Narratives of general principles and European private law: an 
Introduction’, in Bernitz, U. (et al.), General Principles of EU law and European Private law (cit. supra), 
p.1-17, at p.1: ‘freedom of contract, pacta sunt servanda or good faith (…) are examples of general 
principles in private law which could qualify as such general principles – if it can be established that they 
have been pronounced on by EU courts’. 
547
 On the ‘discovery’ of these general principles, see Hesselink, M., The General Principles of Civil Law 
(cit. supra), at p. 9: ‘it is worth pointing out that the Court refers to ‘the (general) principles of civil law’. 
The use of the determinate article (in all language versions) seems to convey the message that these 
principles already existed before the Court referred to them. This matches with the idea that the Court 
discovers such principles rather than inventing them.’ See also Hartkamp, A., ‘The General Principles of 
EU Law and Private Law’, RabelsZ Bd. 75 (2011), p.241-259, at p.255: 'the European courts have 
developed a number of general principles which have their origin in private law. They have been 
developed in a public context. This argues in favour of their nature as general principles, which is 
characterised by generality and comprehensiveness, even if that is not to say they necessarily play a role 
in all branches of union law' 
548
 On the ‘Europeanisation’ of national private law concepts, see Garcia, K., Le droit civil européen – 
nouvelle matière, nouveau concept, Larcier, 2008, at p.170 : ‘les règles européennes de droit civil doivent 
toujours quelque chose à des règles préexistantes. En revanche, l’élément ajouté est, pour sa part, 
d’origine européenne. Les règles de droit empruntées se trouvent ainsi européanisées par l’ajout d’une 
interprétation, d’une définition ou d’une limite européenne.’ ; and at p.179 ‘c’est d’une réelle 
appropriation des notions par le droit européen dont il est question (…). À force d’ajouts européens, une 




harmonization tool (in a bottom-up/top-down relationship type
549
). By creating a path to 
the harmonization of national laws, EU private law concepts can ‘correct’ the 
development of the Member States legal systems in the said areas; as a result, the latter 




At the present moment, the European Union has not adopted any sort of Civil Code. 
Yet, the European Commission has sponsored several projects of a ‘search for post-
national principles of private law’
551
: the Lando Commission prepared a set of 
principles of European Contract Law in 1999 (PECL) and, later on, in 2005, a ‘common 
frame of reference’ was also commissioned to an academic network so as to set which 
basic fundamental principles are to be used in contract law (DCFR). This document was 
published in 2008, being composed of a series of model rules, principles and 
definitions, with special stress on general principles of contract law. In 2011, the 
proposal for a Common European Sales Law, deeply inspired on the previous 
instruments, was launched, containing a section devoted namely to the principles of 
freedom of contract and good faith
552
. The significance of these instruments is not 
negligible, and the Court might be inspired by them
553
, as the Opinion of Advocate 
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 See, on the top-down/bottom-up approach, Hesselink, M., ‘Private Law Principles’ (cit. supra), at 
p.40: ‘With regard to general principles of EU law, i.e. the fundamental principles that are located on the 
level of primary law and thus have constitutional status, a distinction is usually made as to their origin 
between principles deriving from the common traditions of the Member States, on the one hand, and 
principles deriving from that objectives of the EU, on the other. The former could be referred to as 
bottom‐up (inductive) and the latter as top‐down (deductive) principles. A similar distinction could be 
drawn in relation to principles that are not necessarily located at the level of primary EU law. (…) The 
general principles of civil law, at least the ones that the Court has referred to so far, are examples of 
bottom‐up (inductive) principles that are (or should be) derived from the common private law traditions 
of the Member States.” 
550
See Gerstenberg, O., ‘Regulating private Law: in search for a Rawlsian Perspective on the EU’ 
(forthcoming), at p.18/19 
551
 Hesselink, M., ‘Private Law Principles’ (cit. supra), at p.23 
552
 On the need for a body of recognised 'civil law principles', especially in light of internal market 
consolidation, see Hesselink, M., Unjust Conduct In The Internal Market: On the role of European 
private law in the division of moral responsibility between the EU, its Member States and their citizens, 
Centre for the Study of European Contract Law, Working Paper Series, No. 2014-14, at p.2: 'the 
European Union, given its advanced stage of integration, in particular its internal market, is in need, as a 
matter of justice, of a set of principles and rules defining basic private rights. Such a European system of 
private rights and obligations is required as part of the internal market’s basic structure.' 
553
 Hesselink, M., ‘If You Don’t Like Our Principles We Have Others. On Core Values and Underlying 
Principles in European Private Law: A Critical Discussion of the New “Principles” Section in the Draft 
Common Frame of Reference’, in Brownsword, R., Micklitz, H-W., Niglia, L., and Weatherill, S. (eds), 
Foundations of European Private Law (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2011) 59-71, at p.61: ‘The ‘general 





General Maduro in the Hamilton
554
 case indicates. In fact, when, in paragraph 24, the 
Advocate General referred to the ‘principles common to the Member States’, he 
footnoted the Lando Commission’s principles. The same paragraph bears equally a 




6.1.3 General principles of civil law in the academic literature 
The existence of a legitimate role for the Court in the use of these principles has not, 
however, been consensual
556
 – in this, they seem to trigger the same (if not more) 
distrust as the ‘discovery’ of general principles of EU law. Several authors have hence 
questioned whether the CJEU is entitled to intervene in private law matters and 
‘Europeanize' principles which are not of public law origin, but rather belong to the core 
of national private legal traditions.
557
  
                                                                                                                                               
are of a similar nature [to the ‘common fundamental principles of European contract law’ contained in the 
draft common frame of reference of the European Commission]. In 2007, in Société Thermale d’Eugénie 
les Bains, the Court cites ‘the general principle of civil law’ that ‘each contracting party is bound to 
honour the terms of its contract and to perform the obligations thereunder’; in 2008, in Hamilton, it 
mentions as ‘one of the general principles of civil law’ the (frankly somewhat opaque) principle ‘that full 
performance of a contract results, as a general rule, from discharge of the mutual obligations under the 
contract or from termination of that contract’.’ 
554
 Judgment in Hamilton, C‑412/06, EU:C:2008:215 
555
 Opinion of Advocate General Poiares Maduro in Hamilton, C‑412/06, EU:C:2007:695, at paragraph 
24 and footnotes 8 and 9. 
556
Defending the legitimacy of the Court for such task, see Hesselink, M., Unjust Conduct In The Internal 
Market (cit. supra), at p.21/22: 'in order to fill the normative gap the CJEU, in a series of cases, has 
started formulating ‘principles of civil law’, such as the principles of binding force of contract, good faith 
and unjustified enrichment. If the ‘lords of the treaties’, for primary EU law, and the ordinary legislator 
(Commission, Council and European Parliament), for secondary EU law, fail to take their responsibilities 
then some other institution has to step in. For, a European internal market requires European principles of 
civil justice. The internal market cannot be complete and function properly in a justice vacuum.' 
557
Mak, C., Europe-building through Private Law. Lessons from Constitutional Theory, Centre for the 
Study of European Contract Law Working paper Series, nº 2012-02, at p.5: ‘the acknowledgement of 
such general principles is not unproblematic, insofar as the Court does not specify its relation to more 
nuanced conceptions and applications of equivalent concepts on the national level.’ See also Groussot, X., 
and Lidgard, H., ‘Are there general principles of community law affecting private law?’ (cit. supra), at 
p.175: ‘it may be premature to talk about firmly established general principles of Community law in the 
field of private law. But it does seem as if we are seeing ‘embryos’ of private law principles starting to 
develop within the Community legal order’; and at p.163: ‘good faith, unjust enrichment and estoppel are 
concepts of private law, which are making their way within the Court of Justice – but are they considered 
as general principles of Community law?’. See also, on the inherent public nature of EC/EU law, Caruso, 
D., ‘The Missing View of the Cathedral: The Private Law Paradigm of European Legal Integration’, ELJ, 
Vol. 3, No. 1, March 1997, pp. 3–32, at p.8/9: ‘The six European nations that signed the Treaty of Rome 
in 1957 each had an autonomous, self-contained and functionally independent civil code, applied and 
interpreted by a distinct national judicial system. Even where the codes of two nations, for historical 





Gerstenberg argues that, in the cases where the Court has used general principles of 
civil law, the latter are derived from national law and appear as a hinge between EU and 
national private law concepts. He speaks of a ‘jusgenerative influence’ of such 
principles on the development of EU law, claiming that the ‘general principles derived 
from national private law operate as a corrective of EU private law’ by establishing 
‘reciprocity of mutual obligations between trader and consumer’ and ‘emphasizing 
contextual limits to consumer rights’, while expressing the Court’s ‘deference to 
domestic private law’. ‘EU private law’, on the other hand, ‘operates as a corrective of 




Such a reading of the Court’s jurisprudence implies the acceptance of a two-way 
corrective function, which will result in the creation of a more proceduralized EU 
structure, based on a mutual sharing of basic concepts. Through its rulings, the Court 
can in this manner ensure that the application of EU law is made in a uniform way 




                                                                                                                                               
would follow identical patterns or even borrow from each other’s experience in adjudicating analogous 
cases. (…) Given this background, it should come as no surprise that the Treaty of Rome was exclusively 
public in inspiration and scope. At least in principle, the four freedoms the Treaty was meant to ensure – 
namely, the free trans-border movement of goods, services, people and capital – could be achieved 
without reference to the substance and structure of the civil codes’. 
558
 See Gerstenberg, O., Regulating Private Law (cit. supra), at p.29/30. See also, on the creation of a 
common ‘private law space’ for the EU, Hesselink, M., The General Principles of Civil Law (cit. supra), 
at p.13: ‘Another possibility still, is that the Court deliberately refrains from locating the general 
principles of civil categorically (i.e. en bloc) and exclusively at either the European or the national level. 
Maybe the Court envisages a more flexible and chameleonic nature for these principles. (…) they could 
become the ideal tool for further developing the emerging multi‐level system of private law in Europe, or 
a common European private law space. They could contribute to bringing more coherence and 
convergence to European private law.’  
559
 See Trstenjak, V., ‘The ‘instruments’ for implementing European private law – the influence of the 
ECJ case law on the development and formation of European private law’, in L. Moccia (ed.), The 
Making of European Private Law: Why, How, What, Who, Sellier, European law Publishers, 2013, at 
p.90: ‘through its case law on the provisions of the consumer protection directives, the ECJ assures their 
uniform interpretation and application in all Member States. However, the role of the ECJ is not restricted 
to controlling and enforcing a uniform application of EU consumer protection law. For the case law of the 
ECJ also shapes the consumer protection law in force and influences the EU legislator in the development 
of future provisions of EU law.’ See also Fauvarque-Cosson, B., ‘The relationship between the Political 
frame of reference (PFR) and the consumer acquis’, in Kleinmann, J. (ed.), A Common Frame of 
Reference for European Contract Law, Stockholm Centre for Commercial Law, at p.56: ‘there is 
transformation of civil law itself. During the 20th century, many European contract lawyers have 





Others, however, are skeptical as regards the qualification of the principles used by the 
Court in these rulings as ‘general principles of civil law’, which would rank in a parallel 
position to that of the primary-law ranked general principles of EU law
560
. Hartkamp 
claims that the first type of principles do not have the same value as the so-called public 
law ones, as used by the Court. They do not present, in his view, the same 
characteristics of constitutional importance: they are of a lower rank and, as such, 
should not be considered general principles of EU law
561
. Basedow holds the same 
impression: he states that the reasons underlying the use of principles of civil law and 
those recognized by the Court in relation to public law matters are different. The latter 
are, according to him, incorporated in the rulings due to ‘considerations of normative 
hierarchy’, ie: to ensure the effective application of EU law’s primacy; whilst the first 
are rather needed for a more negligible role, ‘systematic and interpretive purposes’, only 
exceptionally being used so as to displace the application of instruments of secondary 
Union legislation
562
. Hesselink furthermore notes that, whereas certain of the used 
principles are generally widely accepted, they may not be compatible with both the 
continental and the common law systems existing in the realm of the EU Member States 
                                                                                                                                               
abuse of rights or unconscionability have expanded so as to serve some form of distributive justice. (…) 
consumer law has thus developed within the realm of private law. Second, there is a transformation of 
civil law by the acquis [communautaire]. (…) the introduction, into private law, of general principles 
derived from European law, based upon values that have been regarded as the touchstones of Europe: 
protection of the weakest but also competitiveness of the market.’ 
560
 Bengoetxea, J., ‘General Principles navigating Space and Time’ (cit. supra), at p.47: ‘such principles 
of European private law do exist but they are either independent from or lower than those of EU law’. See 
also Basedow, J., ‘The Court of Justice and Private Law’ (cit. supra), at p.461: ‘according to a wide 
spread view, the general principles are characterized by their fundamental significance, which is said to 
explain their rank among the sources of primary Union law. Put in other words, the general principles 
take priority over secondary Union law. (…) It is doubtful whether this approach to the general principles 
of union law is appropriate in all contexts and, in particular, in respect of private law matters. It is 
certainly true that general principles are needed in private law too, when it comes to the interpretation of 
fragmentary legislation or to the filling of lacunae. But it is difficult to maintain that all general principles 
ascertained by the Court of Justice are of a fundamental significance.’ 
561
 See Hartkamp, A., ‘The General Principles of EU Law and Private Law’ (cit. supra), at p.256: ‘The 
ECJ also recognises principles of civil law which do not possess the status of general principles of EU 
law, just as there exist principles of taxation law which do not possess that status.’ [referring to NCC 
Constructions]; he adds, however, that cases like Hamilton do not amount to the use of general principles 
of EU law. And at p.257: ‘these principles are not sufficiently important for them to be counted as general 
principles of EU law’. 
562
 Basedow, J., ‘The Court of Justice and Private Law’ (cit. supra), at p. 462. See further p.473: ‘What 
matters in private law is not the priority of general principles as part of the primary law of the Union over 









To my mind, the general principles of civil law assume a particularly important role in 
what comes to the principle based reasoning of the Court. They seem to have a different 
way of operating in correlation with other sources of EU law, but the analysis of the 
case law will allow for the conclusion that they provide leeway for ‘legislative’ 
intervention of the Court. In fact, it is not merely that the Court interprets the instrument 
with the help of the general principle; it is rather that the Court sets aside a significance 
which was clearly envisaged by the European legislator and substitutes it with its own 
assessment by anchoring the judgment in a general principle of civil law
564
. 
Moreover, it should be further noted that the type of relationship here developed is of a 
different nature to that one seen in the previous chapters: while the role of national law 
is more muted, or distant, in the latter, here its influence is directly identifiable. In fact, 
in these cases, the Court uses the ‘general principles of civil law’ to ‘correct’ the 
application of EU directives, by retrieving a general principle from the core of the 
system in question (anchored in national legal instruments). In such a way, the Court 
achieves equally a correction of national law through the ‘Europeanization' of national 
legal concepts. Read in this way, I fail to see how these principles can be considered to 
have a different effect of the other general principles of EU law, in spite of the different 
terminology used (or rather the lack of reference to EU law); in any event, the case law 
analyzed further down will show that this distinctive mode of operation can possibly 
endow these principles with primary law value. 
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 Hesselink, M., ‘Private Law Principles’ (cit. supra), at p.33: ‘especially the principle of freedom of 
contract and the principle of good faith and fair dealing seem to be rather controversial principles that 
may fit well within certain world views but are much less well compatible with certain other reasonable 
conceptions of the good’. And at p.39: ‘the CJEU’s recognition of general principles of civil law, 
however, has so far been entirely apodictic. The Court has given no reasons for their adoption.’ 
564
 See contra, and defending a lower rank/purely hermeneutical function, Basedow, J., ‘The Court of 
Justice and Private Law’ (cit. supra), at p.464: 'the comparison between these statements of the Court in 
private law matters and many others dealing with public law reveals a certain misunderstanding by the 
Court of the role of general principles of private law. They serve primarily hermeneutical purposes. They 
provide and intellectual link between isolated or even diverse rules of law (...), [they] allow the allocation 
of certain issues and their specific solutions (...). They are not meant to be a tool for the legal review of 
Union law or provisions of national law. (...) What is needed for private law are principles of a lower 




6.1.4 General Principles of Civil Law in the case-law of the Court of Justice 
The interaction with secondary legislation is an essential feature in this jurisprudence. 
These instruments evidently provide the platform for the Court to analyze national 
implementing provisions. As referred above, however, they are then ‘corrected’ by the 
application of values which underlie the legal systems in question. This configures a 
particularly interesting use of general principles by the Court, which can arguably fill 
the same goals and allow the Court to interpret EU law so as to overcome limitations 
imposed by the legislature
565
. 
Such instruments play a decisive role in the core of the reasoning of the Court so as to 
anchor the general principle of civil law invoked. The abstract concepts and general 
clauses used in directives – both in the provisions and, especially, in the preface – 
provide platforms for the CJEU to analyze the national private law at issue and consider 
whether it has diverged from the objectives set by EU law, or failed to accompany the 
development of the latter
566
. The analysis of the following cases aims to show that, 
equally in what regards general principles of civil law, directives provide an important 
tool for the application of underlying values which exert a strong bearing in the scope of 
the instrument. This operation, however, in clear contrast with the majority of the cases 
presented regarding general principles of EU law, does not result in a broadening of the 
scope of the instruments as regards the subject matter covered. It is rather the opposite 
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 On the nature of private law regulation at EU level, see Micklitz, H-W., ‘The EU as a Federal Order of 
Competences’ (cit. supra), at p.129: 'European regulatory private law shifts the focus from the national to 
the European level; it tends to disconnect itself from traditional national private law patterns, thereby 
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 Opinion of Advocate General Trstenjak in VB Pénzügyi Lízing, C‑ 137/08, EU:C:2010:401, at 
paragraphs 88/98 
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 See, however, Weatherill: 'The directive's principal aim [in Hamilton] is acknowledged as consumer 
protection, but this is not 'absolute' and 'is subject to certain limits'. The Court's resort to 'one of the 
general principles of civil law' as a basis for approving limits to the duration of the right to withdrawal is 
remarkable. (...) One is familiar with the Court's readiness to animate general principles of EC law 
concerning fundamental rights (...). If such a journey is also to be undertaken in the field of general 
principles of private law, then the potential for systematisation and/or extension beyond the text of the 





Société Thermale d’Eugénie les Bains
568
 is usually perceived as presenting the first step 
taken by the Court in using these principles in the reasoning. Be that as it may, 
reference should equally be made to the Werhof case
569
. This case occurred slightly 
prior and concerned a labour contract and the effects of a collective agreement in the 
ambit of the transfer of a business under directive 77/187/EEC
570
. In its reasoning, the 
Court acknowledged that ‘a contract is characterized by the principle of freedom of the 
parties to arrange their own affairs, according to which, in particular, parties are free to 
enter into obligations with each other’
571
. It furthermore reiterated the need for 
‘secondary Community legislation to be interpreted in accordance with the general 
principles of Community law’
572
. In doing so, it directly addressed the principle of 
contract freedom and proclaimed its necessary impact in the reading of the directive. 
Let us turn to Société Thermale. The proceedings concerned the charging of VAT taxes 
over deposits which were kept over advanced payment made by clients for a stay which 
then was cancelled. Société Thermale argued that these sums should not be subject to 
VAT, since they constituted a compensation for loss deriving from client default, rather 
than remuneration for the supply of certain booking services and other related, as 
claimed by the Tax Authorities. After unsuccessful appeals, the case reached the 
Conseil d’État, which asked the Court, essentially, whether sums which are paid as 
deposits in sales contracts and subject to VAT should be regarded, in case they are to be 
retained when the reservation is cancelled, as remuneration for a service (which would 
be subject to VAT) or rather a compensation for the loss suffered by the vendor with the 
cancellation of the contract.  
When ascertaining the nature of such payments, the Court, after considering that the 
contractual obligation would exist even without a deposit, relied on the ‘the general 
principles of civil law’ to state that ‘each contracting party is bound to honour the terms 
                                                                                                                                               
Hesselink, M., Hondius, E., Mak, C., Du Perron, E. (eds.), Towards a European Civil Code, Fourth 
Revised and Expanded Edition, Wolters Kluwer 2011, 185-203, at p.192) 
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of its contract and to perform its obligations thereunder’
573
. As such, and as the 
compensation paid is directly related to the price to be paid by the fulfillment of the 
service, it cannot be considered as an independent remuneratory sum. Although not 
directly stating so, the Court seems to have resorted here to the general principle of full 
contract fulfillment so as to decide the case. Furthermore, as Hesselink notes, even 
though the instrument at stake was the VAT directive, the Court seems to have rather 
looked at the notions enshrined in the articles of the French Code de la consummation 
and the Code Civile so as to characterize the situation in analysis
574
. It thus appears that 
the Court made the decision of shaping a national private law principle into a general 
principle of civil law with European significance (without, however, explaining the 
derivation in a clear way
575
). 
Advocate General Maduro had not used the expression in his Opinion
576
; however, he 
did proceed to use it in the Hamilton case
577
. Hamilton concerned a contract for a loan 
with a bank. The conditions therein enshrined in accordance with the Law on consumer 
credit established a notice on cancellation, which provided that ‘if the borrower has 
received the loan, cancellation shall be deemed not to have taken place unless he repays 
the loan either within two weeks of giving notice of cancellation or within two weeks of 
the paying out of the loan’. According to the Doorstep Selling directive
578
, consumers 
have to be given written notice of their right of cancellation, to be exercised within a 
period of seven days thereon, which will then release the said consumer from any 
obligations under the cancelled contract
579
. The national law in question stated that, if 
the said written notice is not provided, ‘the consumer’s right of cancellation shall not 
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lapse until one month after both parties have performed in full their obligations under 
the agreement’
580
. Ms. Hamilton had applied for the annulment of her loan contract, 
also asking for the repayment of the interest paid. Following the proceedings, where 
Ms. Hamilton argued that the national law in question did not constitute appropriate 
consumer protection measures, the national court asked the CJEU whether placing 
temporal limits on the exercise right of withdrawal would be contrary thereto.  
The Advocate General started by making reference to a principle ‘common to the laws 
of the Member states’, which appears also ‘in the context of ‘the creation of a common 
framework of reference for European contract law’. He hence categorizes the principles 
at hand as ‘general principles’ in a way perfectly consistent with the one adopted by the 




The Court began its reasoning by reiterating that the aim of this instrument was indeed 
to ‘protect consumers against the risks arising from the conclusion of contracts away 
from business premises’
582
. It then reformulated the question as being rather whether the 
provision establishing that the right of cancellation is to expire one month after both 
parties have performed their obligations under the contract may be deemed a consumer 
protection measure, in case the consumer was given defective notice on the conditions 
for exercising that right. Then, in paragraph 38, it stated that, in line with a general 
harmonization aim, ‘the concept of ‘appropriate consumer protection measures’ (…) 
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This appropriateness, the Court added, ought to be read in a non-absolute manner, and 
thus subject to certain limits: Member States have to be left some discretion regarding 
the way they define such measures, although always in accordance ‘with the principal 
aim of the doorstep selling directive’
584
. These limitations flow not from the directive 
per se, but rather, as stated in paragraph 42, ‘from one of the general principles of civil 
law’ – the principle of full contract performance
585
. 
After Hamilton, and the following cases Messner and Friz
586
, a trend of principle-based 
reasoning in the area of civil law seemed to set in. In this shift, however, the principles 
seems to interact with the secondary law instrument aiming at a different move: towards 
restrictive interpretation. In all these cases, the matter at stake was at the core of 
consumer protection: the right of withdrawal as guaranteed by either the Doorstep 
Selling directive or the directive on distance contracts
587
. 
Messner concerned the exercise of the right of withdrawal within the framework of 
long-distance contracts. Ms. Messner had made an online buy of a second hand laptop 
whose display, after some months of use, had started malfunctioning. She sought 
repairing from the selling firm, which refused to do so free of charge. As such, Ms. 
Messner claimed her right of withdrawal and reimbursement, but the selling firm 
nonetheless demanded compensation for the use she had made of the product, which 
amounted to almost the same price which had been paid initially for the purchase. Ms. 
Messner introduced an action before the national court, which opted for introducing a 
preliminary reference before the Court of Justice. It asked in essence whether the 
provisions of directive 97/7 should be interpreted as precluding a provision of national 
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law which established that, for a withdrawal occurring within the allowed period, the 
seller may claim compensation  for the value of the use of the goods acquired under a 
distance contract. The Court was here forced to strike a balance between consumer 
protection and the principle of good faith/prohibition of unjust enrichment. It first 
alluded to the efficiency and effectiveness of the right to withdrawal, which would be 
hindered in case the exercise of the rights was to be constrained
588
. Nonetheless, the 
Court recalled that consumer protection does not have an absolute character and that 
limitations can be applied thereto. Allowing the consumer to exercise his/her right in an 
abusive manner would go beyond the purpose of this protection and would be 
‘incompatible with the principles of civil law’
589
. 
Friz followed the same type of reasoning, this time as regards the right of cancellation 
of a contract. In this case, at stake was a partnership contract established by the means 
of a doorstep selling visit. Mr. Friz had, in light of it, invested in a real property fund; 
however, after some years of membership, he decided to cancel the participation and 
demanded retroactive compensation for the entirety of his investment. The effects 
contemplated by the national law were, however, of ex nunc nature – and, as such, the 
provisions were questioned as to their compatibility with the Doorstep Selling directive. 
The Court of Justice was hence again essentially called upon to define the boundaries of 
consumer protection measures. It started by reminding that the general structure of the 
directive, as well as its aim, could dictate a limitation to the consumer protection 
objectives. This restrictive approach closely resembles the reasoning used by the Court 
in an otherwise expansionist movement in Sturgeon – it looks at the general structure 
and objectives laid down in the instrument, and extracts a conclusion regarding the 
reading of the overall instrument and corresponding measures
590
. Conversely, whilst in 
Sturgeon the Court engaged in expansionist reading, here the ‘general principles of civil 
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law’ were invoked so as to justify a national measure limiting the scope of the 
directive’s provision at stake and to approve the national legislator’s decision
591
.  
Notwithstanding the fact that the Court accords to these general principles the capacity 
of dictating a restrictive reading of EU law, it does not preclude it from also containing 
their reach. That stems clearly from the reasoning in the Harms case
592
. Here, the Court, 
in spite of upholding the principle of contract freedom, established that the latter could 
suffer limitations imposed by ‘European Union rules’. As such, ‘commitments which 
contradict the objectives’ of the Regulation at stake could not stand
593
. The Court seems 
hence ready to recognize the application of civil law principles, but without engaging 
into unbridled interpretation as regards the scope of the instruments providing the 
liaison. 
6.1.5 General Principles of EU Civil Law versus General Principles of EU 
Law 
In order to understand such general principles of civil law and to analyze whether they 
have the same hierarchical rank as the general principles of EU law recognized by the 
Court, one must assess them using the same standards. I shall thus point to the existing 
commonalities and differences between the two categories. Starting with what could be 
called a 'technical consideration', it should be pointed out that again there seems to be 
lack of consistency in what concerns the terminology adopted – showing how chaotic 
the principle-based reasoning of the Court stands as well in this area. As has been 
showed, in the analyzed cases, the Court does not use the expression ‘general principles 
of EU private law/civil law’, leaving the reference to European Union law aside. This 
could indicate that indeed what is at stake are not principles of EU law, but rather 
national principles which have to be applied in accordance with an instrument of 
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. Yet, this mere omission can also be read as not constituting 
a hindrance to the qualification, since the same is verifiable with the so-called general 
principles of EU law. In fact, as was shown in the previous chapters, the importance the 
Court attaches to the designation is not always the same, and it varies as well in light of 
the translations. What seems to be determinant is rather the way the principle is used. 
Hence, the formulation, or the lack of precision in the denomination attributed, is 
overcome by the mode of operation present in the reasoning. 
In fact, as Hesselink rightly noted, in Société Thermale d’Eugénie les Bains, Hamilton, 
Friz and Messner the general principles of civil law invoked ‘work in support of twin-
sister principles existing at national level’
595
. It is true that, when tackling the contracts 
in question, the Court anchors itself in core private national law, using principles which 
are inherent to the internal legal systems and widely recognized as interpretive and gap-
filling tools therein. In this sense, the general principles of civil law used in the 
reasoning seem to possess an added value in terms of legitimacy: they are widely 
recognized in the civil law systems and, albeit not especially used in the common law 
systems, they are therein recognized
596
. The ‘other’ general principles of EU law, 
inspired by ‘the national constitutional laws and traditions’ and international 
instruments, are, on the other hand, still source of a heavy debate on what concerns their 
true commonality to the Member States’ systems, since the Court has failed to 
demonstrate what common denominator is used to ‘elevate’ a principle to such status.   
As regards their characteristics, as was noted above, the generality of the said principles 
is assessed in relation to their ‘indeterminate, abstract, programmatic, non-conclusive, 
or orientative character’
597. 
When looking at the principles used in the above mentioned 
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cases, it is indeed true that they do not seem to be sector specific principles, applying 
rather to the generality of contracts under national private law. In this sense, it appears 
they possess the generality characteristic so as to qualify as general principles
598
. On the 
other hand, one must analyze whether they are, by their very nature, ‘substantively 
unconditional and sufficiently precise’
599
, ie: whether they can be applied independently 
by a national court, free of any additional conditions. The principles of good faith and 
full contract performance seem to fit this description, for they do not entail further 
Member State action to be made applicable to whichever contracts are celebrated 
between private parties. Arguably, hence, they can be applied independently
600
.  
With regard to the functions usually attributed to general principles, it is hard to, due to 
the reduced number of existing rulings up to the present point, assess whether also 
general principles of civil law can be used in the exact same manner as general 
principles of EU law
601
. The interpretative function is clearly observable in the cases 
presented above, with the Court reading the directive in light of the underlying 
principle. Nonetheless, while the sample provided might seem too narrow to establish 
whether this type of interaction will strive any further, Messner is worth referring to as 
the most striking ruling and one which better establishes the connection of this type of 
general principles with the other analyzed in the previous chapters. Indeed, it is this case 
where a more blatant application of the principle triggers the understanding of this type 
of principles as legal sources with a force similar to the one of general principles of EU 
law. The Court states, with all clarity, that ‘the only charge that may be imposed on the 
consumer’ in the situation at stake is that of the direct cost of returning the goods, as 
                                                 
598
 Hesselink, M., The General Principles of Civil Law (cit. supra), at p.10: ‘Most of the principles that 
the Court has referred to so far indeed seem to be general in this sense: the binding force of contract 
(Sociéte thermale), discharge by performance (Hamilton), good faith and unjustified enrichment 
(Messner) are principles of general contract law or (even broader) of the general law of obligations.’ 
599
 Opinion AG Trstenjak in case C-282/10, Dominguez, cit. supra, at paragraph 135 
600
 See, contra, Hesselink, M., ‘Private Law Principles’ (cit. supra), at p.24: ‘At first sight it seems self-
evident that the principles of the binding force of contract, good faith, and unjust enrichment, even though 
they are among the most fundamental and general principles of private law are nevertheless not 
constitutional principles. (…) Still, it is not entirely self-evident what exactly constitutional means in the 
context of the European Union.’ 
601
 However, when reading the following quote, related to the information duties in pre-contractual 
relationships established at EU level, one can perceive that such a broad formulation is likely to 
encompass both types of general principles: ‘the incomplete nature of the acquis (…) there are not only 
gaps, but frequent references to domestic law to complement the provisions adopted at European level.’ 
(Wilhelmsson, T., and Twigg-Flesner, C., ‘Pre contractual information duties in the acquis 




results from the directive
602
. There is no room for a different interpretation here; there 
could indeed, arguably, be said that there is a gap to be filled, as Hesselink suggests
603
. 
The situation at stake in the case raised a problem (a duty to pay compensation for the 
value of the use of consumer goods acquired under a distance contract) which was not 
contemplated by the directive’s provisions nor preamble but which, nonetheless, was 
considered to be covered by the instrument. 
This represents a very peculiar type of operation, one which can only be understood if 
the general principles analyzed in this chapter can be read as being on equal footing 
with the other general principles of EU law recognized by the Court. The latter are 
recognized as of primary law status. They do, in fact, work sometimes as mere 
interpretive tools, but that does not deprive them from their nature as sources of EU law. 
Here, in relation to principles of civil law, that aptitude can be equally recognized, 
providing the only possible explanation for the possibility, for the Court, to set aside 
other legal instruments and apply the principle instead. Indeed, if one were to deny their 
quality as legal sources, how could the solution in Messner be explained? 
It hence seems that, exactly as the principles addressed in the previous chapters, general 
principles of civil law have the potential to interfere with the scope of other sources of 
EU law
604
. On the one hand, they seem to be quite particular in their connection to 
national law and to represent a trend which somehow europeanizes concepts, whilst 
allowing for deference to the legal systems of Member States. On the other hand, 
however, they can clearly bear a deep significance in the definition of the scope of the 
European legislation instruments, with an impact on both the subject-matter and the 
relationships at stake. Their impact in contractual relations is quite visible in the rulings 
– undoubtedly, they have potential to interfere not only with the expansion or reduction 
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of the scope contemplated by the instrument, but also with the very core of contractual 
relationships. 
It has been argued that the regulatory aims of national legal orders and the European 
Union are necessarily different, the first concerned with protection of the individual and 
its private autonomy, whilst the latter would focus on the effectiveness of EU law
605
. 
Nonetheless, when reading the cases above, it seems that the principles of EU civil law 
are used by the Court of Justice in such a way to shape EU secondary law so as to make 
it compatible with the exercise of private autonomy in the light of the values protected 
by the national legal systems. The mode of operation used is quite close to the one 
sought with the use of the ‘traditional’ general principles of EU law – indeed, although 
the Court’s natural tendency is one of expansion, some of the cases presented 
throughout this study have shown a restrictive use of principles combined with 
instruments of secondary EU law
606
.  
As regards their scope of application, such as the general principles of EU law 
recognized as public law, it seems that general principles in the area of EU private law 
have potential applicability in all areas where EU law is applicable. This naturally 
entails that also these principles can only be applied in situations where Member States 
are implementing EU law or derogating from it, or otherwise when the measures at 
stake fall somehow within the purview of EU law
607
. A contrario, this seems to also 
signify that no new areas of competence shall be created by the application of such 
principles. However, due to their specificities, as the principles in question are so deeply 
connected to national private legal traditions and concepts, it is likely that the national 
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measures applying EU law will be further interpreted internally. This might entail the 
extension of a principle interpreted in accordance with EU law to areas not covered by 
the latter. As such, the application of a general principle of EU civil law can entail that 
national measures not contemplated in the request for interpretation envisaged in a 
certain reference for preliminary ruling will nonetheless be subsequently read in the 
light of the response given by the Court. Arguably, thus, there is wider potential of 
expansion and ‘intrusion’ of EU law into national legal systems deriving from the use of 
general principles of civil law
608
. It seems that the use of these principles as 
harmonization tools might have as a deep an impact as the principle-based reasoning of 
the Court has had on the protection of fundamental rights
609
.  
The similarities seem hence irrefutable. With the added value they possess in virtue of 
their particularly entrenched connection to national law, general principles of EU civil 
law are equally used as strong interpretative tools so as to interfere with the scope of a 
secondary law instrument. One must further consider the presence of the same types of 
elements in the rulings: the existence of a general principle which underlies a written 
provision, with origin in national constitutional laws and traditions (with arguably an 
even deeper link, in the case of general principles of civil law clearly recognized, and 
used as such, in national legal orders). The situation is interpreted in the light of the 
directive’s aims and objectives, which provide the anchorage for the manifestation of an 
existing general principle; this principle is then applied directly, thus interfering with 
the scope of the instrument. In these cases, however, the principle is used as a constraint 
for the scope, whilst in the cases analyzed above relating to directives the results of this 
interaction vary between both ends of the spectrum. It remains to be seen whether the 
inverse trend will be used by the Court. 
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As the concepts used pertain primarily to national law, and are arguably more deeply 
enshrined therein, one can wonder if this represents a move of deference towards the 
national adjudicatory system. While it is true that there is a ‘generalisation’ of an 
otherwise national law originated principle, so as to make it recognizable at EU law 
level, it also seems that the Court is restricting the reach of secondary legislation by 
according preponderance to a national concept. This can perhaps be dictated by the fact 
that the Court is trying to potentiate a certain commonality in what comes to consumer 
law without, however, superimposing EU law over the much sedimented private law 
systems of the Member States.   
All the above raises the question of whether in fact civil law has an important role to 
play in the EU legal order: is there a niche for EU law to intervene in this field too? It 
seems apparent that national private law and (forming) European private law have very 
similar compositions at the core. However, it is also stems quite patently from the above 
analysis that the creation of the latter, although based on essential values protected by 
the different legal systems of the Member States, is anchored on the absorption of such 
concepts, by the EU adjudicatory system, so as to ‘Europeanize' them and provide them 
with an independent value. Only this can explain that the Court uses such principles to 
correct the implementation of EU law instruments, reversing their literal reading in an 
almost contra-legem way, in some cases. 
After examining the mode of operation and characteristics of the general principles of 
EU civil law, one might question whether they ultimately serve the same purposes as 
the general principles of EU law ‘discovered’ by the Court in the public law sphere. The 
above analysis has shown that, in spite of their potential as gap filling instruments, they 
are majorly used as instruments of interpretation of directives, in alignment with both 
national and EU law. They are used as a way to harmonize national legislations and 
create a uniform ‘Europeanized' approach to certain private law matters. One might 
argue that there are specificities to their mode of operation which dictate a different 
outcome, ie, a constraining approach, as opposed to the usually expanding trend 
followed by the Court. It should, however, be recalled that, also in relation to the 








It has been argued that general principles of European civil law should be considered to 
exist merely at secondary law rank, as an unwritten type of the latter
611
. However, I fail 
to grasp the argument contained in this line of thought. When looking at the reasoning 
presented in the rulings above, it seems quite clear that the principles invoked trump the 
instrument of secondary legislation in combination with which they are being used. It is 
undeniable that they provide for a restrictive interpretation of the directives, imposing a 
different conclusion than the one which would have been derived therefrom instead – 
one which was clearly envisaged by the legislator in their making. 
Were the two different sources to have the same value, the mode of reasoning used by 
the Court would necessarily have to be one of balancing. Here, contrarily, one observes 
that the legislation at issue is superseded by a different source of law. The Court 
interprets the directives in a way which could not be foreseen – despite the reference to 
the aim and objectives – by resorting to a general principle retrieved from the core of 
the national legal systems. This mode of operation is much alike the one used in the 
rulings based on the general principles of European Union law. 
Only primary law norms can surpass and constrain the application of secondary law 
instruments, due to their superior legal status; as such, in my opinion, the general 
principles of EU civil law as used by the Court cannot be considered as principles of 
secondary legislation rank. The way the Court makes these principles operate reveals 
that it attributes them the same constitutional status it attributes to general principles of 
EU law. As was argued above, the legitimacy to the ‘discovery’ of such principles 
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seems even to be further enhanced as regards the first. In fact, due to their closer 
proximity to national laws of the Member States, the concepts are more clearly derived 
therefrom, and thus endowed with a firmer legal basis. 
An additional query which is necessarily raised regards the nature of the law so 
'created': when ‘Europeanized', does national private law become European private law? 
Or are the two, in spite of the assimilation of concepts, two distinct legal fields? The 
role of private law in the national legal (civil law?) systems seems to follow an aim of 
redistributive justice, and guaranteeing rights to private parties in an area which 
ultimately is to escape the State's scrutiny. It is a different type of demos the one 
displayed by the European Union and the Member States, since the interests and 
conflicts arising therein have different origins. In a way, national private law is one of 
abstention; while, at European Union level, it appears as a way to safeguard the 
fundamental freedoms, and in that way consolidates both demos and ethos in the 
fundamental status of European citizenship. 
The ‘Europeanization’ of the standards, however, will necessarily create a neutral 
standpoint for cross border private relationships. In this sense, the establishment of a 
concept which has common features might lead to a general harmonization of the 
field
612
. This will further lead to a standardization of legal features, bridging the gap 
between the civil law and common law traditions present in the EU, permitting the 
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6.2 Criminal law  
As was seen, with regard to civil law, the interpenetration of EU law and concepts 
borrowed from the national legal systems has an impact also in what comes to the use of 
general principles. This mode of operation results in a restrictive reading of the 
secondary law instruments and a look at the national implementing legislation, but in 
the light of principles extracted from the core of national legal traditions. The result is, 
as was argued, a ‘Europeanization’ of the principle deployed, but through a restrictive 
reading of the supranational legislation. Having analyzed the area of private law and the 
intervention of the CJEU through its principle based reasoning therein, which affects the 
relationship with national authorities, let us now turn to yet another field for such 
interaction: criminal law matters. 
Criminal law has represented a problematic field for EU law, one which has naturally 
evolved with the consolidation of the Union as a polity
614
; this has especially been so in 
the recent years, with the progressive expansion of its fields of competence and 
action
615
. The matter has been somewhat settled by the changes envisaged in the Treaty 
of Lisbon. Indeed, the latter 'expands criminal law competence in granting Union 
powers to adopt (albeit minimum) rules on criminal sanctions and not merely to require 
Member States to adopt proportionate, effective and dissuasive penalties'
616
. Particularly 
noteworthy is now article 83 TFEU, which dictates that EU action can be enacted so as 
to 'establish minimum rules concerning the definition of criminal offences and sanctions 
in the areas of particularly serious crime with a cross-border dimension resulting from 
the nature or impact of such offences or from a special need to combat them on a 
common basis'. 
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Albeit these changes are a product of recent years, the Court of Justice has long 
defended its standing with regard to the realm of criminal law. Indeed, in Cowan
617
, 
while confirming that criminal law is not within the realm of competences of the EU, 
the Court introduced a caveat to protect fundamental rights and freedoms. It stated that 
'although in principle criminal legislation and the rules of criminal procedure (...) are 
matters for which the Member States are responsible, the Court has consistently held 
(...) that Community law sets certain limits to their power. Such legislative provisions 
may not discriminate against persons to whom Community law gives the right to equal 
treatment or restrict the fundamental freedoms guaranteed by Community law.'
618
 There 
was, hence, a seed for the development of the case-law also in this area. And much was 
done with recourse to general principles
619
. 
6.2.1 General Principles of EU Criminal Law 
The role general principles of EU law have played in this development is far from 
negligible. In fact, faced with the limited competences in the area, the Court has 
nonetheless recurred to principled reasoning, in line with the mode of operation 
explored in this chapter, as a way to guide national authorities in the implementation 
and interpretation of secondary law. 
Miettinen notes, however, that general principles in EU criminal law have peculiar 
characteristics, often presenting themselves as more specific and interchangeable
620
; he 
furthermore adds that the implications of their use are visible on three different levels: 
'they serve to make at least the protective provisions of Union criminal law open-ended', 
they 'influence the interpretation and validity of Union criminal law instruments' and, 
finally, they have an impact on domestic criminal law, which can be therewith 
'tempered'
621
. While the first two seem to be very much in line with the gap-filling and 
interpretation functions of general principles in European Union law, the latter seems to 
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be consistent with the mode of operation explored above. The analysis will thus focus 
on this type of interaction and its impact in the interplay between EU and national law. 
6.2.2 The Role of the Court  
Before the Treaty of Lisbon, the Court seemed to already be inclined to protect the basic 
principles related to individual protection in criminal law proceedings, even in 
detriment of what would stem literally from EU law norms
622
. There are several 
examples of rulings of the Court where it shaped the reading of secondary law 
instruments in such a way to limit their scope and interference with national law, as well 
as to guide the way national authorities were to act in the situations at issue, by 
recurring to underlying general principles. These principles are, as the other general 
principles of EU law, deeply inspired by the national traditions; on the other hand, their 
use by the Court in tackling issues with criminal law impact at EU level has the effect of 




As in other areas of law, the Court seems to be moved by the need to ensure the 
effectiveness of European Union policies and rules, as well as the further integration of 
the market in its economic and non-economic facets
624
. Consequently, even in cases 
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where the subject matter seems to stray off EU law, the fact that certain policies might 
have an impact on the latter dictate the need for the Court's interpretation, as a natural 
consequence of the primacy doctrine.  
Indeed, the inexistence of harmonised principles in the area created several difficulties, 
in connection with the fundamental freedoms. Vervaele makes especial reference to the 
ne bis in idem principle, whose different perceptions at national level created gaps in the 
protection of citizens at EU level
625
; the Court was hence forced, to deal with situations 
which triggered such principle, to shape it in an autonomous way, which necessarily 
evolved with the integration and consolidation of the EU
626
.   
This shaping has often been anchored in the reading of secondary EU law instruments; 
however, as the cases analyzed in this section show, such reading and interpretation was 
made with a restrictive aim. This testifies to the central role the Court has had in 
'creating' or discovering general principles of EU criminal law in the absence of a clear 
mandate in this area of law. Rulings tackling criminal law provide, thus, an example of 
general principles dictating the way in which directives are converted into national law, 
by imposing restrictive conditions to their reading. This is visible particularly as regards 
the use of underlying general principles of criminal law as a limitation on the principle 
of consistent interpretation. Again here it becomes quite visible that the adjudicatory 
intervention of the Court results in a different structuring of EU law/national law 
relations.  
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6.2.3 Case-Law  
References to criminal law in the rulings of the Court come as early as the 80's, with 
Pretore di Salò
627
. This case raised the interpretation of directive 78/659/EEC, on the 
quality of waters for fish life, and concerned criminal proceedings against unknown 
persons related existence of several dams in river Chiese, which caused changes in the 
water level and hence led to the death of fish. The question raised by the national court 
was, in essence, connected to the reading of the Directive, which seemed to provide for 
a broader sphere of protection to that afforded by national criminal law, with the 
consequent possibility of determining, of itself, the criminal liability in the proceedings 
at stake. 
The Court was fierce in limiting the ways in which the directive can impinge upon such 
a delicate area. It recalled Marshall and applied the same reasoning, stating that 'a 
directive may not, of itself and independently of the national provisions, have the effect 
of determining or aggravating criminal law liability for persons who act in 
contravention of the regime established by its provisions'
628
. Drawing on the constant 
jurisprudence of the Court which entails the limitation of the direct effect of directives, 
one can observe here yet another limitation of the instrument's effects by an implicit 
reference to the principle of prohibition of retroactive effect of penal provisions
629
. 
This principle had been already textually recognized by the Court as a general principle 
in Kirk: 'The principle that penal provisions may not have retroactive effect is one 
which is common to all the legal orders of the Member States and is enshrined in 
Article 7 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms as a fundamental right; it takes its place among the general 
principles of law whose observance is ensured by the Court of Justice.'
630
 Here, the 
Court limited the retroactivity provided for by the Regulation in question, saying that its 
provisions could not 'be regarded as validating ex post facto national measures which 
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This unequivocal status of general principle was restated in Fedesa
632
. It is interesting to 
note that, somehow, the commonality reference is reinforced beyond the reference to 
the European Convention on Human Rights due to the formulation 'all the legal orders 
of the Member States'
633
. Indeed, as was shown above, it is rare that such strong 
commonality is found in the general principles of EU law 'discovered' by the Court.  
On the other hand, the application of general principles often implies rendering the 
directive's regime applicable to the situations in question, sometimes in spite of national 
law provisions. In the cases contained in this section, however, general principles act 
rather as a limit to the instruments of secondary law - they provide an underlying 
objective which has to be respected in spite of, and beyond, the written instruments. 
Sevenster has argued that what happens in these cases is a type of interpretation in 
conformity with the directives – I fail to see where this argument can be anchored, since 
the Court seems to instead be pushing for a reading that goes against what is expressly 
written in the instruments
634
. 
As such, there is a type of control over the application of EU law, with the Court 
indicating to the national authorities that they should rather rely on an underlying 
principle. It is difficult not to notice, in comparison with other cases referred to above, 
that the Court uses the formulation 'of itself', such as it did in Marshall and many 
others. This could perhaps represent its own possibility of contravention, as was already 
raised above: of itself would shield the possibility for the instrument to have the 
precluded effect when combined and not acting independently. Arguably, this can be 
the case observed here as well, with the legislative diplomas pointing at the need to 
incorporate the underlying principles in the reasoning. 
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This obligation for the national authorities to interpret national law in the light of the 
directive, provided the underlying general principle is respected, is equally patent in 
Kolpinghuis. In paragraph 13 of the ruling, when referring to the need for national 
courts to look at the core of the directive and its objectives in order to interpret national 
law, in line with the doctrine of consistent interpretation, the Court limited such 
obligation, stating: 'that obligation on the national court to refer to the content of the 
directive when interpreting the relevant rules of its national law is limited by the general 
principles of law which form part of Community law, and in particular the principles of 
legal certainty and non-retroactivity'
635
. The understanding of this mechanism as a 
limitation to the behaviour and actions of Member States' authorities is clearly set out in 
Arcaro, and furthered in Groongard, both focusing on the obligation of interpretation in 
conformity, but highlighting the need for its own limitation, in light of general 
principles of EU law
636
. 
In Arcaro, the Court stated first that the obligation of achieving the results imposed by 
the directive would impend on all the authorities of the Member State
637
. However, it 
furthered in the following paragraph that this obligation, and the consequent 
interpretation in conformity, would have to be limited if it were to would lead to 
imposing on an individual an obligation laid down by a non-transposed directive or 
determining or aggravating criminal liability, on the basis of the directive. Caronna 
follows the same line of reasoning. The 'wording and purpose' of the directive are to be 
respected so as to achieve the envisaged result; however, in criminal matters, certain 
limits are imposed to this obligation
638
. The principles of legal certainty and non-
retroactivity hence act as a brake to a literal interpretation of the directive.  
In Groongard, the Court stated that 'the obligation on the national court to refer to the 
content of the directive when interpreting the relevant rules of its national law is not 
unlimited, particularly where such interpretation would have the effect, on the basis of 
the directive and independently of legislation adopted for its implementation, of 
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determining or aggravating the liability in criminal law of persons who act in 
contravention of its provisions'
639
. 
This is equally stated in Berlusconi: after reminding that 'fundamental rights form an 
integral part of the general principles of law, the observance of which the Court 
ensures', the Court continued by stating that 'the principle of the retroactive application 
of the more lenient penalty forms part of the constitutional traditions common to the 
Member States.  It follows that this principle must be regarded as forming part of the 
general principles of Community law which national courts must respect when applying 
the national legislation adopted for the purpose of implementing Community law and, 
more particularly in the present cases, the directives on company law.'
640
 Also the right 
to fair trial is used by the Court to guide the national court's action, even in situations 




These general principles operate as a limitation for the domestic legislation which gives 
effect to EU law, preventing a reading of the directive towards its implementation 
which would hinder the value to be protected. This was stated in a very clear fashion by 
Advocate General Colomer, in his Opinion in X, where he confirms that the 
interpretation of a directive cannot violate the principle of prohibition of extensive 
interpretation in what concerns criminal law matters
642
.  
On the other hand, while it was mainly in the area of competition law that the Court has 
developed general principles of criminal law
643
, as becomes apparent, the protection 
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fundamental rights represents a non-negligible segment of such the rulings. Klip states 
that, in interpreting the directives in these cases, there are two limitations in what comes 
to interprétation conforme. The first one is that such interpretation 'may not be contra 
legem'; the second is that such 'interpretation in conformity with Union law must not 
violate the general principles of law'. The latter, he says, 'is of a specifically criminal 
nature', safeguarding legal certainty and non-retroactivity
644
.  
a) The Anchoring Instruments 
Albeit in many cases, directives are the written norms through which the Court manages 
to intervene in the criminal law area, these are not the only instruments used to do so - 
which once again proves the assertion that the role of general principles is horizontal in 
terms of interaction with other legal sources. 
In the X case, the Court made the precision that even regulations, by their nature not 
needing any type of implementing measure, should be read in light of the principle of 
prohibition of retroactive effect of penal provisions. It stated that, 'even though in the 
case at issue in the main proceedings the Community rule in question is a regulation, 
which by its very nature does not require any national implementing measures, and not 
a directive, Article 11 of regulation no. 3295/94 empowers Member States to adopt 
penalties for infringements of Article 2 of that regulation, thereby making it possible to 
transpose to the present case the Court's reasoning in respect of directives.'
645
  
Concurrently, the same mode of operation is triggered so as to obviate to the obligation 
of consistent interpretation. Indeed, after referring to such an obligation in paragraphs 
59 and 60 of the ruling, the Court acknowledges that the area of criminal matters 
possesses peculiarities which make it more difficult to implement such duty without 
hindering the well-established general principles of EU law: 'that principle finds its 
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limits in the general principles of law which form part of the Community legal system 
and, in particular, in the principles of legal certainty and non-retroactivity. In that 
regard, the Court has held on several occasions that a directive cannot, of itself and 
independently of a national law adopted by a Member State for its implementation, have 
the effect of determining or aggravating the liability in criminal law of persons who act 
in contravention of the provisions of that directive.'
646
 
Framework decisions are equally subject to this line of reasoning. Advocate General 
Kokott stated in her Opinion in Pupino, that, for the said purposes, framework decisions 
are structurally identical to directives, and thus prompt the same considerations
647
. The 
Court considered the same. It followed the 'principle of conforming interpretation', 
remarking that 'the national court is called upon to interpret it must do so as far as 
possible in the light of the wording and purpose of the framework decision in order to 
attain the result which it pursues'. However, it inserted the same caveat to that 




In all the presented cases, it becomes apparent that general principles are used as a 
means of restricting the reading of the written instruments. More than that, however, 
they become essential to the definition of the duties imposed on national authorities 
when implementing, or complying with, EU law. This confirms their aptitude to play a 
key role in structuring the interplay between EU law and the domestic legal systems. 
The principle of consistent interpretation, one of the main tasks for national authorities 
when implementing EU law, is hence clearly limited by the general principles of EU 
law. This general guiding principle for the interpretation of written instruments, whose 
legitimacy stems from the very primacy of EU law, does not work as a self-standing, 
invalidating principle, falling before the application of general principles of EU law. 
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6.3 Rationale underpinning this mode of operation 
6.3.1 European private law 
As was noted in the beginning of this chapter, there is often confusion in what comes to 
private law in the EU. In fact, the rulings of the Court of Justice more often than ever 
have an impact on the rights of private parties. However, this section's focus was rather 
on those principles which are intrinsically connected to the civil law systems which 
compose the Union (albeit there are naturally, as individualized, influences stemming 
from the common law systems). In this sense, the matters tackled go beyond the private 
relationships' focus in the sense that what is considered is not only the individual rights 
at stake, but rather deference to the development of the civil law systems as codified in 
the Member States' legislative collection. 
It should be further noted that here the trend is also one of restrictive reading of EU law 
instruments when taking into account the principles extracted from national law. What 
can be the reasons for the choice of this particular mode of operation in these situations? 
Safjan refers to a progressive constitutionalization of European Private law. He states 
that there is a tendency to detach the treatment of certain matters from the public law 
sphere and methodology, hence furthering the use of private law tools. This is done, he 
defends, with recourse to a 'hybridyzation' of legal techniques, where private law 
mechanisms are used in the public law sphere. There is, he adds, a tendency to 'de-
publicize' parts of public law, with the legal mechanisms being used in favour of a 
private law approach. Here, there are two logics in opposition: classical concepts and 
structures at the national level, and the very own goals and new structures/methodology 
of the 'transnational' level. In summation, the private law methodology used is shaped, 
ultimately, by the public goals to achieve
649
. 
This is especially visible in connection with consumer protection and freedom to 
contract. There seems to be a need to adapt EU law to the national systems and 
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therewith attempt a harmonized reading of the instruments, so that no hindrance is 
brought notably to the free movement rules
650
.  
6.3.2 European Criminal law 
As noted by Hinarejos, the aims of the Court when tackling criminal law depart from 
assumptions which are not the same as the ones underpinning the free movement rights. 
While the removal of national barriers allowed for further judicial intervention on the 
regulation, since it gave individuals the possibility to appeal to the Court, hence 
legitimizing the latter to 'strike down the national barrier in question'
651
, the 
development of criminal law is not based on the same type of integration aims. Indeed, 
she notes, '(m)ost cooperation concerning criminal matters does not arise, however, as 
an ‘enhancement’ to free movement but, it seems, as a necessary counterpart to it'
652
.   
In addition to the underlying rationale being seemingly different, this equally points at 
the need, in this area, for the Court to use a mode of operation of general principles 
which gives more leeway to national law concepts. Contrary in fact to the functionalist 
reading in the case of the four freedoms, here the harmonization efforts seem to rely, 
rather than on an independent, European conceptualization, on the principles as 
perceived and developed by the national legal systems. This shows, in my view, not 





This chapter has joined under one heading two very different areas of EU law. These 
areas present case-law based in principled reasoning which follows much of the same 
orientation. The use of general principles in both these areas has revealed mainly two 
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aspects. On the one hand, that there are areas in which EU law intervenes which call for 
a deeper connection to national law; indeed, if national courts are supposed to act as 
lower EU courts in that they secure the correct application of EU law within their 
Member State's legal system, it is also true that, many times, the role played by the 
national laws is more muted, confined to its consistency with the underlying aims of the 
instruments it is supposed to implement. Here, however, the role of national law has 
proved much more dynamic, with a greater degree of influence in EU law.  
On the other hand, the analysis of the case-law has shown that here the use of general 
principles tends to have a more restrictive effect on the reading of EU secondary law, 
rather than an expansive aim. While the Court has been massively criticized for judicial 
activism due to an 'ever expanding' reading of the scope of certain instruments in the 
light of general principles, which resulted in the extension of the scope of application of 
such written rules, the cases presented in this chapter have shown that general principles 
can, and will, operate with a different, restrictive aim.  
The reasons for the choice of such mode of operation in these areas are easy to grasp. 
Both criminal law and private law have a great deal of connection to the national legal 
systems of the Member States. These areas were developed under national sovereignty, 
and were not envisaged as covered when the Communities, and later the Union, were 
created. The latter served a purpose of economic union, leaving these matters, which 











‘By formulating general principles of Community law (…) the Court has actually added flesh to 
the bones of Community law, which otherwise – being a legal order based on  




General principles of EU law are as sui generis a topic as the EU legal system itself. 
Their use has contributed significantly to the construction and consolidation of the 
profuse body of rules which now forms the EU legal order. This work has focused on 
particular legal instruments: general principles of EU law. Naturally, in doing so, 
questions related to the institutional balance arise: the accusations of judicial activism 
and competence-creep are much entwined with the affirmation of the CJEU’s role as the 
supreme court of the Union, expounding a constitutional order. My aim was not, 
however, to discuss the structural dynamics of EU law in this institutional perspective; 
the analysis was rather centered on norms and how they are used to serve certain aims, 
having general principles as reference. 
Advocate General Mazak defined general principles as ‘a source of law which may 
embrace rules of widely varying content and degree of completeness, ranging from 
interpretative maxims to fully fledged norms like fundamental rights or the highly 
developed body of Community principles of sound administration and procedure’. He 
further noted that their function ‘varies, too, depending both on the principle in question 
and the actual context in which it is used’
655
. General principles are thus malleable 
enough to pervade different areas of EU law. 
The interesting fact is that they can do so while combined with other legal sources – and 
these interactions go beyond a rigid application of EU law. In fact, the types of 
combinations vary in terms of subject matter, area and effects achieved, which shows 
the importance of the study of these different dynamics. This is the reason why a static 
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hierarchical reading of EU law does not provide a comprehensive understanding of the 
system. My aim was hence to create a framework to understand the diversity of norms 
and sources at the Court’s disposition and, more specifically, how different norms can 
have different roles and produce different effects, depending on whether they are 
applied individually or in interaction with other. 
A. The framework for the analysis 
As mentioned before, this thesis is not about general principles in general. 
Notwithstanding that fact, it would be difficult to address the topic without looking at 
the existing conceptions relating to these legal sources. The first chapter was thus 
devoted to the presentation of the traditional definition of general principles of EU law, 
the suggested categorizations and functions usually attributed thereto. In spite of the 
profusion of studies of this topic, it soon becomes apparent that certain incongruences 
persist, deriving either from the case-law or the academic analyses. 
The diversity of categories, as well as the functions pointed to general principles, albeit 
providing an initial framework for the analysis, seem to fall flat of providing an actual 
account of the complexity of these tools; this is perhaps equally due to the 
inconsistencies stemming from their use by the judicial bodies of the EU. One example 
explored is the case of the precautionary principle, which, as elaborated by the case-law, 
shows that even instruments which seem to address the same type of realities are, in 
fact, very different. Here, the qualification of such principles as general principles of 
EU law is clearly proclaimed by the General Court; the Court of Justice, however, 
seems hesitant to do the same. Moreover, the use of this principle, expressly referred to 
in the Treaties, possesses peculiarities which turn it into a special case: while its 
potential application in diverse fields of EU law endows it with the pervasiveness and 
flexibility characteristic of general principles of EU law, the way in which it operates 
and is referred to in the Treaties and secondary legislation make it more of a 
‘governance principle’. 
All this is exacerbated by the discrepancies found in the terminology used on the 
subject. Both the Court and the EU legislator use different expressions with the same 




academic comments have not made it necessarily better for, in the attempt to give it 
more coherence, they have often proposed views that resulted in being out-rightly 
rejected by the Court. This is blatantly visible throughout the case-law, but has been 
further aggravated with the division between rights and principles in the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights, which the Court is still striving to align with general principles. 
The fact that fundamental rights are recognized and protected as general principles of 
EU law in accordance with article 6 TEU has raised the question whether all the 
provisions in the Charter could eventually constitute a general principle; on the other 
hand, general principles seem to be used beyond the Charter, still, perhaps in reaction to 
the horizontal clauses (the general provisions enshrined in articles 51 to 54 of the 
Charter). The case-law of the Court has failed, for now, to make any of this clearer. In 
addition, the translations of the rulings from French, the working language at the Court, 
to English are often inaccurate – on a small level, but one capable of deeply altering the 
understanding of a certain concept as a general principle of EU law, with the inherent 
rank and legal value.  
Furthermore, a disagreement seems to persist on the treatment of general principles of 
EU law, as legal sources, pertaining to the level of primary EU law, and mere 
‘principles of interpretation’, which, as was seen, some Advocates-General and the 
Court seem to be prone to recognizing at a lower rank, albeit the distinction is not at all 
clear. All of this creates numerous difficulties in analyzing the concept of general 
principle of EU law. However, using these conceptions as a departing point, I have tried 
to shift the focus of the analysis, rather highlighting the modus operandi to which these 
legal sources lend themselves, instead of a purely ontological perspective. 
B. The Court and General Principles 
Before entering the study of the different modes in which general principles seem to be 
applied when combined with other legal sources, it was necessary to consider which 
role they are called upon to play in the case-law of the Court and, hence, the impact they 
might have on the legal system. This is especially relevant looking back at the 
foundations of the Communities and the Union, with the development of fundamental 




The way the legal system was envisaged is deeply based on a set of common goals to 
achieve. This has allowed the Court to guarantee the application of the Treaties from an 
EU point of view, while concurrently maintaining the respect of the particularities of the 
legal systems of the Member States. General principles were a great tool for this 
teleological approach to EU law: underlying values and express objectives were made 
operational through the Court’s interpretation of norms and gap-filling. 
The proclivity of the judiciary to use these tools raises the question of their nature as 
true rules. Legal theory thus provides a good anchoring basis for the study of principles 
here, presenting the traditional conceptions and allowing for a comparison with what is 
effectively done in the case-law of the Court. The division between rules and principles, 
as suggested by the doctrine makes clear that, in EU law, general principles have a 
somewhat stronger component, in spite of their vague character. They thus resemble 
true rules, in the legal theory sense. 
C. The Modes of Operation 
In light of the considerations made in relation to the categories and functions, the 
suggested framework for analysis was centered on three types of interactions, all 
situated, rather than in the realm of validity control, under the interpretative or 
hermeneutical function, with the consequent impact on the scope and/or substance of 
the norms.  
The first relates to what can be labelled the ‘traditional’ use of general principles for 
teleological interpretation of norms, with an impact on their scope of application ratione 
materiae. It has been argued that the Court does so in order to keep the compatibility of 
secondary law with primary law, without having to set the latter aside. However, as 
observed, this poses many problems to legal certainty, since it is unclear when the Court 
will rely on the provision or bring it to a different result, motivated by a general 
principle of EU law. 
The second has the same type of impact, but this time on the scope of application 
ratione personae. The Court, in these cases, uses the general principle to apply EU law 




problems relating to the nature and effects of directives. Principles operate by being set 
by a trigger instrument and then applied to the matter and individuals in question, but 
through the framework of a secondary law instrument (which is deprived, according to 
constant jurisprudence, of horizontal direct effect). Here the entwinement of the norms 
becomes more problematic: the principle is applied to the situation at stake as shaped by 
the written rules, which the national law was often not designed to transpose. It has been 
argued that this mode of operation, especially in connection with fundamental rights, 
could be explained by a need to provide consumers and citizens in general with access 
to the internal market. It remains to be seen, in this sense, how general principles will be 
deployed when combined and/or conflicting with the Charter provisions.  
On the one hand, this type of interaction might somehow add to the level of legal 
certainty, since it anchors the general principle in a written instrument, hence making 
the application more predictable. The fact that this might happen in situations between 
private individuals, on the other, can arguably pose problems; however, these are easily 
overcome with the understanding that general principles are but a reflection of 
principles protected already under the national constitutional laws and traditions. 
The third is maybe more nuanced, but shows the deeper inter-penetration of legal 
systems brought about by the furthering of the integration process. The two areas of 
focus, civil law and criminal law, pertain in essence to the national legal systems. 
However, the proliferation of instruments, the capacity of EU law to more and more 
affect individuals, and the interpretation made by the Court have led to a great 
development of these areas in what comes to EU intervention. Here, nonetheless, a 
more profound degree of influence of national law in the ‘discovery’ of general 
principles can be noted. Indeed, while in the previous modes of operation the interaction 
seemed to be more focused on the interpenetration general principle/EU law instrument, 
here the national law principle clearly exerts a deeper influence in the reading of the 
European instrument, with the same principle being ‘Europeanized’ and then applied to 
the situation. This type of relationship is quite remarkable, especially being that the 




Moreover, it is interesting to note that the Court uses such general principles to contain 
and restrict the application of EU law, what arguably shows a greater deference to 
Member States in such delicate areas of law.  
D.  General Principles: propelling the EU law medley? 
The Court has been both praised and criticized throughout the years for its rulings, and 
the case-law involving general principles has often been at the centre of attention. This 
does not come as a surprise since, as the modes of operation identified above show, 
their use has the proclivity to produce changes in the scope of application of EU law. 
Their fertility as legal sources, and their interactions with other norms, have changed the 
relationship between the legal systems of the EU and the Member States. Indeed, it now 
seems that ‘no field, even when Member States have retained powers, can be excluded 
from EU scrutiny’, with the legal systems being affected by mutual interpenetration
656
.  
The modes of operation identified show another facet of a peculiar legal system: albeit 
many times studied from the perspective of a rigid hierarchical legal system, EU law is 
indeed much more complex than that, with its different sources showing different 
possible combinations, which lead to different results. The Court has, in great part, been 
responsible for the construction of these interactions. The richness they bring to the 
system is, however, tamed by the effects produced on legal certainty. 
It becomes apparent from this analysis that, as much coherence one tries to read into the 
case-law, there are elements which escape any type of taxonomy. It has been questioned 
whether EU law is becoming a type of ‘total law’
657
, and if the Court of Justice is now a 
supreme court, or even a fundamental rights’ court, in the Union. However, recent cases 
seem to show a certain degree of shyness on the Court’s part, perhaps in an attempt to 
control the effects of certain doctrines. The objective of this work was not to achieve a 
rigid and automatic answer to the way general principles work, but to address a theory 
of legal sources in the EU, and make sense of the interactions taking place therein, 
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having general principles as a reference norm. This is hence an analysis of one 
particular type of norm combination. The study of other combinations of norms within 
the EU legal system would be necessary for a broader understanding of the combination 
of legal sources its complexity entails. 
In any event, if it is true that the birth of the Communities was marked by legislative 
gaps in need of filling, and that nowadays the legal system has evolved into a more 
mature form, general principles of law seem to be an ever needed tool to propel the 
legal and structural dynamics within the European Union forward. In this sense, general 
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